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Abstract 
U.S. Quantitative Easing Policies: Effect on the Global Bond Markets 
 
by 
Haiming Yu 
 
Since the 2007 U.S. subprime crisis, major economies have suffered from severe recessions. Even 
cutting short-term interest rates to almost zero has not been enough to stimulate depressed 
economies. Under these circumstances, the Federal Reserve implemented an unconventional 
monetary easing policy in 2008; the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy. Within this U.S. QE framework, 
long-term U.S. assets, and in particular, long-term U.S. Treasuries, have been absorbed, with 
increasing reserves on the Fed’s balance sheet. This policy was initially designed to tackle domestic 
recession problems: it significantly reduced long-term U.S. interest rates and lowered unemployment 
levels. Due to the U.S.’s role in global markets, these U.S. QE policy effects are certain to spill over to 
other markets and economies. 
This study investigates the U.S. QE spillover effects on ten-year bond markets in both developed and 
emerging economies for the period 2007 to 2016. I apply both Structural VAR (SVAR) model and 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation-GARCH (DCC-GARCH) model to address the interactions among 
global bond markets when examining the U.S. QE spillover effects. The inclusion of both short- and 
long-term U.S. QE policy shocks better measures the policy shocks from each U.S. QE policy. 
Empirical evidence suggests a growing trend in integration levels between U.S. bond market and 
global bond markets during each U.S. QE period. This indicates a more substantial U.S. QE spillover 
effect to the global bond markets. Further, the results also reveal that long-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks will significantly reduce bond yields, particularly in developed markets, across all three U.S. 
QE periods. The results also show limited evidence which supports short-term U.S. QE spillover 
effects on bond yields. This means that long-term assets purchase activities will provide more long-
lasting and substantial spillover effects on reducing long-term foreign bond yields. Furthermore, the 
results show pronounced volatility spillover effects, from both short-term and long-term U.S. QE 
policy shocks, although mainly on emerging bond markets. This significant U.S. QE volatility spillover 
effect indicates that although bond yields in emerging markets may not be subject to U.S. QE 
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spillover effects, as a result of less developed financial market foundations, compared to the 
developed bond markets, they are more vulnerable and sensitive to the exogenous monetary shocks 
from leading economies.  
 
Keywords: Quantitative Easing, monetary policy shock, global bond market, spillover effect, volatility 
spillover, market integration, SVAR model, DCC-GARCH model  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, major economies around the world 
faced severe recessions. The increasing needs to support aggregate demands and ease financial 
conditions led to a variety of monetary policy innovations to deal with this “unconventional” 
circumstance (Klyuev et al., 2009). Of all the unconventional monetary policies applied, the 
Quantitative Easing (QE) strategy seems to be the most popular method of stimulating economies. 
QE policy has developed over time, with various changes made since it was first invented. QE has 
been defined as the means through which central banks increase the market liquidity level in the 
economy through purchasing long-term securities with increasing reserves on central bank balance 
sheet (Bernanke & Reinhart, 2004; Benford et al, 2009). Blinder (2010) later concludes that through 
these asset purchasing programs, QE policy not only increases the size of bank’s balance sheet but 
also, changes the composition of the bank balance sheet as well. More specifically, securities 
purchased under QE programs include long-term Treasuries, agency mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), and agency bonds (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). The main aim of QE policy is to 
lower the long-term interest rates through purchasing long-term assets and therefore spur economic 
activity when short-term interest rates are at zero lower bound. Since the government bond 
markets, especially the leading government bond markets which have a large volume and are widely 
traded, the QE policy of purchasing domestic government bonds implemented in developed 
countries such as Japan, United States (U.S.), and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (see Table 1.1) are 
certain to have large spillover effects to other economies (De Grauwe & Ji, 2015).  
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Table 1-1 Quantitative Easing Programs in the U.S., U.K. and Japan 
Bank 
Name 
Policy Start End Volume Security Type 
Fed 
(Federal 
Reserves) 
QE1 2008 2010 $600 billion, later 
raised 
to $1.7 trillion 
Agency mortgage-backed 
Securities (MBS), agency debt, 
long-term Treasuries 
Fed QE2 2010 2011 $600 billion Long-term Treasuries 
Fed 
 
QE3 2012 2014 $40 billion 
monthly,  then 
increased to $85 
billion monthly 
Long-term Treasuries, 
Mortgage-backed Securities 
(MBS) 
BOE 
(Bank of 
England) 
QE1 2009 2011 £75 billion, 
gradually 
increased to £200 
billion 
Medium and long-term Gilts 
(government bonds issued by 
the U.K.) 
BOE 
 
QE2 2011 2012 £75 billion Medium and long-term Gilts 
BOE 
 
QE3 2012 2012 £50 billion then 
raised to £100 
billion 
Medium and long-term Gilts 
BOJ 
(Bank of 
Japan) 
QE 2001 2006 ¥0.4 trillion 
monthly, then 
increased to ¥1.2 
trillion monthly 
Long-term JGBs (Japanese 
government bonds), asset-
backed securities (ABS) 
BOJ CME 
(Comprehensive 
Monetary 
Easing) 
2010 2012 ¥35 trillion, 
gradually 
increased 
to ¥101 trillion 
JGBs, commercial paper, 
corporate bonds, exchange-
traded funds, real-estate 
investment trusts 
BOJ QQE 
(Quantitative 
and Qualitative 
Monetary 
Easing) 
2013  ¥50 trillion 
annually, the 
increased to ¥80 
trillion annually 
JGBs, exchange-traded funds 
Source: (Bernoth et al., 2015) 
1.2 QE Policies in Japan 
Though unconventional monetary policies, such as the QE policy, have been widely implemented in 
the U.S. as well as the U.K., it is widely accepted that the first QE policy was launched in Japan. In the 
early 1990s, Japan suffered a persistent depression as a result of the Japanese Asset Pricing Bubble. 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) implemented many conventional means, including cutting interest rates to 
stimulate the economy. In September 1995, the BOJ started to cut the overnight rate, gradually 
reduced it from 6% to 0.5%; a rate which remained in place until September 1998. Apart from 
several transient recovery periods, the economy deteriorated again in 1998. Finally, in February 
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1999, the BOJ successively lowered the overnight rate to the zero lower bound (Girardin & Moussa, 
2011). According to Keynesian economics (1936), once the short-term interest rate is either at, or 
close to, zero, the economy slips into the “liquidity trap;” in other words, the common open market 
option can no longer lower the interest rate, hence conventional monetary policies cease to be 
effective (Krugman et al., 1998). New policies must be created in order to resolve these 
circumstances; these policies have become known as unconventional monetary policies. The BOJ 
first launched the Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP) during the period of April 1999 to August 2000. 
This policy generated some expected results, with the economy recovering and prices stabilising in 
2000. However, the economy fell into a further depression with the cessation of the ZIRP in 2001. 
These policies are thus ineffective unless they are continued on a long-term basis. In this case, the 
BOJ had to implement more aggressive monetary easing policies to further stimulate the economy. 
Hence, in March 2001, the BOJ announced the QE policy and began purchasing Japanese 
Government Bonds (JGBs) (Ugai, 2007). The BOJ decided to terminate the QE policy and stop buying 
government bonds five years later, in March 2006, when the key inflation rate rose and was 
expected to remain positive for the foreseeable future. The Japanese QE1 policy achieved great 
results. The QE policy provided ample liquidity to the domestic economy and stabilised the domestic 
financial system, while simultaneously fulfilling the rising liquidity demands of financial institutions. 
The Japanese QE policy commitment to continue zero interest rates,created a perfect environment 
which allowed economic recovery (Shirai, 2014).  
 In 2010, after the 2007 U.S. subprime loan crisis and the resulting global financial crisis, the BOJ 
reintroduced the Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) programs in response to persistent 
economic deflation (Berkmen, 2012). This CME program, announced in October 2010, consisted of 
purchasing government securities and corporate bonds to the value of 35 trillion yen. This was 
gradually expanded to 101 trillion yen in December 2012. The CME program also included other 
liquidity-stimulating components such as equity investments, asset-based lending, and U.S. dollar 
lending arrangements to support economic growth. A key goal of the CME program was to establish 
price stability in the medium and long term, or more precisely, to achieve a 2% inflation rate (Ugai, 
2015).However, this goal has not been achieved.  
After Shinzo Abe became the Prime Minister in December 2012, the Japanese government 
established a new policy package to end long-term deflation and restore sustained growth, named 
“Abenomics.” It included three main “arrows” (components): easy monetary policy, structural 
reforms for growth, and “flexible” fiscal policy. Under Abenomics, the BOJ launched their new 
monetary policy framework in April 2013; the so-called Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) 
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(Fukuda, 2014; Ho, 2015). The government’s commitment to achieve its 2% inflation target (already 
stated in CME) was renewed in January 2013 and was expected to remain in force for two years. The 
BOJ noted however, that the QQE would remain in force for longer than this it was necessary to 
maintain the price stability target. The BOJ planned to double the monetary base in two years, 
increasing it by ¥60 trillion to ¥70 trillion in a year. The BOJ expanded its Japanese government bond 
(JGB) purchase programs to approximately ¥50 trillion annually across all maturities. It also doubled 
its exchange-traded fund (EFT) purchases and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REIT) (Kawai, 
2015).  
Although the QQE policy managed to increase the inflation rate (to about 1%), it is still far from the 
expected 2%. As a result, in October 2014, the BOJ announced it was expanding the current QQE 
program (also termed as QQE2) (Coy, 2014).The QQE2 program would increase the monetary base 
from ¥60-70 trillion set within the QQE annually to ¥80 trillion. The asset size of BOJ, together with 
the monetary base, would increase to approximately 80% of the GDP. The BOJ decided to increase 
the Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) purchases (from 50 trillion to 80 trillion yen) and extend 
their maturities (to 7-10 years). At the same time, the BOJ tripled its exchange-traded fund 
purchases (ETF) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REIT) (expanded from ¥1 trillion to ¥3 
trillion, and from ¥30 billion to ¥90 billion, respectively). One of QQE policy’s main purposes was to 
transform the inflationary mindset. The BOJ was almost the only buyer of JGBs in the secondary 
markets (Ugai, 2015). Therefore, the next step for the BOJ and Japanese government is to deal with 
many JGB related issues, including the management of public debt, and the BOJ’s balance sheets. 
1.3 QE Policies in the U.S. 
In 2007, with the subprime crisis, the U.S. faced its worst recession since 1937-1938 (Blinder, 2010). 
As with the Japanese situation, even with short-term market interest rates reduced to almost zero, 
the economy failed to revive; conventional methods of stimulating the economy proved largely 
unsuccessful. The Federal Reserve (Fed) thus launched a series of unconventional monetary policies 
(including QE policy) to stimulate the depressed economy; it lowered long-term interest rates 
(Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Before the recession, the Fed held around $700 to $800 
billion of Treasury notes on its balance sheet. However, after the implementation of the U.S. QE1 
policy in late 2008, it gradually accumulated $600 billion of long-term securities, including 
Treasuries, agency bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These bonds peaked at 
$2.1 trillion in June 2010. This first round of U.S. QE policy has since been named the U.S. “QE1”.  
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As the recovery of the economy faltered in November 2010, the Fed issued a new quantitative 
easing policy (QE2),which involved gradually purchasing $600 billion of long-term Treasuries by the 
end of the second quarter of 2011 (Censky, 2010). On the 21st of September 2011, the Fed issued 
their new maturity extension policy (MEP). This policy stated that by the end of June 2012, the Fed 
would purchase $400 billion of Treasuries, with maturities varying from six to thirty years. At the 
same time, the Fed also sold roughly the same amount of Treasuries with maturities between three 
months to three years. In other words, without changing the total assets scale, the Fed exchanged 
short term Treasuries with long-term securities (Meaning & Zhu, 2011). 
On 13 September 2012, the Fed annnounced another quantitative easing policy (QE3). The Fed 
implemented a new, open-ended bond purchasing program of $40 billion on a monthly basis. This 
was seen as an effective means through which the Fed could reduce $40 billion per month of 
commercial housing debts (Jansen, 2012). On 12 December, the Fed raised the assets purchasing 
scale from $40 billion to $85 billion per month. Owing to continued positive economic data, on the 
19th of June, 2013, the Fed Chairman Bernanke announced that the Fed would reduce its bond 
purchasing scale from $85 billion to $65 billion monthly. He also indicated the possibility of exiting 
the current QE policy by mid-2014. He mentioned that the Fed might consider increasing short-term 
interest rates when the inflation rate reaches 2% and the unemployment rate declines to 6.5%. The 
stock markets instantly dropped in response to these signals, with a 4.3% decrease three days after 
Bernanke's announcement. The Dow Jones declined 659 points between the 19th and 24th of June, 
closing at 14,660 on the 24th of June (Walsh, 2013). Finally, on the 29th of October 2014, the U.S. 
QE3 policy was discontinued having added $4.1 trillion of securities to the Fed’s balance sheet.  
1.4 QE Policies in the U.K. 
In addition to the BOJ and Fed, the Bank of England (BOE) also issued their own unconventional 
monetary policies to curb the recession. The BOE cut interest rates sharply, from 5% in early 2008 to 
0.5% in March 2009. Unlike its counterparts, the BOE judged that it would be unrealistic to achieve 
the 2% target inflation rate without aditional policies (other than the typical way of cutting short-
term nominal interest rates). Thus, the BOE established a new program whereby they made large-
scale purchases of both public and private assets in March 2009. They announced the gradual 
purchase of £200 billion of medium and long-term government bonds (gilts), which accounted for 
roughly one third of the free-floated gilts. These gilts were valued at approximately 14% of the 
nominal GDP. This became known as the U.K. QE1 policy, and was accomplished by January 2010 
(Joyce et al., 2011).Most of the gilts purchased were bonds with maturities varying from 5 to 25 
years. By the end of the U.K. QE1 period, 40% of the outstanding gilts with under 10 year maturities 
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were purchased, half of the free-floated gilts with 10 to 25-year maturities and 15% of gilts with 
longer-term (over 25 years) maturities were also purchased. In addition to the various gilts 
purchased under the U.K. QE1 policy, the BOE also purchased other securities including commercial 
paper and corporate bonds; however, these securities were purchased in much smaller quantities 
and were sold again by December 2009 (Steeley, 2015). All in all, the U.K. QE1 policy expanded the 
size of the BOE’s balance sheet by threefold compared to the pre-crisis period (Fawley & Neely, 
2013).  
In response to the euro sovereign crisis, and to meet its 2% target inflation rate, the BOE expanded 
the U.K. QE1 policy with further purchases of £75 billion in October 2011 (Churm et al., 2015). In 
February 2012, the BOE expanded their assets purchase scale to £50 billion; these purchases were 
finalised in early May 2012. This was yet another quantitative easing program (the U.K. QE2 policy) 
(Steeley & Matyushkin, 2015). Two-month later, in July 2012, the BOE extended the U.K. QE2 policy 
with another £50 billion gilts purchasing program (the U.K. QE3 policy), which raised the total assets 
purchase ceiling to £375 billion gilts (Bernoth et al., 2015). In September 2015, the BOE announced 
that it would maintain the short-term interest rate at 0.5% (set during the U.K. QE1 period) and 
would also keep the same scale of assets purchase (£375 billion) decided in July 2012 (Lea, 2015).  
1.5 QE Policies in the Euro Zone 
When the global financial crisis impacted the countries in the European Union, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) reacted differently, using more conventional methods, including interest rate cuts. It 
adopted unconventional measures much later than the U.S. Differences between ECB’s and Fed’s 
monetary policies could be explained by the different characteristics of the potency (Ferreira, 2015). 
Unlike other markets which have control over their domestic currencies, the European Union does 
not. It consists of 28-country economies and political partnerships only 19 of the countries share a 
common currency (Euro). All of the member countries must approve political or economic measures. 
Therefore, the ECB experienced significant difficulty in adopting QE policies to revive the economy. 
In relation to the ECB’s government bonds purchase policies, German government and economists 
argued that there must be a balance of both monetary and fiscal policy to manage credit default 
risks in some EU member countries. However, some researchers (De Grauwe & Ji, 2015; De Groen, 
2015) believed that it was possible for the ECB to implement QE policies without creating future 
risks, but only if the interest paid by the governments to the ECB were refunded. More specifically, 
when some member countries stopped paying interests on the bonds held by the ECB, the ECB could 
stop paying interest to the defaulting government. Hence, the ECB would only pay interests to non-
defaulting member countries. 
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 On the 22nd of January 2015, the ECB announced its first QE program of repurchasing private and 
public debts, including government bonds that amounted to between 1,100 and 1,600 billion euro 
by the end of 2016, or 60 billion euro per month (Rey & Mazur, 2015). They stated that policy may 
continue for a longer period until the target inflation rate is achieved. The ECB QE policy purchased 
sovereign bonds as well as investment-rated corporate bonds. There were some special conditions 
imposed on some of the bonds, where issuing countries are under reform programs (such as 
Greece). The ratio of bonds purchased was decided using the capital key (the GDP weights). The risk-
sharing mechanism designed in the ECB QE policy only covered 20% of the total losses by using the 
captial key, while the rest (80% losses induced by the ECB QE policy) were to be borne by the 
national central banks (Watt, 2015). Roberto (2016) argued that the ECB QE policy would directly 
influence the cost of public debt, which creates inflation and depreciates the real cost of debt at the 
same time.  
1.6 Consensus of QE 
There are several commonalities across countries relating to the implementation and effect of QE 
policies. Unconventional monetary policies, like the QE policy, signifcantly lowered long-term asset 
yields, not only domestically, but also internationally, though mainly in other developed markets 
(Roberto, 2016). This, in turn, had a positive impact on the long-term interest rates by decreasing 
them, generating extra liqudity and promoting economic recovery. This process has been 
documented in previous research. For example, Bernanke et al. (2004) found that both changes to 
relative asset quantities and changes in market expectations about the related assets can affect 
asset returns. Similarly, Gagnon et al., (2011); He et al. (2010) and Joyce et al. (2012) found that the 
Fed’s purchase of long-term Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities significantly lowered 
nominal interest rates on Treasuries, corporate bonds, and mortgage-backed securities during the 
early U.S. QE phases (U.S. QE1 and QE2 periods). In terms of Japan, Ugai (2007) concluded that the 
government bonds generated lower yields over the Japanese QE period. Likewise, Meier (2009) 
discovered that long-term gilt yields declined following the initial U.K. QE announcement in March 
2009.  
In addition to the impact of QE policies in domestic markets, previous research has also determined 
that the implementation of unconventional monetary policies in advanced countries (especially in 
the U.S.) not only impacted on developed markets but also emerging ones. For instance, Bredin et al. 
(2010) found evidence of significant U.S. spillover effects in both Germany and the U.K. bond 
markets. Dahlhaus et al. (2014) found that U.S. QE significantly increased Canadian GDP and import 
demands. Fic (2013) concluded that QE policies launched by leading economies (that is, the U.S., 
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U.K., Japan and Euro Zone) affected long-term yields, equity prices, and exchange rates in both 
developed and developing economies. Kim and Nguyen (2009) also revealed that unexpected U.S. 
QE announcements may have led to negative responses in Asian-Pacific stock markets. Moreover, 
Bhattarai et al. (2015) found that the U.S. QE policy induced the appreciation of domestic currencies 
in emerging markets against the U.S. dollar, growth in emerging stock prices, as well as the capital 
inﬂows to emerging markets. Furthermore, Rogers et al (2014) determined that the U.S. QE spillover 
effects on other developed markets were larger than the spillover effects on the U.S. markets from 
the QE policies of other advanced economies (such as the U.K. and Japan). 
QE policies not only affected market returns, but also market volatility. The U.S. QE policies had an 
even more noticeable impact than most. Li & Giles (2015) compared the U.S. and Japanese QE 
volatility spillover effects on emerging markets. They found that the U.S. QE volatility spillover 
effects were more pronounced than those of the Japanese market on the emerging markets they 
sampled. Mukherjee & Bhaduri (2016) found a pronounced increase of volatility in the Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (BRICS) markets during the U.S. QE periods. However, the authors 
noted that these volatility spillover effects gradually disappeared as a result of market adjustments 
or stricter regulations in these markets. Ghosh & Saggar (2016) examined the U.S. QE volatility 
spillover effects on the BRICS markets and some other emerging markets during the tapering talk 
period. The authors noticed a contemporaneous volatility covariance between the U.S. markets and 
other emerging markets, both for equities and government securities. Yang & Zhou’s study (2016) 
concluded that the U.S. QE policy was the primary driver for intensifying volatility spillover effects in 
global stock markets and could explain roughly half of the variations of spillover effects. 
A key belief of scholarship is that only unanticipated changes in the target rate affect financial 
markets, especially stock markets, whereas anticipated changes do not. This finding is consistent 
with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The semi-strong-form efficiency hypothesis states that 
stock prices can rapidly respond to the latest public information. Thus, there are no excess returns 
by trading on that information. Meanwhile, the EMH theory also highlights a negative correlation 
between unanticipated changes of the target rate and stock returns. In other words, an 
unanticipated increase of the target rate leads to negative stock returns and vice versa (Chuliá et al., 
2010). In this scenario, market volatilities tend to increase in response to unanticipated policy 
changes. For example, Gospodinov and Jamali (2012) found that stock volatilities could significantly 
and positively increase after the Fed funds rate surprises, while there was no significant response to 
the expected target rate change. Kishor and Marfatia (2013) showed a significant and dynamic 
response from the global equity markets (36 leading equity markets including the U.S.) towards the 
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U.S. monetary policy surprises. However, the situation was slightly different in the bond markets. 
Bredin et al. (2010) found no statistically significant impact from a U.S. monetary policy surprise on 
the three chosen markets’ (the U.S., U.K., and Germany) excess bond returns. Thus, although the 
unexpected U.S. policy changes were found to influence global stock markets, there was still a gap 
on international bond markets. 
1.7 Research Problem 
The current study examines the spillover effects of the U.S. QE policies on the global bond markets 
following the 2008 global financial crisis, in particular, from both bond yield and volatility 
perspectives. Meanwhile, there is also study on the market integration changes among the global 
bond markets. The results of this study enhances the understanding of bond market interactions 
during the crisis period and provides information for policy makers as well as investors about the 
international political corporation and investment decision making in especially international bond 
markets.  
1.8 Research Objectives 
a. To investigate changes in the level of market integration in global bond markets during the U.S. 
QE phases.  
b. To investigate spillover effects of the U.S. QE policy shocks on the global bond yields.  
c. To examine U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on the global bond markets. 
1.9 Research Contribution 
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of the U.S. QE policies (focusing primarily on U.S. QE1 and 
QE2 policies) on the financial markets (mainly stock markets) or on real economies. However, few 
studies have focused on the global bond markets and even fewer cover the U.S. QE3 period. 
Moreover, previous studies apply either the event study approach or the time-series models. Only a 
few have included the exogenous U.S. monetary policy shocks into these models. This is the first 
study that attempts to assess the cumulative U.S. QE spillover effects from both bond yield and 
volatility perspectives on global bond markets for the entire U.S. QE period (covering all three U.S. 
QE policies).Exogenous U.S. QE policy shocks will be calculated independently from the models and 
distinguished in each U.S. QE phase. 
This research expands scholarship on the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond markets from both 
the yield (return) and volatility perspectives. In order to achieve these objectives, in this study, both 
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DCC-(T) GARCH and SVAR models are applied. Additionally, unlike most previous studies, which do 
not distinguish between U.S. QE policy shocks, here I define both the short-term and long-term 
exogenous U.S. QE policy shocks from three different U.S. QE phases. The results of our study will 
bridge the gap in the literature by identifying the (volatility) spillover effects of the U.S. QE policies 
on different bond markets and assist researchers and investors to better understand the market 
responses and movements resulting from uncoventional monetary policies like the QE policies. 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the research problem and objectives, 
identifies the significance of the study and provides background information about specific 
quantitative easing policies. Chapter Two reviews relevant literature relating to QE effects. Chapter 
Three outlines the research methodology and the data used in this study. Chapter Four reports and 
discusses empirical results in relation to each specific research objective. Chapter Five summarizes 
the study’s major findings, proposes policy implications, highlights limitation of the research and 
provides recommendations for future studies. Ultimately this study argues that during U.S. QE 
period, the level of market integration in the international bond markets significantly improves. This 
explains the pronounced spillover effects from especially the long-term U.S. QE shocks on decreasing 
bond yields in developed markets and increasing bond yield volatilities in emerging markets. These 
results suggest an increasing need in cross-market policy coordination with leading economies for 
policy makers and a higher requirements for risk management in investing in emerging market 
assets for market participants.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Having introduced the details of QE policies adopted in developed markets (the U.S., U.K., Japan and 
Euro Zone) in the previous chapter, this chapter reviews literature about the formation and 
development of the U.S. Quantitative Easing Policies. It also examines some recent empirical 
research that investigates both the domestic impact and international spillover effects triggered by 
U.S. QE policies. The literature about U.S. QE spillover effects is discussed from both return and 
volatility perspectives. Thus, this chapter reviews several strands of literature relating to the 
implementation and effect of these policies. More specifically, the chapter explores the rationale for 
the shift from conventional to more unconventional monetary policies under liquidity trap. Next, the 
chapter details the transmission channels through which QE policy may affect both the domestic and 
international financial markets. Besides the literature which is concluded on the domestic impacts of 
QE programs, this chapter discusses the theoretical basis of monetary spillover effects on other 
countries. Then this chapter reviews the empirical methods used to estimate the QE impact upon 
financial variables and the change of market integration level and the spillover effects. The chapter 
also outlines the spillover effects of U.S. QE policy on different bond yields as well as the volatility 
spillover effect of U.S. QE policy across markets. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the 
literature.  
2.2 Development of Quantitative Easing 
Post 2000, conventional monetary policy has become increasingly unsuitable, especially in the wake 
of rapidly falling short-term interest rates in major economies. According to the classical economic 
theory, monetary policy tools cease to be effective when short-term interest rate reach zero lower 
bound, with no room for further decreases (Krugman et al., 1998). In such circumstances, investors 
are unwilling to invest in the financial markets, regardless of liquidity rates .The possibility of 
alienating investors, however, does not seem to deter most central banks from modifying their 
interest rates. When short-term interest rates led to a liquidity trap, central banks simply adjust 
long-term interest rates so as to inject extra liquidity into the depressed economy. Hence, central 
banks purchase long-term government bonds in order to reduce long-term interest rates. It is for 
these reasons that unconventional monetary policies, such as the QE policy, were developed to spur 
major economies in the wake of almost certain financial collapse post 2000.       
 12 
2.2.1 Conventional Monetary Policies 
Monetary policy has been a key topic of academic discussion since the 1990s. At that time, the main 
focus was on examining and quantifying the effects and transmission channels of monetary policies 
launched worldwide (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992; Mishkin, 1996). More recently, with the subprime 
loan crisis in 2007, there has been a notable increase in research that addresses monetary policies, 
with the introduction and implementation of various unconventional monetary policies 
(Baltensperger et al., 2007; Bernanke, 2012). Some researchers conclude that monetary policy 
typically has two aims (Borio, 1997; Disyatat, 2008; Borio & Nelson, 2008). The first goal is to signal 
future policy stances or more specifically, interest rate changes over time, which refers to interest 
rate policy. The second relates to the central bank’s balance sheet and how they can achieve this 
goal, what is commonly known as balance sheet policy (Borio & Disyatat, 2010). As these methods 
are used to manage central bank reserves they are referred to as “liquidity management 
operations.”  
2.2.1.1 Conventional Monetary Policy 
During periods of financial stability (such as before the 2007 subprime loan crisis), monetary policy 
generally focused on short-term interest rates and used “interest rate policy,” or conventional 
monetary policy. This approach provides information to the markets and is the domain of most 
central banks. Using this approach, central banks set an overnight interest target in the interbank 
money market through signalling the desired policy rate (Bruno, 2015).  
In order to maintain price stability, central banks can lower policy rates during economic downturns 
and increase it during economic upturns. The key interest rate can affect the real economy through 
different channels. Figure 2.1 shows how conventional monetary policy influences the real economy 
and markets through five different transmission channels: interest rate channel, wealth channel, 
balance sheet channel, credit channel and exchange rate channel (Bruno, 2015). 
 13 
 
Figure 2-1 Conventional Monetary Policy Transmission Channels 
Source: https://www.oenb.at/en/Monetary-Policy/How-Monetary-Policy-Works.html 
2.2.1.2 Conventional Monetary Policy Transmission Channels 
The interest rate channel is the primary means through which conventional monetary policy works 
(Kuttner & Mosser, 2002). Any increase in key interest rates trigger an increase in short-term 
interest rates through this channel. This, in turn, increases savings, lowers consumption and 
investments. When the central bank reduces key interest rates, short-term interest rates also 
decrease. Therefore, real interest rates and the cost of capital falls, leading to reduced savings and 
higher investment, boosting aggregate demand and likewise inflation. 
In the life-cycle model (Ando & Modigliani, 1963), household wealth is a core factor of consumption. 
The wealth channel affects the price of both securities such as stocks and bonds, and real estate via 
interest rates. Falling interest rates, due to policy changes, can increase the value of these assets 
(Kuttner & Mosser, 2002). For example, once the central bank lowers key interest rates, stock prices 
increase, since investors discount future dividends with a lower interest rate. Real estate prices 
increase because mortgages are cheaper, thus increasing demand for housing. Growing real estate 
and stock prices increase householders’ wealth as well as shareholders’, leading to higher 
consumption and therefore, to increasing aggregate demand and inflation.  
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The balance sheet channel measures the role of collateral of the central bank’s assets. In a similar 
process to the wealth channel, when the central bank decreases key interest rates, asset prices 
increase, which leads to a growth in net assets in the balance sheet. Therefore, the value of 
collateral on loans increases, thereby increasing lending and investment spending, hence aggregate 
demand and inflation. Meanwhile, the changes of the balance sheet’s size also related to the effects 
of another channel, the credit channel (Bruno, 2015). 
The credit channel refers to the impact of key interest rate on the credit supply. When the central 
bank lowers key interest rates, banks pay lower interest rates on households’ deposits and their 
balance sheet improves as well. Since banks can refinance themselves more easily, they tend to 
finance more loans and thus, increase the credit supply. Consequently, central bank credit easing 
leads to more investment, consumption and higher inflation (Mishkin, 1996). 
The exchange rate channel represents the impact of changing interest rates on the exchanging of 
domestic currency with foreign currencies. When domestic interest rates decrease, domestic assets 
become less attractive than foreign assets, which leads to a decline in the value of domestic assets 
compared to foreign assets. This decline in the value of domestic assets indicates a depreciation of 
the domestic currency. The depreciation of the domestic currency makes domestic products cheaper 
than the foreign products, thereby resulting in increasing net exports as well as in aggregate output 
(Mishkin, 1995). This channel relies upon the openness of the domestic economy; the more open it 
is, the more this channel affects the economy. Transmission via the exchange rate channel directly 
affects inflation (Bruno, 2015).  
2.2.2 Liquidity Trap 
Modifying short-term interest rates is the most efficient means through which central banks can 
influence the real economy during non-crisis periods. Increasing key interest rates can cool an 
overheated economy (Bruno, 2015). During economic downturns or recession periods, central banks 
can lower key interest rates to low levels (even to almost zero) to stimulate depressed economies. If 
the central bank fails to boost the aggregate demand and inflation in this situation (when the short-
term nominal interest rate is close to zero) , the real economy falls into what is called the “Zero 
Lower Bound” (ZLB) (Bruno, 2015). In ZLB, cutting short-term interest rates cease to be effective, 
since the short-term nominal interest rate cannot drop any lower (below zero percent). This causes a 
“liquidity trap,” originally defined by Keynes (1936) as a situation in which economic agents prefer 
holding cash instead of borrowing money at a very low interest rate, hence pushing down 
investment, consumption, aggregate demand and inflation. Therefore, any injection of money into 
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the system through conventional monetary policy will cease to be effective (Farmer, 2012). For 
example, following the 2007 subprime loan crisis, the Fed reduced the policy rate from 5.25 percent 
in July 2007 to 0.15 percent in December 2008. In order to deliver further monetary stimulus, the 
Fed further lowered the policy rate to -5 percent, well below its lower bound of zero (Rudebusch, 
2009). Since the policy rate could not be reduced any further, conventional monetary policies (that 
is, through the interest channel) ceased to be effective. The Fed was thus forced to adopt 
unconventional policy tools (Fawley & Neely, 2013). The liquidity trap raises concerns about the 
credibility of the monetary policy (Krugman et al., 1998). For example, after the Japanese asset price 
bubble in the early 1990s, the Japanese economy struggled with a persistent depression. The BOJ 
gradually reduced the policy rate to zero lower bound in February 1999 (Girardin & Moussa, 2011). 
As there was no room for further reductions, market participants did not believe that the BOJ could 
sustain conventional monetary expansions (Ugai, 2007). Therefore, apart from more traditional 
counter-cyclical policy measures, central banks should institute unconventional monetary policies 
not only to ensure financial stability and spur economic growth, but also to improve economic 
environments beyond short-term interbank interest rates (Bean, 2012; Bruno, 2015). 
2.2.3 Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Compared with interest rate policies, balance sheet policies may influence broader financial 
environments more directly. Balance sheet policy decisions influence the economy by changing 
either the composition or the size of the central bank’s balance sheet (Disyatat, 2008). Central banks 
such as the Fed, BOE and BOJ have adopted balance sheet policies to counter economic 
deterioration triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis. In some extreme cases, central banks may 
decide to change both the size and structure of their balance sheet at the same time (for example, 
the QQE policy in Japan) (Kawai, 2015). These measures are commonly known as “unconventional 
monetary policies.” However, not all balance sheet policies are that unconventional. For example, 
foreign exchange intervention is one of the most familiar forms of balance sheet policy. This 
approach seeks to influence the exchange rate separately from the policy rate by either purchasing 
or selling a certain amount of foreign currency. It can therefore either expand or reduce the size of 
the central bank’s balance sheet. As it can be separated from the policy rate, it can be adopted 
regardless of whether the policy rate is close to zero or not. In other word, in balance sheet policy, 
foreign exchange intervention can be exerted at both “conventional” and “unconventional” times 
(Borio & Disyatat, 2010).  
Unconventional monetary policies fall under two broad categories: quantitative easing (QE) and 
credit easing (CE) policies, conventionally known as qualitative easing (Fratzscher et al., 2018). These 
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strategies are used in response to problems which cannot be solved by many conventional theories 
of monetary policy. Once short-term interest rates reaches a liquidity trap and cannot decrease any 
further, the central bank attempts to lower long-term interest rates through absorbing an 
unprecedented scale of long-term securities, thus effectively enlarging the size of their balance sheet 
(Dahlhaus et al., 2014). The purpose of long-term assets purchase programs is to decrease long-term 
private borrowing rates. Long-term Treasuries are treated as benchmarks for pricing various private 
assets, thus decreasing long-term Treasury yields are expected to decrease the interest rates for 
both private securities and loans (Klyuev et al., 2009). Since late 2007, the Fed started to 
aggressively lower its federal funds rate target (the policy rate). This came at a time when inflation 
was arguably increasing (Curdia & Woodford, 2010). Core interest rates no longer matched U.S. 
policy rates as they typically did after August 2007. At this time, there was a dramatically spread 
between the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) Rate. 
This exceedingly volatile LIBOR-OIS spread on U.S. dollar was induced by the 2008 global financial 
crisis that triggered stress in the U.S. money markets (Ji & In, 2010). Other studies noted that banks 
must take the changes to this spread into account when deciding on their monetary policies (such as 
Taylor, 1993, 2008). In short, unconventional monetary policies, such as expanding the central bank 
credit intermediation, emerged as a means to boost the economy, even after short-term interest 
rates reaches the zero lower bound (Gertler & Karadi, 2011). Some researchers (Goodfriend, 2011; 
Shiratsuka, 2010) distinguish these unconventional monetary policies from QE and CE policies. 
The differences between QE and CE policies have been widely discussed. King (2009) defines QE as 
the purchase of securities with higher liquidity, such as government bonds, to stimulate the money 
supply. In contrast, policies focused on improving liquidity in certain credit markets, through asset 
purchases, are part of CE policy. Other research suggests that QE policy is an expansion of the 
central bank balance sheet (especially the money base) without changing the structure of the bank’s 
balance sheet (Goodfriend, 2011; Lenza et al., 2010; Shiratsuka, 2010). In other words, central bank 
asset portfolios do not alter and the share of each asset category does not change substantially, with 
no new assets added into the holding portfolio. On the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet, the 
increase in monetary base is reflected in an accumulation of central bank reserves. In terms of the 
CE policy, the overall size of the central bank balance sheet stays unchanged, instead, central banks 
alter the composition of asset holdings with some unconventional assets replacing conventional 
ones. Ugai (2015) further notes that CE policy focuses on the central bank’s asset portfolio, with risky 
assets purchasing, while QE policy focuses on the liability side of the central bank balance sheet 
through purchasing government bonds. In other words, both QE and CE policies influence the central 
bank balance sheet, just in different ways.  
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2.3 QE Policy Transmission Channels 
The 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent launch of various unconventional monetary 
policies in many developed countries, has meant that QE policy, especially the QE policy 
transmission channel, has become a hot topic in academia (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2011; Aysun & Hepp, 2011; Bauer & Rudebusch, 2014; Dahlhaus et al., 2014; Ehlers, 2012). This is 
because the transmission channel explains how QE policies can affect both domestic and 
international markets. Benford et al. (2009) outlines several channels through which the central 
banks’ unconventional monetary policies can affect the real economy. Purchases of securities 
financed by the central bank’s reserves increase security prices; higher security prices lower 
borrowing costs, which in turn promotes investment and consumption. This practice increases asset 
holders’ wealth and encourages them to spend their money. The announcement of large asset 
purchasing programs can affect the prices of both target assets and other related assets. For 
example, QE programs purchasing large amounts of government bonds will lower their yields and 
indirectly affect the company bonds at the same time. QE announcements also alter the investors’ 
future expectations.  
Joyce, Lasaosa, et al. (2011) identified five transmission channels through which QE policy may 
influence the real economy: signalling (macro news) channel, portfolio balancing channel, liquidity 
channel, bank lending channel and confidence channel (see Figure 2.2). Park and Um (2015) suggest 
that unconventional monetary policies such as QE policies can influence asset prices and foreign 
exchange rates through three of these channels (signalling channel, portfolio rebalancing channel 
and liquidity channel), which indicates that QE policies not only impact the domestic economy and 
markets, but also the international market due to the spillover effects. It is thus necessary to 
understand the QE transmission channels when estimating the spillover effects of QE policy.  
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Figure 2-2 Unconventional Monetary Policy Transmission Channels 
Source: Adapted from Bruno (2015); Joyce, Tong, et al. (2011) 
2.3.1 Signalling Channel 
QE purchase announcements convey information to market participants about the economic 
environments and how central banks may react to future developments. This channel can capture 
information about future policy rates, and thus is also known as the macro or policy news channel 
(Joyce, et al., 2011). QE policy is far more likely to influence the real economy than conventional 
monetary policy. This is because QE policy aims to alter long-term interest rates. Further, monetary 
policy effectiveness relates to signalling effects, especially in terms of financial indicators (such as 
long-term interest rates), which reflect future monetary policy expectations. The monetary policy 
stance should be assessed in terms of expected future monetary policy intentions rather than the 
current setting of short-term nominal interest rates (Andersson et al., 2006). In regards to the future 
of the short-term interest rate path, the information conveyed through this channel can be both 
direct (explicit) and indirect (implicit) (Woodford, 2012). It not only affects the bond yields, but also 
influences other asset prices which themselves are influenced by relevant discount rates. However, 
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there are many debates about the impact of QE policies through this channel. Joyce, et al. (2011) 
found the overall impact on yields or prices are ambiguous. Typically, safe, long-term government 
bond yields can be decomposed into the sum of the average short-term interest rates over the 
maturity of the bonds (the risk-neutral rates) and the term premium. In specific, the term premium 
can compensate investors for the uncertainty induced by holding bonds for long period (such as 
uncertainty of future inflation rates). Concerns about future inflation rates are often cited as one of 
the reasons why investors sell their long-term bonds (Bauer & Rudebusch, 2014; Kim & Wright, 
2005). QE announcements may suggest lower future rates in the short run, but can also indicate 
higher future inflation rates, which can mean either lower or high yields. According to Gagnon et al. 
(2011), the Fed does not use QE policies to signal future short-term policy rates. Hence, the U.S. QE 
policies may play a more important role in signalling future long-term interest rates.  
2.3.2 Portfolio Balancing Channel 
Research on the portfolio balancing channel1 has been transformed since its inception, in the work 
of Tobin (1958) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973). Based on conventional New Keynesian theories, QE 
policies cannot influence broader economic environments. Eggertsson (2003) claims that there are 
no portfolio balance effects for QE policies since the decrease in private sector portfolio risks can be 
offset by a corresponding increase in the riskiness of public sector portfolios due to the uncertainty 
of future taxes and spending. He suggests that the cancelling out of these risks makes QE policies 
ineffective in the portfolio rebalancing channel. However, other studies (Andrés et al., 2004; 
Harrison, 2012) argue that if incomplete markets, financial frictions, and imperfect substitutes 
between different assets have been taken into consideration, then QE policies can influence asset 
prices by altering the supply and maturity structure of different securities. Bernanke (2010) contends 
that QE policies work primarily through the portfolio balancing channel by altering the quantity of 
various securities held by the public. Based on the assumption of imperfect substitutability between 
different assets, QE purchasing programs lead investors’ to rebalance their asset portfolios. The 
changes in net supply of one asset within investors’ portfolios influence their yields and other 
relative assets. Impacts can be felt immediately after QE policy announcements may take longer, as 
investors adjust their portfolios. When the central bank absorbs securities (such as long-term 
Treasuries), sellers’ money increases. Since money cannot be a perfect substitute for the sold 
securities, sellers must rebalance their portfolios through purchasing better substitute securities 
(Dale, 2010; Joyce, Lasaosa, et al., 2011). During this process, security prices will continue to increase 
                                                          
1 Portfolio balance channel is also known as the “term premium” channel (Glick & Leduc, 2012) or the 
“duration” channel (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). 
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until investors are willing to maintain the overall supplies of securities and money. Yields and 
borrowing costs will decrease, which in turn stimulates spending through raising asset holders’ total 
wealth. As QE policies (especially the U.S. QE policies) purchase large scale, long-term Treasuries and 
other long-term risky assets, they may also reduce the term premium (the spread between long-
term and short-term interest rates) and risk premium (spread between risky securities and the risk-
neutral securities) through the portfolio rebalancing channel (Gagnon et al., 2010; Joyce et al., 
2011).  
More importantly, the U.S. QE effects can also spread to other financial markets through the 
portfolio rebalancing channel. Since the U.S. dollar is the dominant reserve currency in the global 
economy, the U.S. Treasuries play a special role in the global financial markets and cannot be 
perfectly substituted by other sovereign or private debt instruments (Neely, 2010). When the U.S. 
QE policy reduces the U.S. long-term bond yields, investors may turn to other securities (issued on 
the market from countries other than the U.S.) of similar maturities, for larger returns. This could 
stimulate security prices and decrease long-term interest rates in financial markets other than the 
U.S. As a result, it effectively injects more liquidity into the real economies. Therefore, owing to 
globalization and concomitant growing market integration level, the spillover effect from a domestic 
monetary easing policy in a leading economy (especially from the U.S.) is inevitable, though the size 
of such spillover effect may vary across markets based on the strength of cross-border transmission 
channels (Chen et al., 2012).  
2.3.3 The Liquidity Channel 
Unlike the signalling and the portfolio balance channels, which may decrease bond yields, central 
banks can raise the yields of some securities via the liquidity channel. When implementing QE 
policies, central banks purchase long-term securities in the market and pay back by increasing 
reserve on banks’ balance sheets. The increasing liquidity level can ease banks’ credit levels and 
allow banks to provide more loans to investors (Park & Um, 2015). Since the reserves are of higher 
liquidity than the long-term securities, the QE policy of increasing market liquidity levels can 
decrease liquidity premium on most of liquid bonds. It is widely thought that treasury bonds carry a 
liquidity price premium, and that liquidity premium is higher during periods of severe crisis. At these 
times, markets becomes more volatile and riskier. Thus, more liquid assets will be valued higher and 
the liquidity premium enlarges. QE policy can expand liquidity, which in turn leads to a reduction in 
liquidity premiums and increases Treasury yields (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). 
According to Joyce et al. (2011), this effect can be temporary and only limited within the asset 
 21 
purchase periods since this channel relies heavily upon the capital flow generated by the asset 
purchases. 
2.3.4 The Bank Lending Channel 
The bank lending channel can be considered as a supplementary channel of the monetary policy. As 
previously stated, QE policy releases a large scale of liquidity to the banks; this means that banks can 
increase their levels of credit and lending (Joyce et al., 2011; Butt et al., 2014). The operation of bank 
lending channel relies heavily on the supply of loans and credits which banks provide. Changes in 
banks’ loans supply also impact upon the real economy (Apergis et al., 2014). When securities are 
purchased from non-banking sectors, the banking sector obtains extra reserves from the central 
bank and a corresponding growth in the deposit sector. Although these transactions seem to 
contemporaneously alter deposits from non-banking sectors, Butt et al. (2014) found that these 
changes have limited impact on the lending sector. Furthermore, they suggest that if the QE policy of 
raising deposits are short-lived in any given bank, then the bank lending channel diminishes. Joyce 
and Spaltro (2014) also conclude that the QE policy effect in altering bank lending is limited. 
2.3.5 The Confidence Channel   
Higher asset prices induced by asset purchases may have broader confidence effects on financial 
assets (Joyce et al., 2011). It may alter investors’ risk appetite and investors’ portfolio decisions as 
well as the security prices (Fratzscher et al., 2018). For instance, U.S. QE policy announcements can 
be considered as a signal of deteriorating future economic conditions, as a result, it may encourage 
the sale of assets or trigger a flight to safety2. This signal can also enlarge the portfolio rebalance 
activities in especially international market and thus, enhancing the spillover effects of U.S. QE 
policies (Neely, 2010).  
2.3.6 Summary 
Previous literature (Park & Um, 2015) demonstrates that there are three major channels through 
which QE policy can affect other countries: the signalling channel, the portfolio rebalancing channel 
and the liquidity channel. Information regarding reducing interest rates can lead to increasing 
interest differential between the U.S. and other countries, therefore inducing capital flows into 
other countries. In turn, this process affects prices and trading volume of foreign-held securities. 
Owing to the imperfect substitutability between assets in various markets, the U.S. QE policy 
                                                          
2 Flight to safety refers to when investors move their capital from riskier investments to ‘safer’ programs 
(Noeth & Sengupta, 2010). 
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absorption of U.S. Treasuries can increase investors’ demand for assets in other markets, which in 
turn lowers the yields in other markets. The U.S. QE program exchanges U.S. Treasuries with 
reserves; this activity can also raise the liquidity level of the financial markets. It results in decreasing 
borrowing costs as well as asset returns in other markets  
2.4 QE Effects at the Domestic Level 
This section reviews the literature relating to the domestic impact of QE programs on both the 
economy and market, focusing primarily on the domestic government bond market. QE policies have 
been adopted in several advanced countries, but the domestic responses varies. Some of the QE 
programs (such as the U.S. and U.K.) have had positive responses in the economy and the markets, 
while there is little evidence of the impact in other countries such as Japan.   
2.4.1 QE Effects on Domestic Economies 
After the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, major economies suffered serious recessions. In order to 
stimulate depressed economies, most central banks launched QE policies (Klyuev et al., 2009). 
However, the response from domestic markets varies. In terms of the Japanese QE program, there is 
a marginal positive response documented in the literature. Several studies (Berkmen, 2012; 
Fujiwara, 2006) have reported a positive, albeit insignificant change in the economic growth and key 
inflation rate, triggered by the Japanese QE policy. Despite the achievement of positive core 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation (0.5% when the first Japanese QE policy was terminated), 
Shiratsuka (2010) argues that the monetary easing policy had a limited impact on output and 
inflation. Watzka and Schenkelberg (2011) found that although long-term interest rates in Japan 
declined, and output increased as a result of the Japanese QE policies, the inflation target was not 
met. One explanation suggests that the BOJ’s impaired balance sheets reduced the potential effects 
of the Japanese QE policy (Berkmen, 2012).  
QE policies in the U.S. and U.K. had more of an impact. For example, Kapetanios et al., (2012) 
reported that the U.K. QE policies kept a half year and one year increase on the domestic GDP and 
inflation rate, respectively. In general, the U.K. QE policy raised the domestic GDP by 1.25% and the 
inflation rate by 1.5%. Chung et al. (2012) claimed that the U.S. QE policy reduced the deterioration 
in the labour market and the deflation in the economy. U.S. QE policies also promoted the real GDP 
level, prevented deflation and reduced the unemployment rate (Chung et al., 2012). Lenza et al. 
(2010) provided evidence that the European Central Bank’s (ECB) QE policies successfully reduced 
dysfunction in financial markets, while also promoting economic output. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the ECB QE policies also promoted the inflation rates although with a lag. 
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Using a counterfactual scenario analysis, Baumeister and Benati (2010) explored the macroeconomic 
effects of lowering the long-term bond yields for the U.S., U.K., Euro and Japan during the 2007 – 
2009 recession period. They found that the shrink in long-term yield spreads significant impacted on 
output growth and inflation rates for all of the sample economies. Their counterfactual simulation 
results also indicated that both the U.S. and U.K. QE polices managed to reduce the risk of deflation 
and collapse in the economic output which occurred during the recession. In short, the U.S. and U.K. 
QE policies were superior to the Japanese QE policy in recovering their economies. However, other 
researchers such as Martin and Milas (2012) contend that since QE policies have been implemented 
alongside other policies such as fiscal policy which also affect the real economy, it is impossible to 
assess the impact of QE policies alone.  
2.4.2 QE Effects on Domestic Bond Markets 
QE policies effects on the real economy, tend to be indirect. However, when it comes to the 
domestic government bond markets, these effects are more direct (D’Amico & King, 2013; Joyce, 
Lasaosa, et al., 2011; Shirai, 2014) (see Figure 2.3). 
The U.S. QE policies have significantly enlarged the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and fuelled one of 
the longest bull markets in American history. The Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index rose 131% since 
U.S. QE1 policy was instituted in November 2008 (Lu & Jennifer, 2015). The Fed’s balance sheet 
expanded significantly during the U.S. QE periods (Michel & Moore, 2014), from $850 billion to more 
than $4.4 trillion (see Figure 2.4). Specifically, there was a sundden surge of the Fed’s balance sheet 
scale in early September, 2008 as shown in Figure 2.4. This is due to the chain reactions in the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. On September 15th 2008, Lehman Brothers declared for bankrupcy. 
This led to the chain reactions where the money fund broke the buck, that is, unable to maintain a 
net asset value of $1 per share. Therefore, the Fed helped to stabilize the money funds by enlarging 
their balance sheet scale. In Figure 2.5, the shaded areas measure the different U.S. QE phases. 
Besides expanding the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, Carpenter et al. (2013) reveal that the 
structure of the Fed’s balance sheet also underwent significant changes during the U.S. QE periods. 
The Fed absorbed more mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the U.S. QE1 phase and yet it still 
accounted for approximately 40% of the balance sheet at the completion of the U.S. QE3 policy, 
which was not on the balance sheet before the crisis. Although the proportion of Treasury securities 
(TS) held by the Fed dropped, they constituted half of the total assets (reducing from over 90% to 
approximately 50%). Furthermore, Figure 2.6 reveals that the Fed gradually contracted the scale of 
short-term Treasuries (with maturities less than a year) and amassed significant amounts of medium 
and long-term Treasuries (with maturities longer than a year). Following the introduction of the 
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Fed’s Maturity Extension Program in September 2011, the Fed issued another $400 billion purchase 
program. Prior to the implementation of the U.S. QE3 policy, there were no short-term Treasuries 
held on the Fed’s balance sheet (Ehlers, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Japanese QE Transmission Mechanisms 
Source: Shirai (2014) 
 
Figure 2-4 Total Assets held by the Fed ($trillion) 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on the U.S. Federal Reserve System 
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Figure 2-5 Changing Compositions in the Fed’s Balance Sheet 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on the U.S. Federal Reserve System 
 
Figure 2-6 Short, Medium and Long-Term Treasury Securities held by the Fed 
Source: Author’s Calculations Based on the U.S. Federal Reserve System 
All three U.S. QE policies encouraged purchasing large amount of U.S. Treasuries, which directly 
affected the supply and demand relationship in the Treasury market. Doh (2010) found that the U.S. 
QE policy lowered the term premium in long-term bond yields by altering the supply in long-term 
bonds. These changes in the term premium are linked to market participants’ risk aversion. During 
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crisis periods, investors’ risk aversion is higher, therefore the U.S. QE policy triggered a more 
substantial decrease in term premium. Moreover, he also concluded that U.S. QE policy may be 
more effective in reducing long-term interest rates when liquidity is reached at the time of liquidity 
trap. 
Similarly, Meaning and Zhu (2011) found that bond yields responded to the U.S. QE announcements 
with decline across maturities. The five- and ten-year Treasury yields were affected the most by the 
U.S. QE policies. There was a reported 0.8% total drop in the ten-year U.S. Treasury yields following 
the U.S. QE announcement. This is in line with Gagnon et al. (2011) study which estimated that the 
total decrease in the ten-year term premium on the U.S. Treasuries was between 30 and 100 basis 
points. Meaning and Zhu (2011) also found that the one-year Treasury yield decreased by about 30 
basis points, which indicates that Treasuries with shorter maturities are less influenced by the U.S. 
QE announcements, probably because their yields were already very low at the time.  
Similarly, Swanson et al. (2011) presented evidence relating to the U.S. QE2 effects based on the 
experience of the 1961 Operation Twist using the event study method. The study shows that with 
high-frequency data, the U.S. QE2 policy exhibited a highly statistically significant effect on long-
term Treasury yields, though the effects are moderate (around 15 basis points). They explained that 
due to the imperfect substitutability between corporate bonds and long-term Treasuries, long-term 
corporate bond yields declined less than the Treasuries.  
With regards to the U.K. market, Meaning and Zhu (2011) revealed that the ten-year gilts yields 
dropped by 0.5% during the U.K. QE1 period. This result is consistent with Glick and Leduc‘s (2012) 
findings that a cumulative 49 basis points decline in gilts was triggered by the U.K. QE1 
announcement. At the same time, Lam (2011) found that after the announcement of CME, ten-year 
JGB yields were reduced by 24 basis points. It is important to note that some researchers (Wright, 
2012; Belke et al., 2016) claim that results gained using the event-study method only focus on the 
QE announcements within the short term and neglected downward trends in global financial 
markets. In short, these studies may overestimated QE effects because the event-study method 
simply gives too much credit to QE announcements.  
2.5 The Theoretical Basis of Monetary Policy Spillover Effects 
The literature on the QE impact on the U.S. bond markets primarily focuses on the domestic level; 
research on the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond markets is still emerging. Given the elevated 
degree of trade openness and market integration, markets are interwoven and integrated with each 
other. Although the U.S. QE policies were implemented primarily to solve domestic recession 
 27 
problems, they had world-wide effects, due to both global market integration and America’s role in 
the international markets (Chen et al., 2012). Studying the U.S. QE spillover effects in further detail is 
essential for understanding global financial market movements (Belke et al., 2016).  
2.5.1 Mundell-Fleming Model 
Monetary Policy spillover effects have been a popular topic for researchers for many years. As early 
as 1963, Mundell identified how monetary easing policies in one economy influenced other markets 
with a standard two-country Mundell-Fleming Model. The author predicted that monetary policy 
easing could increase domestic output and hence, lead to the depreciation of domestic currency. 
Mundell argued that domestic currency depreciation also leads to an increase in domestic CPI but a 
drop in foreign CPI. This means that the real consumption of a foreign currency increases and 
benefits the foreign country (Kawai, 2015). 
2.5.2 New Open Economy 
A more recent theory, new open-economy macroeconomics (Corsetti & Pesenti, 1997; Obstfeld & 
Rogoff, 1995, 2000), further explains the international spillover effects of monetary policy. This 
theory suggests that if nominal prices are rigid, the spillover effect is subject to differences in the 
exporting companies’ price-setting behaviours. When both domestic and foreign companies trade in 
foreign currency (the producer’s currency), domestic monetary easing policy will increase the costs 
of import but not for the export sectors. Consequently, in this case, domestic monetary easing 
policies have a negative impact upon domestic trade activities but improves trade in foreign markets 
(Corsetti & Pesenti, 1997). The situation is reversed when both the domestic and foreign firms use 
domestic currency. In this case, domestic monetary expansion raises the domestic price of exports 
while the import price remains unchanged. As a result, the domestic monetary easing policy 
privileges domestic consumers through stimulating domestic output and trade. Meanwhile, it will 
produce a negative spillover effect on neighboring markets (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). The situation 
is more complicated when different currency pricing is adopted in different markets. In this case, 
domestic monetary easing policies can generate either positive or negative spillover effects on 
international markets (Buiter et al. 2001). 
2.6 Modelling Quantitative Easing 
Much research has tried to quantify the impact of QE policies on either financial or macroeconomic 
variables with different econometric methods. Event-study method is applied to measure the 
immediate responses of financial variables to QE announcements (Bernanke et al., 2004; Gagnon et 
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al., 2010; Joyce et al., 2012; Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Several other studies have 
adopted time-series type models3 to quantify persistent effects of financial variables from a cross-
country perspective (Bayoumi & Bui, 2012; Bredin et al., 2010; Ghosh & Saggar, 2016; Ji & In, 2010; 
Kapetanios et al., 2012; Kishor & Marfatia, 2013).   
2.6.1 Event Study and QE 
Event-study compares the expected percentage change of one financial asset value relative to the 
expected percentage change in its value when an event is announced. It is based on the efficient 
market hypothesis, which suggests that when the markets are efficient and the announcement of 
the event is unanticipated, the impact on the value of financial assets will be quick and persistent 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Following the 2007 subprime crisis and the launch of QE policies, event-study has 
been used by numerous studies to test the immediate reactions of financial variables to QE 
announcements. For instance, Bernanke et al. (2004) used event-study to estimate the impact of 
unconventional monetary policies (such as QE policies) when nominal interest rates reach a liquidity 
trap. They first adopted event studies with a narrow window to assess the responses of the financial 
assets following central bank statements. They found both direct and indirect influences from the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements on private sector expectations. Aït-Sahalia et 
al. (2009) adopted event study method using a three-day window around the Fed’s monetary policy 
announcement dates and found an immediate positive market response to QE announcements. 
Similarly, Gagnon et al. (2010) presented a comprehensive event-study on the Fed’s QE effects with 
a one-day window on eight important LASP announcements during the U.S QE1 period. They 
examined financial variables including long-term government bonds, agency bonds, MBS, swap rates 
and corporate bonds. They found that QE programs could significantly lower term premium, 
successfully reduce longer-term private borrowing rates and stimulate the economy. Joyce et al. 
(2012) estimated the gilt reactions over a two-day period after six QE announcements released by 
the Bank of England (BOE). They also ran robust tests with one-day and three-day windows event-
study methods and found that the initial QE announcement exhibits greater downward pressure on 
gilt yields than later announcements.  
Although event-study method provides a way to measure instant responses to financial variables, it 
is not perfect. For instance, Bernanke et al. (2004) point out that the estimated results from event-
studies only focus on the short-term responses of the market, but cannot track long-term effects. 
Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) note that event study cannot fully capture the macroeconomic impact and 
                                                          
3 For example, the Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity Model (GARCH) are two time-series models. 
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structural factors that might affect market responses to policy announcements. Some researchers 
(Martin & Milas, 2012; Steeley & Matyushkin, 2015) have suggested that event studies implicitly 
assume constant characteristics of bonds within the event window. However, some bonds may have 
different characteristics during the event window while others do not. A recent study (Belke et al., 
2016) claims that results estimated using the event-study model may overestimate the QE effects on 
decreasing interest rates. They contend that some of these studies do not consider global downward 
trends. As a result of this oversight, and the neglect of high integration level among advanced 
markets, event study estimates overestimate the QE impact generated by such announcements. 
2.6.2 GARCH Models on Quantitative Easing 
Apart from event-study methods, there are also time-series models which can be used to test 
persistent and cross-country responses toward the Fed’s QE. Unlike the event-study approach, 
which depends upon the event window length, time-series models allow for multiple factors to be 
examined both dynamically and simultaneously (Steeley & Matyushkin, 2015). The Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is one of the models applied in the 
financial analysis of time-series data. 
Based on the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model developed by Engle 
(1982), Bollerslev (1986) introduced the GARCH model, which permits the conditional variance to 
follow an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process. The GARCH model allow for both 
autoregressive and moving average components in the heteroskedastic variance (Enders, 2008).  
The GARCH model is popular for modelling financial data because the variance specification of these 
types of models are able to measure the commonly observed features of the time-series financial 
variables. It is useful to model volatility as well as changes in volatility dynamically (Hill et al., 2008). 
There is also new developments in the GARCH model relating to the analysis of multivariate data. 
The Multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) model takes advantage of the fact that contemporaneous 
shocks from different markets can be correlated. In other words, the MGARCH models suggests that 
volatility spillover effects in one financial asset may influence the volatility of other related financial 
assets (Enders, 2004).  
Engel’s (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model is one of the most practical forms of 
MGARCH models. It is developed based on the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model and it 
is applied to capture the dynamic process of conditional volatilities and conditional correlations 
simultaneously. However, unlike the CCC-MGARCH model, which assumes the constant correlation 
among variables, the DCC-MGARCH model allows for dynamic conditional correlation, which is more 
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practical in modelling the time-varying spillover effects among different markets (Celık, 2012). 
Another merit of the DCC-MGARCH model is that it estimates correlation coefficients of the 
standardized residuals as well as accounting for heteroscedasticity directly. Therefore, the dynamic 
correlation is free of bias from volatility (Chiang et al., 2007; Celık, 2012). 
Since the 2007 subprime loan crisis, many researchers have utilized GARCH-type models to examine 
the impact of the Fed’s QE policies, from both yield and volatility perspectives. For instance, in order 
to capture the dynamic reactions of the global stock markets to the Fed QE policy shocks, Kishor and 
Marfatia (2013) applied GARCH (1, 1) model under a time-varying parameter (TVP) framework. Their 
results show that the U.S. monetary policy shocks had more spillover effects on the international 
stock markets during the 2007 subprime crisis periods. They also noted that emerging stock markets 
tended to be more volatile than developed stock markets.  
Similarly, GARCH type models, especially the MGARCH type models, have been widely applied in 
estimating the volatility spillover effect among different markets. For example, Celık (2012) 
examined the financial contagion effects among several foreign exchange markets during the 
subprime loan crisis using a DCC-MGARCH framework. The author found significant contagion 
effects between most developed and emerging markets. Furthermore, the result showed that, 
compared with developed exchange markets, there were larger spillover effects in emerging 
exchange markets from the U.S. subprime loan crisis.  
Li and Giles (2015) examined the volatility spillover from the U.S. stock market in seven Asian stock 
markets (including the Japanese stock market) using an asymmetric MGARCH model. Their empirical 
study provided evidence of a unidirectional spillover effect from U.S. stock markets to both Japanese 
and other Asian emerging stock markets. This was the case in both the short-and-long run. These 
effects were not only more apparent, but also more significant for emerging markets than the ones 
triggered by Japan after its QE policies were launched. This implies that the Fed’s QE policies had 
more powerful spillover effects than their Japanese counterparts. 
Ghosh and Saggar (2016) used both univariate and multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) models to assess 
the volatility spillover effects triggered by the U.S. QE policies in several emerging equity markets 
(BRICS). The study found a pronounced volatility clustering in their sample markets during the taper 
talk period of QE. Ghosh and Saggar (2016) also noted contemporaneous volatility covariance on 
both equities and government bonds between the U.S. and emerging markets (including BRICS).  
Guerello (2016) investigated the financial stability’s effect on the QE transmission mechanisms with 
a MGARCH-in-mean model. The author demonstrated that if the structural breaks in volatility series 
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are triggered by monetary policy changes the low volatility of macroeconomic variables (due to 
these breaks) cannot lower the financial stability directly. I build our DCC-MGARCH model using both 
Kishor and Marfatia (2013) and Engle (2002) studies. This model addresses research objectives 2 and 
3.  
2.6.3 VAR models and QE 
The Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model is another kind of time-series model utilized to examine the 
international spillover effects of QE policies. The VAR model, developed by Sims (1980), is a natural 
generalization of univariate auto-regressive models. It captures the responses of both 
macroeconomic and financial variables in relation to certain shocks (such as the QE policies). These 
variables can be either domestic or international, which provide the opportunity to evaluate cross-
border spillover effects of certain financial activities. Indeed, the VAR model has been commonly 
used to analyse such cross-border linkages (Bayoumi & Bui, 2012). For instance, Imakubo et al. 
(2008) utilized the VAR models to examine the interdependence of LIBOR–OIS spreads in major 
currencies from the U.S., the U.K., Japan, the Eurozone and Australia. They noticed co-movements in 
the spreads for the U.S. dollar, euro and Japanese yen. Apart from the spillover effects, VAR models 
can also be used to examine the dynamic movements between financial variables. In order to assess 
the economic conditions under the zero lower bound, Bernanke et al. (2004) estimated the 
dynamics of employment, inflation rate, the federal fund rate, and the Eurodollar futures rate using 
a VAR model. They found a significant long-term effect of these variables on Treasury yields. Bredin 
et al. (2010) adopted the VAR model to assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on international 
bond yields. They found a significant divergent relationship between domestic monetary policies and 
on excess bond returns in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany. 
Besides the studies conducted related to the U.S. QE policies, there are some literature focusing on 
the U.K. QE policies. For example, Kapetanios et al. (2012) used different VAR models to assess the 
impact of the U.K. QE policies during the U.K. QE1 period. Their Bayesian VAR (BVAR) results clarified 
that real GDP would have reduced by even more during 2009 and inflation would have reached 
lower or even negative levels without the implementation of QE policies. Their findings were 
supported by their Markov Switching Structural VAR (MS-SVAR) and Time-varying Parameter SVAR 
(TVP-SVAR) results. Joyce et al. (2012) incorporated several exogenous variables (the growth rate of 
industrial production, RPI inflation, and the slope of the yield curve) into their VAR model, with both 
excess returns and asset shares, to measure the exogenous impact on asset demand and supply. 
Their results showed a large decrease in the expected excess returns on gilts, corporate bonds, and 
equities in response to the U.K. QE policies. They noted that these effects could last for over six 
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months. The current study uses a Joyce et al.’s., SVAR model (2011) to test bond market integration 
level during each U.S. QE period. This answers research objective 1.  
2.7 Market Integration and Spillover Effects 
Recently, the global markets, especially the developed markets, suffered from a severe financial 
crisis initiated by a bubble in the U.S. housing market. The co-movements of different financial 
markets generated debate around contagion as it affected different countries and the 
interdependence of global financial markets (Celık, 2012). 
The definition of the spillover effect has gone through a gradual refinement process since the 1990s 
(Cho & Parhizgari, 2008). Initially, the contagion effect was measured using a static measure of 
correlation between different markets. Further development of the contagion effect added testing 
co-movements, causality, error correction models, and co-integration among different market 
returns (Cho & Parhizgari, 2008; Darbar & Deb, 1997; Karolyi & Stulz, 1996; Pascual, 2003). The co-
movement describes the strong correlation among the asset returns. In terms of the co-integration, 
it means the two time series have the same stochastic trend and their linear combination can be 
stationary even though they may be non-stationary. Some later researchers (Cho & Parhizgari, 2008; 
Engle, 2002) highlighted that correlation estimates should be dynamic in order to capture the 
continuous market changes when identifying the contagion effect among different markets. Today, 
the magnitude of the spillover effects are considered to be subject to market integration levels. 
Given the elevated level of market integration, financial assets across various markets are bound to 
be influenced by external shocks from leading economies (Chen et al., 2012). 
However, it is difficult to properly distinguish and identify levels of market integration, since it 
encompasses different aspects of interdependence across various markets. For example, some 
researchers identify market integration as the proportion of market returns which can be explained 
by external factors. The market is more segmented if the proportion is small, while a larger market 
response to exogenous shocks may thereafter be explained as higher levels of market integration 
(Pukthuanthong & Roll, 2009; Stulz, 1981; Errunza & Losq, 1985). Some others (Lane & Milesi-
Ferretti, 2008; Fecht et al., 2012) note that in a well-integrated markets, investors may be benefit 
through risk sharing, and also from improvements in capital allocation efficiency and a reduction in 
transaction costs.  
From the perspective of a portfolio investor outside the region, stock market integration suggests 
that separate markets move together and have high correlation. Some theorists (Prasad et al., 2005; 
Baele et al., 2004) consider market integration as beneficial; this is a central theme in international 
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finance and helps economic growth via risk sharing, reducing macroeconomic volatility and 
transaction costs Therefore, drawing on Kim et al.’s (2006) study, I only consider co-movements 
across asset returns, or in particular the daily bond yields.  
Market integration levels have attracted much scholarly attention. For example, Kim et al (2006) 
assessed the degree of integration in European government bond markets over the period of 1998 
to 2003. They found significant contemporaneous linkages between Germany and other Euro zone 
markets. Later studies (Abad et al., 2010) have compared the levels of integration between 15 Euro 
zone bond markets, world markets and the Euro Monetary Union (EMU). They found that the 15 EU 
bond markets are more integrated than the EMU markets or the world markets. Other studies have 
examined Asian markets. For example, Click and Plummer (2005) investigated the levels of market 
integration in Southeast Asian Nations. Their results suggest an increasing trend in market 
integration, although the level of integration is far from complete.  
The literature on QE effects on market integration is still very limited. Steeley (2015) employed the 
DCC-GARCH model to assess the U.K. QE impacts on U.K. capital market integration; the author 
found limited effects on both stock and bond correlations. However, the author noted that the QE 
policies impacted upon volatility persistence. Some researchers (Pukthuanthong & Roll, 2009) have 
argued that correlation is not suitable to represent market integration since some perfectly 
integrated markets may have weak correlations with others. I therefore employ the Structural VAR 
model to examine changes to market integration levels in global bond markets during the various 
U.S. QE phases. 
2.8 The U.S. QE Spillover Effects on Global Bond Yields 
Much of the earlier literature focuses primarily on the U.S. QE impact on financial and 
macroeconomic variables at a domestic level. However, due to the increasing levels of market 
integration, monetary policy implemented in the developed economies can also affect other markets 
as well (Kim & Nguyen, 2009). Of the QE policies implemented by advanced economies, the spillover 
effects from the U.S. QE policies were more wide-reaching and noticeable than other advanced 
nations. This could be because the Fed was the first to respond to the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Additionally, they amassed the largest amount of government bonds in the U.S. QE policies4 
(Bernoth et al., 2015; Christensen & Krogstrup, 2015). Another reason why the early literature tends 
                                                          
4 The U.S. QE1 policy was announced in November 2008. The Fed purchased $ 4.1 trillion treasuries over a 
period of several years (November 2008 to October 2014 when the QE3 policy was terminated). The U.K. QE1 
policy was launched in March 2009 and the BOE accumulated £ 375 billion government bonds by July 2012. 
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to focus on the U.S., relates to the country’s central position in global markets; the sheer number of 
trades that occur in U.S. dollars impact upon financial markets (Chen et al., 2012). This study sheds 
light on how different bond yields responded to external policy shocks generated by the leading 
economy. 
There is still some debate about the factors which affect the magnitudes of the QE spillover effects 
to other countries (Park & Um, 2015). Several studies (Chen et al., 2014; Neely, 2015) contend that 
the magnitude of the spillover effect relies upon several macroeconomic factors, including the 
foundations of the banking system, the current deficit and real GDP growth. Eichengreen and Gupta 
(2015) emphasize that both market size and liquidity level also matter. Following sections summarize 
the literature which attempts to quantify the U.S. QE spillover effects on the returns perspective.  
2.8.1 The U.S. QE Spillover Effects on Macroeconomic Variables 
U.S. QE policies not only impacted the American economy (section 2.4.1), but also, those of other 
nations. Examining the impact of the U.S. policies on Canada, Dahlhaus et al. (2014) found that the 
Canadian GDP increased by 2.2% due to drops in long-term spreads induced by the U.S. QE policies 
in both economies. The authors also noticed that the positive spillover effect of the U.S. QE policies 
led to a stronger Canadian demand for imports, which somehow reduced the net exports. 
Edwards (2012) investigated the U.S. QE spillover effects on short-term interest rates in seven 
developing markets during the 2000s. Using weekly data, Edwards found that the extent of 
transmission of interest rate shocks from the U.S. QE policies differed in each country. The author 
further explained that the U.S. QE shocks affected interest rates in the three sampled Asian markets 
(Indonesia, Korea and Philippines), while for the Latin America economies, the magnitude of 
spillover effect on interest rates was only one half. These results suggests that the adjustment 
process in Asian countries was significantly faster than in Latin America. This indicates that short-
term interest rates in less mobile countries5 (in terms of capital) were more sensitive to the U.S. QE 
policy shocks than economies which were more integrated in global markets. 
Foreign market responses to U.S. monetary policies vary over time (Kishor and Marfatia, 2013). 
Kishor and Marfatia (2013) contend that the fixed-coefficient approach of measuring U.S. monetary 
policy spillover effects is inappropriate. They explain that responses can be due to the dynamic 
movements of market integration and the business cycle. Kishor and Marfatia’s results showed 
significant dynamic responses in the Asian-Pacific and Latin American markets in relation to the U.S. 
                                                          
5 Edwards (2012) categorised that the three Asian countries have less mobility of capital than the four nations 
in Latin America. 
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monetary policy surprises. Furthermore, they found that the announcements had a larger impact on 
most of the Asian-Pacific and Latin American equity markets during the recession and crisis periods. 
In short, they concluded that emerging stock markets were more sensitive to the Fed’s monetary 
policy shocks during the crisis phases. 
Capital flow is another key theme in the literature on U.S. QE spillover effects. Dahlhaus and 
Vasishtha (2014) examined the U.S. QE spillover effects on emerging markets. Their results suggest 
that the effect of the U.S. monetary “policy normalization shock” on capital flows to emerging 
markets is economically small. Lavigne et al. (2014) identified some possible negative U.S. QE 
spillover effects on emerging markets. The U.S. QE policies may have led to more capital flows into 
emerging markets and this may have put unwelcome pressure on asset prices and exchange rates. In 
spite of these negative spillover effects on emerging markets, Dahhaus and Vasishtha (2014) argue 
that the majority of U.S. QE spillover effects on emerging markets were positive since the U.S. QE 
policies generated economic trade and market confidence. These benefits are even more significant, 
given U.S. exits from the QE programs in improved economic conditions. They also predicted that 
without the U.S. QE policies, emerging markets may even have suffered from weaker demand for 
their exports. 
More recent studies have assessed the U.S. QE spillover effects on emerging markets. For example, 
Miyakoshi et al. (2017) applied the VAR model to examine the responses from eight Asian emerging 
markets to the U.S. QE policy shocks and found that the U.S. QE policies contributed to significant 
rises in stock prices in the sampled markets. Kryzanowski et al. (2017) examined the U.S. QE spillover 
effects on cross-market correlations among stocks, bonds and forward contracts for 31 markets. 
Incorporating the different U.S. QE indicators in the DCC-GARCH model, the authors found that the 
U.S. QE policies had considerably different spillover effects on cross-market correlations triggered by 
conventional U.S. monetary policies. 
2.8.2 The U.S. QE Spillover Effects on Global Bond Yields 
Since most of the QE policies include purchasing large amount of government bonds, an 
investigation of the QE spillover effects on the global bond markets is necessary. Some research has 
focused on the U.S. QE spillover effects in the global bond market from the return perspective. 
However most of these studies only focus on long-term government bonds in advanced markets6. 
                                                          
6 For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Rosa (2012) and Neely (2010).  
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There has been little discussion of the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields with emerging 
markets included.  
At the domestic level, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) found that the QE policy signal 
does significantly lower yields on bonds with various maturities, but that the intensity depends on 
bond maturity. They found that the signalling channel does a better job in reducing bond yields with 
shorter maturities than ones with longer maturities. As Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
explain Fed may keep lower bond yields until the economic recovery and thereafter, sell the 
amassed assets; in short, they are not a long-term investment However, this is not the only view. 
Rosa (2012), for example, employed a similar approach and identified unanticipated changes in U.S. 
QE announcements using newspaper articles to estimate the U.S. QE effects on both bond and stock 
markets. According to this study, the total effect of U.S. QE policy on the financial markets was 
roughly equal to an unexpected cut of zero (three-month Treasury) to 197 basis points (ten-year 
Treasury yields). Rosa (2012) noted that the U.S. QE acquisition of large-scale, long-term Treasuries 
significantly changed the supplies of long-term bonds, which then led to a decline in premium in 
long-term Treasury yields. Consequently, long-term Treasury yields decreased. Doh (2010) notes 
that changes in term premium depend on investors’ risk aversion. During crisis periods, investors’ 
risk aversion is typically higher than in non-crisis periods, therefore, QE policies may trigger a more 
substantial decrease in term premium. 
At the global level, Neely (2010) examined the spillover effect of the U.S. QE announcements on 
long-term foreign bond yields in five advanced markets (the U.S., U.K., Canada, Japan, and 
Germany), using the event study method. He found a significant decline in all bond yields, which 
followed on the heel of U.S. QE announcements. Neely (2010) argued that the U.S. QE1 policy 
reduced the ten-year U.S. Treasury yields by 107 basis points. On average, the U.S. QE1 policy also 
led to a decline in the ten-year foreign bond yields for roughly 53 basis points. This finding is in line 
with Glick and Leduc (2011) study which estimated that the U.S. QE1 policy reduced the U.K. gilt 
yields by approximately 46 basis points. This is equivalent to almost the same impact induced by the 
U.K. QE1 policy on U.K. bond yields. According to Neely (2010), the success of the U.S. QE policies in 
lowering the long-term government bond yields in both the U.S. market and foreign markets 
suggests that the monetary authority is not powerless when facing the zero lower bound. In 
particular, the decrease in all bond yields (either in the U.S. or in foreign bond markets) indicates 
that the U.S. QE policy should have substantial effects not only on the domestic market, but also on 
international markets. As the U.S. QE policies have had spillover effects on global financial markets, 
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Neely (2010) suggests it is necessary to coordinate policies among central banks to avoid potential 
contradictory or overly simulative effects.  
Rogers et al. (2014) extended the scope of their original analysis of the spillover effects from the Fed 
to four major central banks (the Fed, BOE, BOJ and ECB) with high frequency intraday data. Their 
results show an asymmetric spillover effect from monetary policies within these economies. More 
specifically, the study found that the U.S. policy spillover effects on non-U.S. yields are higher than 
the other way around. This is in line with Christensen and Rudebusch’s (2012) study and they 
explained this asymmetric spillover effect as “institutional and investor differences” between the 
U.S. and U.K. markets.  
Neely (2015) assessed the U.S. QE spillover effects on long-term yields of the U.S. and other markets 
(Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and U.K.). The author found a significant yield decrease for all 
sample markets in response to the U.S. QE policies. Bauer and Neely (2014) decomposed the yield 
changes following the U.S. QE policy into changes induced by signalling and portfolio balance effect. 
Using dynamic term structure models, Bauer and Neely (2014) concluded that for those markets 
which show strong yield responses to conventional U.S. monetary policies (such as Canada), the U.S. 
QE signalling effects are larger. In terms of the markets that have higher bond yield covariance with 
the U.S. Treasury yields such as Australia, the U.S. QE spillover effects through the portfolio 
rebalancing channel were higher. For the Japanese market, the portfolio effects were small and 
there were no significant signalling effects from the U.S. QE policies. 
One conclusion can be drawn based on the existing literature. The U.S. QE policies have had 
pronounced spillover effects across markets and economies. However, there are also some gaps in 
the study of the U.S. QE spillover effects in the global financial markets from the return perspective. 
Unlike studies at the domestic level, most of the studies conducted from an international 
perspective focus mainly on the stock markets or only on the ten-year government bond yields in 
developed markets; few studies have been conducted on bond yield responses in emerging markets. 
Moreover, most of the studies on the U.S. QE spillover effects do not consider the dynamic 
interaction and simultaneous interdependence among markets, which may overestimate or 
underestimate U.S. QE spillover effects. Additionally, the measurements of the U.S. QE policies in 
previous studies rely either on the event window length, or on policy shock measures based on the 
residuals generated in the VAR or GARCH models; no specific identification of the exogenous U.S. QE 
policy shocks have been estimated. All of these issues may lead to a lack of accuracy in measuring 
the U.S. QE policy shocks and assessing of the U.S. QE spillover effects. 
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2.9 U.S. QE Volatility Spillover Effects on Global Financial Markets 
Literature on the U.S. QE spillover effects focuses mainly on the return or yield perspective of 
financial assets. However, the volatility spillover effects across financial markets are also important 
for both policy makers and market participants. It is for this reason that this topic has come to the 
attention of several scholars. The potential volatility spillover effects of the leading economies have 
been a hot topic, especially during periods of financial crisis7 (Buiter et al., 1998; Mishkin, 1999). 
Some researchers (Ghosh & Saggar, 2016) believe that the world has become more integrated after 
the 2008 global financial crisis; according to these theorists, policies of leading markets are almost 
instantaneously transmitted to emerging market economies. This increasing level of integration 
among the markets results in more pronounced volatility spillover effects from advanced economies 
to the rest of the world. 
In terms of the volatility spillover effects of the U.S. QE policies, Li and Giles (2015) examined stock 
market linkages among the U.S., Japan and six other Asian (developing) markets. The study found 
that although emerging markets are more vulnerable to their own past shocks in both the short and 
long-term, the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects were not only more pronounced than before, but 
also larger than those of the Japanese market. Mukherjee and Bhaduri (2016) adopted Diebold-
Yilmaz spillover index within the VAR model framework to measure the U.S. QE volatility spillover 
effects on the BRICS markets. Their findings showed significant bursts of volatility in the sample 
countries during the U.S. QE periods. However, the authors also pointed out that these volatility 
spillover effects were severe during the early U.S. QE periods and gradually declined because of 
market adjustments or stricter regulations in these markets. Another study (Ghosh & Saggar, 2016) 
employed the MGARCH model to investigate the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on BRICS markets 
and some other emerging markets during the taper talk period8. The authors found a pronounced 
volatility clustering phenomenon in emerging bond markets. They also noticed contemporaneous 
volatility spillover effects from the U.S. markets to other emerging markets, both for equities and 
government securities. The market interactions are more significant in the bond market. 
Yang and Zhou (2016) used implied volatility indices to assess the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects 
on global stock markets. The authors found the U.S. volatility spillover effects intensified three times 
during the U.S. QE periods. They also pointed out that the U.S. QE policy was the primary driver of 
                                                          
7 For example, the European exchange rate mechanism crisis in 1992 and the tequila crisis in 1994. 
8 The taper talk period was from 22 May 2013 to end of August 2013 and included Bernanke’s first remark on 
May 22 that the Fed could taper QE and his June 19 testimony in which he clarified that the Fed could begin 
tapering by the end of the year (Ghosh & Saggar, 2016). 
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intensifying volatility spillover effects and could account for about half of the variations of spillover 
effects. These results indicate that despite the benefits generated by the U.S. QE policy, there was 
also a potential cost of increasing global systematic risks. 
There are some gaps in the previous studies. First, most of these studies focus on the stock markets; 
there is a notable lack of study on global bond yield volatilities throughout the entire U.S. QE 
periods. In addition, the application of either VAR or MGARCH models may only capture 
contemporaneous interactions among the markets; however, none of the studies above explicitly 
define the U.S. QE policy shocks. The disturbance terms, which measure U.S. QE policy shocks, 
generated in both models, is inappropriate to capture the unexpected component of the U.S. QE 
policies. One explanation is the including of omitted variables other than the policy shocks in the 
distrubance term. For example, the credit quality or credit rating can affect the bond yields and bond 
volatilities, the higher the bond or asset rating is, the lower the risk suggested by the rating agencies 
(such as Moody’s and Fitch). However, the credit rating is highly related to these individual rating 
agencies and generally, this factor is not included in the models as independent variable. Thereafter, 
this factor is typically included in the disturbance term and the relying on the disturbance terms in 
identifying the policy shocks may lead to biases in estimating the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects. 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the development of the U.S. QE policies, the emprical 
methods employed in previous studies on the U.S. QE spillover effects, on market integration and 
the U.S. QE spillover effects from both the return and the volatility perspectives. According to 
previous studies, the U.S. QE policies (especially the U.S. QE1 policy), significantly lowered bond 
yields and other financial variables, both at domestic and international levels. However, there are 
still some gaps in the literature. Firstly, previous studies on the U.S. QE spillover effects focus 
primarily on the initial QE policy (QE1), with less attention paid to later policies (the U.S. QE2 and 
QE3 policies). Secondly, although many researches include ten-year government bonds in their 
study, they treat it as the benchmark in estimating long-term interest rates; only a few researchers 
estimate the U.S. QE effects on government bonds at the domestic level. There is still a notable gap 
in the literature on U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond markets. Thirdly, in terms of the U.S. QE 
spillover effects on other markets, most of the studies focus on assets return or yield perspective; 
few studies examine the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects. Most importantly, to the best of our 
knowledge, no research has been conducted regarding the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on 
global bond markets.  
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Our study attempts to fill these gaps and investigates the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond 
markets from both yield and volatility perspectives. The different spillover effects induced by each 
individual U.S. QE policy are also compared. This will shed light on how global bond markets respond 
to policy shocks from leading economies. Our results will provide information for both policy makers 
and market participants regarding either cross-market corporation or investment choices in global 
bond markets when facing exogenous monetary policy shocks. Next chapter will firstly discuss the 
data and then the empirical models using in this study. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Having concluded the literature of QE policies and previous studies on particularly the U.S. QE 
impact on the international markets, this chapter discusses the data and the empirical methods used 
to assess the three research objectives. Specifically, this chapter describes the time-series data 
collected from different bond markets and the unit root tests used to examine data stationarity. 
Next, the chapter depicts the measurement of both short- and long-term U.S. QE policy surprises. 
The chapter also presents the Structural VAR (SVAR) model which is used to examine global bond 
market integration levels during the U.S. QE periods (research objective 1) and the empirical models 
used to estimate the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields (research objective 2) and 
volatilities (research objective 3), respectively. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the 
empirical methods. 
3.2 Data and Stationarity Test 
This section describes the time-series daily yield data from different bond markets applied in the 
current study. Price data relating federal funds futures contracts, as well as ten-year Treasury 
futures contracts, are used to calculate both short- and long-term U.S. QE policy surprises (the 
independent variable), respectively. Some control and dummy variables are included in the 
estimation.  
3.2.1 Data 
This study covers the period from the 1st of January 2007 to the 31st of December 2015, which 
includes all three of the Fed’s QE periods; U.S. QE1 covers the 25th of November 2008 through the 
25th of March 2010, U.S. QE2 covers the 3rd of November 2010 to the 25th of June 2011, and U.S. 
QE3 covers from the 13th of September 2012 to the 29th of October 2014. The bond yield data were 
obtained from Bloomberg and DataStream. The daily data applied in this current study includes the 
federal funds futures data, the ten-year Treasury futures data, the ten-year government bond yields 
from ten bond markets, and the price data from international stock markets. Daily data was chosen 
because it provides more information about the immediate responses to exogenous shocks which 
typically only last for a couple of days rather than relying on weekly and monthly data (Gallagher & 
Twomey, 1998; Worthington & Higgs, 2004). 
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The first data set contains information about on the 30 days Federal funds futures contract or more 
specifically, tracks the overnight Federal funds rate for each month (Kishor & Marfatia, 2013). It is 
calculated with 100 minus the expected average effective Federal funds rate for the delivery month. 
This data is used by the current study to calculate short-term U.S. monetary policy shocks generated 
by the U.S. monetary policies. In addition to the measurement of short-term U.S. policy shocks, I also 
measure the long-term U.S. monetary policy shocks using the ten-year Treasury futures data. Short-
and long-term U.S. monetary policy shocks that correspond to each QE period are generated by 
multiplying short-and long-term U.S. monetary policy shocks by a dummy variable which represents 
each individual U.S. QE round (see section 3.3).   
Another data set consists of the daily bond yield data from ten long-term (ten-year) government 
bond markets based on Fratzscher et al. (2018) and Kishor and Marfatia (2013) study. Of all the 
assets purchased by the Federal Reserves within the U.S. QE policy framework, the largest purchase 
was on long-term government bonds, and in particular, the ten-year bonds (Gagnon et al., 2010; 
Neely, 2015). It is for this reason that the current study chooses to focus on these bonds to evaluate 
QE impacts. 
I include some variables to control for changes in both international and domestic economic 
environments in our study. Since the data used in this study is daily, common macroeconomic 
variables such as inflation rate and GDP growth are difficult to include. Unlike financial market data, 
which is available daily or at even higher frequencies, macroeconomic data is usually released 
monthly, or sometimes quarterly. This means it is challenging to include macroeconomic variables in 
financial models which use daily based data. However, it is still possible to incorporate changes in 
economic environments using daily data. The most readily available proxy variable adopted in the 
previous study (Steeley & Matyushkin, 2015) is the stock market return. I include return data from 
each sample stock markets as a control for the changes in the stock performance. Apart from daily 
stock returns, the lag value of bond yields are also incorporated to represent previous information 
generated within each bond market.  
All markets in the study sample are divided into developed markets and emerging markets according 
to Fratzscher et al. (2018) study, as shown in Table 3.1. The comparison of responses from different 
groups will provide more detailed information on how the global bond markets respond to the U.S. 
unconventional monetary policies. The six developed markets include the United States (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Japan (JP), Australia (AU), France (FR) and Germany (GE). The emerging 
markets included in this study are China (CH), Brazil (BR), India (IND), and Russia (RU). They are 
markets that either have great impact on the global economy, that is the U.S., the U.K. and Japan 
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(Yang, 2005) or ones which play a more pronounced role in the global markets such as Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC markets). In addition to these markets, I also include bond yields from other 
markets. I consider bond yields from Hong Kong, Canada and New Zealand for developed markets. In 
terms of emerging markets, I include Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, and Malaysia. However, due 
to missing data, especially for some essential U.S. QE starting and ending dates, I exclude these 
markets. For example, there are 1893 data for Hong Kong market and the entire sample size is 2349. 
Moreover, there is still a debate on the definition of emerging markets. For instance, Malaysia is not 
in the group of BRICS+ Next Eleven markets nor in the Columbia University Emerging Market Global 
Player (EMGP) groups. Pakistan is not accepted by S&P, Dow Jones and Russell Investment in the 
emerging markets. Indonesia is not on the Columbia University EMGP list and Thailand is not in the 
BRICS+ Next Eleven. Therefore, I only choose the BRIC markets, the four largest and well-known 
emerging markets for my study. 
Table 3-1 Markets Included in the Current Study 
Developed Market Emerging Market 
United States (US) China (CH) 
United Kingdom (UK) Brazil (BR) 
Japan (JP) India (IN) 
Australia (AU) Russia (RU) 
France (FR)  
Germany (GE)  
Based on (Fratzscher et al., 2018; Kishor & Marfatia, 2013) 
3.2.2 Stationarity of Data and Break Points 
The stationary series is the one with a constant mean, variance and auto-covariance for each given 
lag. In other word, the stationary series has all these statistical properties with constant over time. 
This is very different from non-stationary variables, which have time dependent means and 
covariance. A random process time series is integrated in the order d; in the series the random 
process requires a difference of d time in order to guarantee stationarity (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
It is necessary to test for stationarity in time series data before running a regression analysis because 
there will be spurious regression results when running traditional regression analysis with non-
stationary time series variables (Granger & Newbold, 1974). The R2 may be high and the t statistics 
may be significant for a spurious regression result, but the results are meaningless statistically. In 
short, the output will appear significant due to the non-consistent least squares estimates and the t 
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statistics do not follow the normal t distribution. Therefore, the integration properties of the data 
should be examined in advance of any regression analysis. In this study, I use the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test, Dickey Fuller Generalized Least Square (DFGLS) test, Phillips-Perron (PP) test and 
Break Point Unit Root test, respectively. Specifically, I run the tests for both the level and first-
difference of the bond yield data. 
Besides the unit root tests, based on different U.S. QE programs, I also run the break point tests to 
examine the potential structural break dates in the bond yield series. In addition to the Break Point 
Unit Root test discussed in section 3.2.2, I also apply the Chow test to examine if the key U.S. QE 
announcement dates (Including the starting and ending dates of each U.S. QE policy) are the 
potential structural break points for the sample series. 
3.3 Identification of U.S. QE Policy Surprises 
It is often argued that global bond yields are driven by monetary policies implemented by the 
Federal Reserves. Empirical evidence suggests that advanced market, such as German bond yields, 
responded more to U.S. macroeconomic shocks than shocks from elsewhere, including domestic 
economic shocks (Andersson et al., 2009; Goldberg & Leonard, 2003). As Andersson et al (2009) and 
Goldberg and Leonard (2003) explain, this is due to the country’s integration with U.S. markets and 
the U.S’s central role in global economic growth. Therefore, it essential to have correct measures for 
U.S. monetary policy changes so that investors and policymakers are able to respond appropriately. 
Bredin et al. (2010) identifies two methodological issues in relation to monetary policy. The first 
issue is endogeneity or omitted variables between different bond markets. The second issue relates 
to the need to properly capture the surprise or unanticipated element of monetary policy changes. 
Many researchers put a lot of effort into avoiding endogeneity and omitted variables in identifying 
monetary policies. However, they are unlikely to include all of the influences and there can still be 
omitted variables. Previous studies, however, demonstrate that the issue of endogeneity or omitted 
variables have very limited impact upon the results. For instance, Rigobon and Sack (2004) 
attempted to develop a robust estimator with controls added for endogeneity and omitted variables 
problems. They found that the failure to account for any endogeneity is rather limited practically. 
Later studies have also demonstrated that omitted variables bias and endogeneity are of limited 
value when examining the relationship between interest rates (Valente, 2009).  
Meanwhile, Bredin et al. (2010) examined the responses from international bond yields to the 
monetary policies in the US, the UK and Germany. The endogeneity problem they identified was 
between the monetary policy shocks and bond yields. The authors explained that it was strange to 
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believe that the bond yield changes may affect the setting of monetary policy targets. My thesis is 
also about the monetary policy shocks on the global bond yields. Similar to the Bredin et al. (2010) 
study, I assume that there is little endogeneity problem since the monetary policy targets are not 
decided by the changes of bond yield, or in other words, the monetary authorities do not design 
their monetary policy in response to the bond yield changes. Instead, they will consider to adjust 
their monetary targets to the broader economic changes. Therefore, the bond yield changes should 
not affect the monetary policy shocks and there should not be large endogeneity issue. Moreover, 
there are other studies which support the exogenous U.S. QE policy shocks. For example, Barroso et 
al. (2016) examined the U.S. QE policy impact on the capital flows in the Brazilian markets. 
Specifically, they used the U.S. term spread as the exogenous variable to represent the foreign 
impact that U.S. QE policy has on the Brazilian markets. 
Based on the theoretical assumptions of efficient market hypothesis (EMH), only unexpected policy 
changes affects asset prices. The expected monetary policy changes should have been fully 
transmitted into market price (Malkiel & Fama, 1970). In other words, once policy rate change, asset 
prices should respond only to the unexpected policy change. The expected component should have 
been reflected into the asset prices prior to the policy statement. Consequently, analysis (Cook & 
Hahn, 1989; Roley & Sellon, 1995; Sellin, 2001) which is unable to decompose monetary policy 
changes into anticipated and unanticipated elements are likely to have biases in the results due to 
the errors in the variable. One common method suggested by the existing studies is to use futures 
data to differentiate between unexpected and expected changes in monetary policies (Bredin et al., 
2010; Kuttner, 2001). Therefore, I adopt the federal funds futures data and ten-year Treasury futures 
data to calculate both the short and long-term U.S. monetary policy shocks. I use the federal funds 
futures data since it provides a better means of predicting the future path of monetary policy 
(Gürkaynak et al., 2007). In addition, it can avoid the biases of model selection and the ‘generated 
regressors’ problems (Kishor & Mafartia, 2013). Hence, I calculate the short-term U.S. monetary 
policy shocks with the federal funds futures data. Moreover, since unconventional monetary policies 
like the U.S. QE policies, include absorbing a large proportion of long-term (especially ten-year) 
Treasuries, I develop the long-term U.S. monetary policy shocks with ten-year Treasury futures data. 
In order to capture unanticipated monetary policy changes, I adopt the method developed by Bredin 
et al. (2010) based on Kuttner (2001). The first day short-term U.S. monetary policy surprise is 
computed as: 
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Where 
ST
tr the short-term policy surprise
9, ms is the number of days in month s, 
0
,sf   is the present 
futures rate on day   of month s and 0, 1sf    is the current futures rate on day 1  . The model is 
applied for all the days within a given month, with the exception of the first and last day. When the 
monetary policy change happens on the first day of a month, its expectations would have been 
reflected in the previous month spot rate, therefore, the 1-month futures rate on the last day of the 
previous month, 
1
1, 1sf    is utilized instead of
0
, 1sf   . Similarly, when the short-term U.S. monetary 
policy change takes place on the last day, the difference in the 1-month federal futures rate is used. 
When the short-term U.S. monetary policy change takes place on the last day of the month, it would 
not influence the spot policy rate, since the federal funds rate does not change until the day 
following the target changes. Furthermore, in order to reduce the amplification of the month-end 
effect, no scaling adjustment is made when the U.S. monetary policy change statement is issued 
within the last 3 days of each month. 
Similar to the definition of the short-term U.S. monetary policy shocks, I also calculate the long-term 
U.S. monetary policy shock 
LT
tr  in the equation (2): 
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                                                       (2) 
The short-term and long-term policy shocks defined in equation (1) and (2) are not specific to the 
U.S. QE policy shocks, but the U.S. monetary policy shocks during the sample period (2007 to 2016). 
Next, the short- and long-term U.S. monetary policy shocks are multiplied with the dummy variables 
(see Table 3.2), which represent different U.S. QE periods to obtain the U.S. QE policy shocks. 
Table 3-2 Dummy Variables Represent Each U.S. QE Round 
Dummy Variable 1 0 
d1 25th, November, 2008 to 25th, March, 2010 Otherwise 
d2 3rd, November, 2010 to 25th, June, 2011 Otherwise 
d3 13th, September, 2012 to 29th, October, 2014 Otherwise 
 
                                                          
9 The monetary policy surprise can be zero, which indicates either that there are no monetary policy changes 
or announcements made on that specific day. 
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3.4 Market Integration during Different U.S. QE Periods 
In order to measure the global bond market integration level during the U.S. QE periods (the first 
research objective), I designed our SVAR models equation (3) as outlined below: 
                    1 1 2 2 3 3 ...t t t t p t p tAY AY AY AY A Y B                                        (3) 
tY  is a nx1 vector of stationary endogenous variables, which represents the bond yield changes from 
ten sample markets. A is an nxn invertible matrix of structural coefficients, which captures the 
dynamic interactions between the n variables. B is another nxn matrix of structural coefficients 
which represents the effects of structural shocks. P is the lag length determined by information 
criteria Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which is in line with previous studies (Kang et al., 2016; 
Kilian 2001; Yang 2005). Kilian (2001), in particular, claims that AIC is of higher accuracy in terms of 
confidence intervals than other information selection criteria such as SIC in VAR impulse response 
analysis. 
t  is the white noise structural error term with 
'( ) 0, ( ) 0t s tE E s t      .  
The corresponding reduced form VAR model can be estimated by pre-multiplying equation (3) with 
the inverse of matrix A, A-1 and described in equation (4). 
                             1 1 2 2 3 3 ...t t t t p t p tY CY C Y C Y C Y u                                          (4) 
Where 
iC  is equal to 
1
iA A
 . The error term ut in equation (4) is equal to A-1Bεt. Since on the right 
hand side of reduced VAR does not contain time t endogenous variables, therefore, no variable has a 
direct contemporaneous effect on the other variables. Meanwhile, the relationship between the 
reduced form residuals, 
tu , and the structural residuals, t , suggested by Amisano & Giannini 
(1997) are described in equation (5). 
                                                             t tAu B                                                                               (5) 
In order to identify the parameters in the structural matrices, restrictions are needed on the 
matrices. The necessary numbers of restrictions to identify A and B matrices is equal to n(n-1)/2, 
where n is the number of variables. Ten variables are included in our study. Therefore, at least 45 
restrictions should be imposed to estimate the models. 
Since our focus is on the QE policies (especially on the U.S. case), I assume that the U.S. bond shocks 
can affect all sample bond markets (including the U.S. bond market), while no shocks other than the 
U.S. bond shocks can affect the U.S. bond markets. Since the U.K. and Japan both implemented their 
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own QE policies during the sample periods (2007 to 2016), I assume that bond shocks from both the 
U.K. and Japanese bond markets can affect other markets (except for the U.S. bond markets). The 
U.K. shocks can affect all of the markets (including the U.K. bond market) with the exception of the 
U.S. bond markets. Japanese bond shocks can affect markets other than the U.S. and the U.K. This 
order is simply determined due to the important effects the market has in the global economy. The 
A and B matrices are defined in equation (6) and (7), respectively.   
A=
21
31 32
41 42 43
51 52 53
61 62 63
71 72 73
81 82 83
91 92 93
101 102 103
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
a
a a
a a a
a a a
a a a
a a a
a a a
a a a
a a a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             (6) 
 
B=
11
22
33
44
55
66
77
88
99
1010
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       (7) 
Once the SVAR models are defined, I identify three sub-samples based on the actual implementation 
of the U.S. QE periods (see Table 3.2). I examine the SVAR model with both the entire sample period 
(2007 to 2016) and sub-sample periods (the U.S. QE1, QE2 and QE3 periods). In order to measure 
market integration levels within different sample periods, I then apply the impulse response function 
analysis generated using the SVAR models. According to Hill et al. (2008), this is an appropriate 
technique to analyse monetary policy changes on financial market. It shows the dynamic effect the 
shock of one standard deviation to a variable on the other variables, and the interdependence 
between each variable (Helmut, 1993). It is also considered as a non-causality test; the zero impulse 
responses between two variables simply indicate a lack of causality (Ji & In, 2010). The forecast error 
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variance decomposition analysis within the SVAR framework is another technique I apply to analyse 
market integration levels during the U.S. QE periods. It can tell us what proportion the forecast error 
variance of one bond yield can be attributed to the external shocks. 
3.5 The U.S. QE Spillover Effects on Global Bond Yields 
In order to assess the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields (second research objective), I 
apply the DCC-MGARCH model as suggested by previous research (Guerello, 2016; Kishor & 
Marfatia, 2013). One merit of the DCC-MGARCH model is that it allows for interaction between 
different markets. I include both the short- and long-term U.S. QE monetary policy surprises 
calculated in section 3.4 as the exogenous shock to different bond markets. I examine the short- and 
long-term U.S. QE policy shocks simultaneously. Our model is developed also in the spirit of Steeley 
& Matyushkin’s (2015) study, adding the stock index variable to control for the broader economic 
environments both internationally and domestically. The mean equation for each bond yield with 
short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks is given as: 
            
0 1 2 1 3 4 5 1 1 2 2
3 3 4 1 5 2 6 3
(d * ) (d * )
(d * ) (d * ) (d * ) (d * )
ds us uk jp ST ST
t t t t t t t t
ST LT LT LT
t t t t t
Y C a R a Y a R a R a R b r b r
b r b r b r b r 
           
                     (8) 
Where 
tY  is the change of yield data at time t for each bond market, 
ds
tR  is the daily stock return 
data, which stands for the domestic economic changes for each sample economy, 
us
tR , 
uk
tR  and 
jp
tR  are the change of economic environments from three leading economies (U.S., U.K. and Japan), 
respectively. The inclusion of domestic economic changes in each equation is due to the important 
effects that the domestic economic changes have on bond yields. The economic changes from the 
U.S., the U.K. and Japan represent the international economic changes, since these economies have 
significant impact on international financial markets.
ST
tr  are the short-term U.S. monetary policy 
shocks calculated with federal funds futures data (see section 3.3). LT
tr  are the long-term U.S. 
monetary policy shocks calculated with ten-year Treasury futures data. 1d , 2d  and 3d  are dummy 
variables that measure different U.S. QE rounds, respectively (see Table 3.2). Therefore, 1d *
ST
tr , 
2d *
ST
tr  and 3d *
ST
tr  are the short-term policy surprises within different QE rounds, respectively. 
Thus, 1d *
LT
tr , 2d *
LT
tr  and 3d *
LT
tr  are the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks for each U.S. QE 
period.  
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The residuals for each individual bond markets calculated in equation (8) are modelled as follows: 
                                              
2 2
1 1 1 1 1t t th C h                                                                   (9) 
This is the first step in estimating univariate in the GARCH (1, 1) model. The second step in 
estimating the conditional correlation will be modelled based on the univariate results and the 
residual t  generated from all three mean equations in a standard GARCH model as: 
                                           (0, )t t t tDv N H                                                                     (10) 
Where t   is a k x 1 vector of residual yields of Y, k is the number of sample markets,  tv  is a k x 1 
vector of standardized residual yields. tH  is a k x k matrix of dynamic variances. Specially,  
                                                                    t t t tH DRD                                                                 (11) 
tD  is a k x k diagonal matrix of dynamic standard deviation of residuals in equation (8), with
 t tD diag h . Where each th  is calculated from the univariate GARCH (1, 1) model in equation 
(9).  
The framework also consists of a specific DCC structure tR , which is a k x k matrix of time-varying 
correlations and can be expressed as: 
                                            
* 1 * 1
t t t tR Q QQ
                                                                        (12) 
The dynamic conditional correlation structure is then given by equation (13):  
                             
'
1 1 1(1 )t t t tQ Q v v Q   

                                                                           (13) 
Where tQ  is the conditional variance–covariance matrix of residuals with its unconditional variance–
covariance matrix Q

 obtained from the GARCH (1, 1) process in equation (9). 
*
tQ  is a diagonal 
matrix with the square root of the diagonal elements of tQ , and  *t tQ diag Q . /t t tv h , the 
scalars  and   are non-negative which satisfy 1   .  
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The parameters estimated in equation (13) represent the dynamic conditional correlation among the 
global bond markets. Unlike the estimation in univariate GARCH model independently, which ignores 
the interaction within each markets, the DCC-MGARCH model jointly consider the interdependence 
among the markets and the exogenous QE shocks, which can better identify the spillover effects 
triggered by the U.S. QE policies. These parameters are associated with the exponential smoothing 
process that is used to construct the dynamic conditional correlations. The DCC model is mean 
reverting as long as the sum of α and β is less than one. In this case, the sum of these two dynamic 
coefficients is less one which implies that there is a stationary time-varying correlation among the 
sample markets. 
3.6 The U.S. QE Volatility Spillover on Global Bond Markets 
As well as assessing the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields, I also apply the DCC-MGARCH 
framework to determine the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on global bond yields (third research 
objective). However, I make some modifications to the models when estimating the U.S. QE volatility 
spillover effects. First, unlike the DCC-MGARCH discussed in section 3.5, which incorporates both the 
short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks in the mean equation, I add the U.S. QE policy shocks 
(both the short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks) and the control variables in the variance 
equation to test the volatility spillover effects of the U.S. QE policy shocks. Hence, the mean 
equation is defined as follow: 
                                                t tY C e                                                                      (14) 
tY  is the change of bond yield for each bond market, te  is the error term. 
Another difference from the DCC-MGARCH in section 3.5, is that compared to the ordinary GARCH 
model, the Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model includes the asymmetric term in variance equation. 
Therefore, besides the U.S. QE shocks and the control variables, there is also the asymmetric term to 
capture the potential leverage effects of the U.S. QE policy shocks on global bond yield volatilities. 
The variance equation with the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks is defined as follow: 
2 2 ' ' ' ' ' '
1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 2
' ' ' ' 2
3 3 4 1 5 2 6 3 1 1
(d * ) (d * )
(d * ) (d * ) (d * ) (d * ) (e )
ds us uk jp ST ST
t t t t t t t t t
ST LT LT LT
t t t t t t
h C e h a R a R a R a R b r b r
b r b r b r b r e I
 

 
 
          
        
         (15) 
Where 1th  is the conditional variance at time t, 
2
1te   is the square of residuals on time t-1, which is 
the previous period of t,  
2
1 1th   is the square of the conditional variance on time t-1, which also 
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stands for the previous t period. Similar to section 3.5, 1d * tr , 2d * r , 3d * tr , 1d *
LT
tr , 
2d *
LT
tr  and 3d *
LT
tr  are the short-term and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks for each U.S. QE 
period defined in section 3.4, respectively. Meanwhile,
ds
tR ,
us
tR ,
uk
tR and
jp
tR  are the changes in 
economic environments from the domestic economy as well as the three leading economies (the 
U.S., the U.K. and Japan), respectively. Term 1(e )tI   measures the potential leverage effects to 
which different information may affect bond yield volatility. The whole term is equal to one if 
1 0te    and 0 otherwise. A positive value of   suggests that negative residuals tend to increase 
more variance than the positive ones. This can also be interpreted as ‘bad news bring more volatility 
to good news.’ The rest of the DCC model is the same as the ones discussed in equations (10) to (13). 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter describes the models used to investigate the (volatility) spillover effects triggered by 
the Fed’s QE policies to other bond markets from January 2007 to January 2016. The current study 
examines the U.S. QE spillover effects from both a bond yield perspective and a volatility spillover 
effects perspective. Our study also assesses bond market integration levels during each U.S. QE 
period. Unlike previous studies which only use the dummy or event study with a short window to 
quantify QE shocks, our study adopts the monetary surprise calculated with Federal future funds 
data as well as ten-year Treasury futures data to represent the QE surprises. These have only been 
used to estimate the spillover effects in global stock markets and have never been applied to global 
bond markets. Furthermore, compared to many studies that attempt to quantify QE spillover effects 
with a fix trend, I apply the DCC-MGARCH framework which allows for dynamic changes of the 
conditional correlations among global bond markets. The results generated from these models are 
expected to provide more accurate measures of the global spillover effects initiated by the U.S. QE 
policies. Next chapter will present the empirical results of each research object of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction 
Having outlined the methodology in Chapter Three, this chapter discusses the empirical results. It 
argues that with the increasing integration levels among international bond markets, the U.S. QE 
policy shocks (in particular the long-term U.S. QE shocks) significantly influenced the bond yields in 
most developed markets and bond volatilities in most emerging markets. In detail, this chapter first 
presents both the descriptive statistics of the long-term bond yield data. Next, this chapter reports 
the time series property and the structural breaks in the data. Then this chapter reports the 
empirical results of the market integration levels among global bond markets over the three U.S. QE 
periods. This chapter also reports the regression results of the U.S. QE policy spillover effects on 
global bond markets from both the bond yield and bond volatility perspectives. This chapter ends 
with a brief summary of the empirical results  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Data Properties 
This section presents the descriptive statistics on the changes in government bond yield data applied 
in this study. It describes global bond market movements after the U.S. subprime loan crisis (from 
2007 to 2016), and provides evidence of how the bond yields reacted during different U.S. QE 
periods. Figure 4.1 reveals the general movement of global bond yields after 2007. Figure 4.2 shows 
the first difference of daily bonds yield data. Table 4.1 summarises the bond yield data from ten 
long-term (ten-year) bond markets from 2007 to 2016. Tables 4.2 to 4.4 describe the long-term bond 
yield data during each of the U.S. QE periods, respectively. Tables 4.5 to 4.8 report the unconditional 
correlation among global bond markets during both the entire sample period and individual U.S. QE 
rounds, respectively. The time series properties of the data are also discussed in this section along 
with the unit root test results (see Table 4.9). 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.1 reveals the characteristics of bond yields from global bond market after 2007. The table 
shows the highest mean bond yields achieved in the Russian long-term market was 8.55%, while the 
lowest was the long-term Japanese bond yield, with a mean yield of 1.04%. The average bond yields 
were higher in emerging markets than in developed markets. One possible explanation could be that 
the widely-spread economic deterioration originated in the U.S. The long-term bond yield represent 
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investors’ expectations of future inflation. Since most of the advanced economies suffered from a 
recession over that period, investors would have had low or even negative expectations regarding 
future economic conditions and inflation rates. However, since then (after the 2007 Subprime Loan 
Crisis), the emerging markets exhibited better economic conditions than developed markets, and 
investors’ future expectations of their economic developments were higher than developed 
markets, which also indicates higher long-term bond yields. However, bond yield movements are 
different during each QE period. As Tables 4.2 to 4.4 show, during the U.S. QE1 and QE2 periods, 
most of the markets had higher mean bond yield than the mean bond yields for the entire sample 
period. The data shows seven markets exhibiting the highest mean bond yield values during the U.S. 
QE1 period. This indicates that during both the U.S. QE1 and QE2 periods, especially during the U.S. 
QE1 period, global bond yields are at a comparative high level. However, during the U.S. QE3 period, 
only a few markets (China and India) have higher bond yields than the entire sample mean value, 
which indicates that most bond yields dropped in the QE3 period. This can also be supported by the 
mean and median difference results shown in Table 4-5. Based on these results, the bond yields 
from all markets tends to have a pronounced difference in their mean and median values, since all 
the results reject the null hypothesis of same mean and median across different U.S. QE periods. This 
indicates that within each of the U.S. QE programs, the Fed’s absorbed a large amount of floating 
long-term Treasury bonds (the majority had a ten-year maturity). This significantly changed the 
supply and demand relationship of the U.S. Treasury market and may have spread to the rest of the 
world (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4-1 Global Bond Yield Movements (2007 to 2016) 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on data from Bloomberg and DataStream 
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Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Bond Yields (2007 to 2016) 
 
US10 UK10 JP10 CH10 BR10 IN10 RU10 AU10 FR10 GE10 
 Mean 2.92 3.13 1.04 3.72 4.61 7.97 8.55 4.53 2.87 2.43 
 Median 2.74 2.98 1.03 3.6 4.59 7.98 7.87 4.35 3.02 2.33 
 Maximum 5.29 5.55 1.97 4.71 11.13 9.48 16.24 6.79 4.84 4.68 
 Minimum 1.39 1.33 0.2 2.78 2.24 5.08 6.26 2.28 0.35 0.08 
 Std. Dev. 0.92 1.12 0.43 0.43 1.18 0.62 2.03 1.19 1.14 1.24 
 Skewness 0.53 0.36 -0.01 0.43 0.41 -1.01 1.27 -0.07 -0.37 0.05 
 Kurtosis 2.37 1.94 1.92 2.21 4.14 5.43 4.11 1.67 2.15 1.8 
 Jarque-Bera 141.74 158.87 113.62 133.88 193.24 971.22 749.07 174.98 122.83 140.4 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 2333 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Bond Yields (U.S. QE1 Period) 
 
US10 UK10 JP10 CH10 BR10 IN10 RU10 AU10 FR10 GE10 
Mean 3.26 3.66 1.35 3.38 5.39 6.98 10.82 5.1 3.6 3.24 
Median 3.41 3.68 1.33 3.38 5.22 7.06 11.26 5.43 3.58 3.24 
Maximum 3.95 4.23 1.56 3.71 7.73 8.02 15.88 5.86 4.05 3.72 
Minimum 2.05 2.95 1.17 2.78 4.61 5.08 7.02 3.86 3.36 2.89 
Std. Dev. 0.45 0.278 0.07 0.21 0.54 0.64 2.27 0.6 0.14 0.16 
Skewness -0.8 -0.49 0.37 -0.68 1.66 -0.6 0.16 -0.65 0.77 0.35 
Kurtosis 2.71 2.66 2.85 3.3 6.2 2.89 2.28 1.78 3.25 3.35 
Jarque-Bera 38.62 15.42 8.05 28.41 308.55 21.14 9.03 46.2 34.89 9.08 
Probability 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 
Observations 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 4-3 Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Bond Yields (U.S. QE2 Period) 
 
US10 UK10 JP10 CH10 BR10  IN10 RU10 AU10 FR10 GE10 
 Mean 3.24 3.49 1.2 3.92 4.28  8.11 7.85 5.48 3.44 3.06 
 Median 3.33 3.51 1.21 3.91 4.17  8.1 7.84 5.5 3.45 3.10 
 Maximum 3.74 3.88 1.36 4.13 4.76  8.46 8.3 5.78 3.78 3.49 
 Minimum 2.49 2.95 0.93 3.72 3.54  7.89 7.39 5.02 2.82 2.39 
 Std. Dev. 0.26 0.2 0.08 0.07 0.25  0.13 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.24 
 Skewness -0.72 -0.3 -0.73 0.37 0.02  0.48 -0.07 -0.64 -0.91 -0.92 
 Kurtosis 2.96 2.63 3.89 3 2.69  2.43 2.26 3 3.74 3.69 
 Jarque-Bera 14.42 3.5 20.29 3.85 0.68  8.58 3.96 11.41 27 26.97 
 Probability 0 0.17 0 0.15 0.71  0.01 0.14 0 0 0 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167  167 167 167 167 167 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Table 4-4 Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Bond Yields (U.S. QE3 Period) 
 
US10 UK10 JP10 CH10 BR10 IN10 RU10 AU10 FR10 GE10 
 Mean 2.35 2.37 0.67 3.97 3.66 8.36 7.88 3.66 2.04 1.49 
 Median 2.51 2.48 0.64 4.03 3.8 8.48 7.68 3.61 2.14 1.52 
 Maximum 3.03 3.07 0.93 4.71 4.84 9.24 10.22 4.39 2.63 2.05 
 Minimum 1.58 1.62 0.45 3.29 2.24 7.2 6.44 2.87 1.13 0.76 
 Std. Dev. 0.42 0.4 0.11 0.4 0.72 0.47 0.98 0.38 0.34 0.28 
 Skewness -0.44 -0.31 0.22 0.15 -0.38 -0.56 0.53 0.13 -0.84 -0.45 
 Kurtosis 1.75 1.69 2.08 1.58 1.86 2.41 2.1 1.8 2.92 2.68 
 Jarque-Bera 53.36 48.5 23.74 48.01 42.69 36.58 44.3 34.47 64.19 21.22 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 4-5 Mean and Median Difference for Bond Yields across Different U.S. QE Periods  
 Mean Difference Median Difference 
Market Anova F-test Welch F-test Med. Chi-square Kruskal-Wallis 
US 654.1*** 729.1*** 589.8*** 613.3*** 
UK 1750*** 1789*** 986.6*** 806.9*** 
JP 6197*** 6535.1*** 994.4*** 852.7*** 
CH 395.5*** 921.6*** 422.3*** 487.6*** 
BR 860.1*** 896.7*** 527.2*** 747.8*** 
IN 842.9*** 619.3*** 512*** 649.8*** 
RU 461.6*** 288.8*** 210.4*** 388.9*** 
AU 1700.9*** 3884.1*** 733.8*** 749.2*** 
FR 4120.6*** 4562.9*** 994.4*** 813.3*** 
GE 6749.2*** 7456.4*** 994.4*** 811.2*** 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 4-6 Unconditional Correlation among Long-Term Bond Yields (2007 to 2016) 
 
US10  UK10  JP10  CH10  BR10  IN10  RU10  AU10  FR10  GE10  
US10      1.00 
         
UK10   0.97***     1.00 
        
JP10   0.83***  0.90***     1.00 
       
CH10   0.27***  0.29***  0.09***     1.00 
      
BR10   0.69***  0.67***  0.50***    -0.03     1.00 
     
IN10  -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.25***  0.59*** -0.38***     1.00 
    
RU10  -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.36***  0.12*** -0.46***     1.00 
   
AU10   0.88***  0.94***  0.91***  0.30***  0.50*** -0.07*** -0.47***    1.00 
  
FR10   0.78***  0.88***  0.97***  0.19***  0.44*** -0.15*** -0.43*** 0.91***    1.00 
 
GE10   0.88***  0.95***  0.97***  0.21***  0.56*** -0.20*** -0.40*** 0.95*** 0.97***    1.00 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-7 Unconditional Correlation among Long-Term Bond Yields (U.S. QE1 Period) 
 
US10  UK10  JP10  CH10  BR10  IN10  RU10  AU10  FR10  GE10  
US10      1.00 
         
UK10   0.83***     1.00 
        
JP10   0.37***  0.27***     1.00 
       
CH10   0.71***  0.54***     0.04     1.00 
      
BR10  -0.50*** -0.29***    -0.08 -0.33***     1.00 
     
IN10   0.80***  0.68***     0.08  0.78*** -0.29***     1.00 
    
RU10  -0.63*** -0.67***     0.02 -0.51***  0.40*** -0.72***     1.00 
   
AU10   0.94***  0.75***  0.30***  0.73*** -0.57***  0.81*** -0.70***     1.00 
  
FR10  0.11**     0.09  0.64*** -0.21***      0.03 -0.29***  0.39***    -0.02    1.00 
 
GE10   0.63***  0.54***  0.66***  0.27*** -0.29***  0.20*** -0.14***  0.57*** 0.76***    1.00 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4-8 Unconditional Correlation among Long-Term Bond Yields (U.S. QE2 Period) 
 
US10  UK10  JP10  CH10  BR10  IN10  RU10  AU10  FR10  GE10  
US10        1.00 
         
UK10  0.94***       1.00 
        
JP10  0.87*** 0.90***       1.00 
       
CH10  0.37*** 0.45*** 0.49***       1.00 
      
BR10  0.61*** 0.53*** 0.63***    0.17**       1.00 
     
IN10  -0.24*** -0.31*** -0.20***       0.08 -0.24***       1.00 
    
RU10      -0.10      -0.11      -0.01 0.35***      -0.03 0.64***       1.00 
   
AU10  0.74*** 0.83*** 0.67*** 0.23*** 0.30*** -0.54*** -0.49***       1.00 
  
FR10  0.85*** 0.79*** 0.85*** 0.44*** 0.76***      -0.04 0.20*** 0.43***       1.00 
 
GE10  0.84*** 0.77*** 0.84*** 0.41*** 0.76***      -0.03 0.20*** 0.43*** 0.99***    1.00 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 4-9 Unconditional Correlation among Long-Term Bond Yields (U.S. QE3 Period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
 
US10 UK10 JP10 CH10 BR10 IN10 RU10 AU10 FR10 GE10 
US10        1.00 
         
UK10  0.97*** 1.00 
        
JP10  -0.26*** -0.29*** 1.00 
       
CH10  0.83*** 0.87*** -0.51*** 1.00 
      
BR10  0.95*** 0.90*** -0.25*** 0.77*** 1.00 
     
IN10  0.67*** 0.74*** -0.58*** 0.87*** 0.59*** 1.00 
    
RU10  0.47*** 0.46*** -0.62*** 0.60*** 0.41*** 0.57***       1.00 
   
AU10  0.88*** 0.88*** -0.13*** 0.79*** 0.86*** 0.63*** 0.19*** 1.00 
  
FR10  0.18*** 0.21*** 0.64*** 0.03 0.19***     -0.03     -0.59*** 0.46*** 1.00 
 
GE10  0.40*** 0.42*** 0.54*** 0.20*** 0.38*** 0.12*** -0.47*** 0.63*** 0.96*** 1.00 
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Figure 4.1 reports the daily ten-year generic government bond yield data of the ten bond markets 
during 2007 to 2016. The vertical bars indicate the date of each individual U.S. QE program was 
announced by the Federal Reserves. There was a significant decline in most bond yields right after 
the first announcement of both the U.S. QE1 and QE2 programs. Since then, the global bond yields 
have gradually decreased. This is consistent with the mean bond yields reported in Tables 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4 which show that most of the bond yields are highest during the U.S. QE1 period (seven 
out of ten markets).       
Although mean bond yield values are higher during the U.S. QE1 and QE2 periods, the bond yield 
volatility (standard deviation) is different. Most of the bond yield volatility values (with the exception 
of India and Russia in the U.S. QE1 period) are lower than the entire sample values. This suggests 
that during the U.S. QE periods, the bond yields are less volatile compared to the non-QE period. In 
other words, for most bond markets, the U.S. QE programs reduce the volatility of the global ten-
year bond markets. Conversely, most of the bond volatilities are higher in the QE3 period than the 
other two QE periods, which suggests that bond yields are more volatile during this period than 
others.  
Apart from the mean and standard deviation values reported, there are other values to discuss. 
Most of the bond yields are positively skewed during the entire sample period, but the bond yields 
during each QE period are mostly negatively skewed. This suggests that during the U.S. QE periods, 
most of the yield change series have long left tails. Most of the kurtosis values are less than 3, which 
suggests that compared to the normal distribution, the bond yield series have less and fewer 
extreme outliers and the distribution curves are flatter. Except for some bond yield series during the 
U.S. QE2 period, none of the series shows any evidence of normal distribution since the Jarque-Bera 
statistics significantly reject the null hypothesis of normality. Figure 4.2 describes the daily difference 
data of bond yields (also known as the first difference of the original data), and shows a volatility 
clustering phenomena in all of the data series. More specifically, the volatility clustering implies large 
changes on bond yield generally followed by large bond yield changes while small changes on bond 
yield tend to be followed by small bond yield changes. It is for this reason that I used the GARCH 
type model in this study. The GARCH model measures the volatility clustering phenomena in 
financial data (Bollerslev 1986; Bai, Russell & Tiao 2003). Furthermore, the GARCH models allow the 
bond yield volatility to be dependent on past volatility processes rather than assuming constant 
volatility. 
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Figure 4-2 Daily Differenced Data of Global Bond Yields (2007 to 2016) 
Data Source: Author’s Calculations based on Data from Bloomberg and DataStream 
 
In addition to the descriptive statistics presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.4, there are also unconditional 
correlation values reported in Tables 4.6 to 4.9. As these tables demonstrate, most of the long-term 
bond markets are significantly correlated during the entire sample period. In advanced markets, the 
correlation is generally much higher than emerging markets, with the highest (97%), between U.S. 
ten-year bond yield and the U.K. ten-year bond yield. The correlation between advanced markets is 
also highly correlated during each of the U.S. QE period. For instance, during the U.S. QE1 period, 
the correlation between Australia and the U.S. is 94%. During the U.S. QE2 period, the correlation 
between France and Germany is 99%. In terms of the U.S. QE3 period, the highest correlation is 97% 
between the U.S. and the U.K. This is no surprise since developed markets have demonstrated 
higher levels of market integration for many years. However, the situation for emerging markets is 
different. The correlation within emerging markets is comparatively lower than developed markets, 
with 87% between China and India during the U.S. QE3 period. Most of the correlation coefficients 
for emerging markets are less than 50%, some are insignificant. The correlation between emerging 
and developed markets are negative, which suggests bond yields in advanced and emerging markets 
move in the opposite direction.  
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4.2.2 Time Series Property of the Data 
Having discussed the descriptive statistics in the previous section, I now describes the unit root test 
results for the stationary of the data series. Prior to the estimation of either SVAR or DCC-MGARCH 
models, I apply the unit root test to ensure the data series are statistically stationary, otherwise, 
there may be spurious regression problems. The spurious regression problem implies that regression 
results may be statistically meaningless even with high R2 and the t statistics that appear to be 
significant (Granger & Newbold, 1974). First of all, based on the visual impression of the bond yield 
changes, there is a trend and intercept for all of the data series (see Figure 4.1). Therefore, I run the 
unit root tests with both trend and intercept included for the level. Later on, for the first differenced 
data, I choose no trend nor intercept (see Figure 4.2). The results in Table 4.10 show that most of the 
ten-year bond yield series are non-stationary at level (except for JP), while they are all stationary in 
first differences, which means that the data series are integrated of order 1 (Dickey & Fuller, 1979). 
Therefore, the first differenced data of all bond yield series are used in the regression model to avoid 
the spurious regression problem. Another reason of choosing the log differenced data for all bond 
yield series is the benefit on result discussion and interpretation. Since most financial data is 
nonstationary and the ranges of value are various from each other, there may be the large value 
problem when using the level of data. The log differenced data represent the % change of the bond 
yields rather than the actual changes of the data, which can avoid the too large values in the data 
analysis. Also based on the various unit root results, most of the data series are I(1) only except for 
JP. In this case, I choose to adopt I (1) of the data (the log differenced data) for all the data series. 
This will not provide a large over-differencing problem (only the JP data has been over-differenced).  
Table 4-10 Unit Root Results among ADF, DFGLS, PP and Break Point ADF Tests 
Markets ADF DFGLS PP Break Point ADF 
US I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
UK I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
JP I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
CH I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
BR I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
IN I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
RU I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
AU I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
FR I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
GE I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Results based on author’s calculation. The null hypothesis for each test is there is a unit root in the 
data, or in other words, the data series is not stationary. 
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4.2.3 Tests for Structural Break Points 
In order to address the potential structural breaks induced by the U.S. QE policy shocks, I run more 
tests of the models. First, as stated in section 4.2.2, I run the break point unit root (ADF) tests for all 
the data series. The tests show similar results with other non-break point unit root tests as stated in 
Table 4.10.  
Regarding the structural breaks in models, first based on the reality and my study design, I test 
whether the starting and ending dates are the structural break points for all the bond yield data. 
Based on the joint Chow test results reported in Table 4.11, I reject the null hypothesis of none 
breaks at these specified breakpoints. This indicates that all of these dates are break points. 
According to these results, I use different methods to incorporate the structural breaks. In my SVAR 
models, I not only run the regression on the entire sample, but also divide it into three subsamples. 
Each subsample measures the global bond yield movements during the different U.S. QE periods. 
This avoids the potential effects from the structural breaks. In terms of DCC-MGARCH model, I 
incorporate the dummy variables which represent the individual U.S. QE rounds to control for the 
potential structural breaks brought by the U.S. QE policies. Besides the structural breaks described in 
Table 4.11, I also conclude the structural break points suggested by the break point unit root tests in 
Table 4.12. 
Table 4-11 Chow Tests for All Starting and Ending Dates of U.S. QE Policies 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 11/25/2008 3/25/2010 11/03/2010 6/27/2011 9/13/2012 10/29/2014 
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables  
Equation Sample: 1/01/2007 12/31/2015  
     
     
F-statistic 264.9773  Prob. F(60,2269) 0.0000 
Log likelihood ratio 4865.828  Prob. Chi-Square(60) 0.0000 
Wald Statistic 15898.64  Prob. Chi-Square(60) 0.0000 
     
     
Author’s calculation. 
Table 4-12 Break Point Dates for All Markets from Break Point Unit Root Tests 
Market Level 1st Difference Log Difference 
US 4/27/2012 12/16/2008 11/14/2008 
UK 4/11/2012 3/24/2009 10/07/2014 
JP 5/25/2007 5/14/2013 11/05/2014 
CH 7/23/2014 6/27/2007 9/11/2008 
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BR 10/24/2012 10/22/2008 4/26/2013 
IN 3/28/2014 8/19/2013 11/18/2008 
RU 12/04/2012 12/19/2008 11/19/2008 
AU 3/21/2007 6/24/2013 3/22/2013 
FR 8/14/2013 11/15/2011 12/17/2014 
GE 5/15/2012 7/10/2015 1/30/2015 
Author’s calculation. 
I also try to incorporate the log-differenced break point dates (Table 4.12) into the regressions. In 
case of the SVAR model, I create an individual dummy variables for each markets. The value is zero 
all before the break point date and then one. I also add the dummy variables which represent the 
break dates for each series into the DCC-MGARCH models10. 
4.3 Empirical Results and Discussions of Market Integration during the U.S. 
QE Periods  
Having examined the stationarity of the data in previous section, this section presents the empirical 
results of the market integration level (also known as the market interrelationship) among the 
international bond markets during different U.S. QE periods. In order to achieve this objective, both 
the short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks are incorporated as exogenous variables within the 
Structural VAR (SVAR) framework. Before running the SVAR model, I first developed the reduced 
form VAR model and decided the optimal lag length for each model. Thereafter, I report the 
contemporaneous coefficients defined in the matrices A and B defined in Chapter 3. I also report the 
empirical results of both impulse response function and the variance decomposition generated 
within the SVAR framework. 
4.3.1 Optimal Lag Length of Unrestricted VAR Models 
As defined in section 4.1, the time series data applied in this study is the change of ten-year bond 
yield data (also known as the first difference of the ten-year bond yield data), which is all statistically 
stationary. Prior to using the SVAR model, I developed an unrestricted VAR model that included all of 
the ten long-term bond yield change data as an endogenous variable. The short-term and long-term 
U.S. QE policy shocks were also included as exogenous variables. Before estimating the SVAR 
models, I defined the lag-length of the dependent variables. The value of Akaike information 
criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) are 
                                                          
10  Both the SVAR results and DCC-MGARCH results with different break point dates provide similar findings as 
the ones without these break points. Since the priority of this study is to examine the impact from U.S. QE 
periods, and some of the break point dates are not included in the U.S. QE periods. Therefore, I do not include 
these results in my thesis for the brevity purpose. However, it is available upon requests. 
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reported in Table 4.13. Table 4.13 shows the AIC, SC and HQ values for both the entire sample 
period (2007 to 2016) and each U.S. QE period, respectively. 
Table 4-13 Information Criteria for Optimal Lag Length 
Panel A: Entire Sample Period  
Order AIC SC HQ 
0 24.187 24.263 24.215 
1 23.438 23.768* 23.558 
2 23.32 23.904 23.533* 
3 23.21 24.078 23.546 
4 23.238* 24.329 23.636 
5 23.239 24.585 23.73 
    
Panel B: U.S. QE1 Period  
Order AIC SC HQ 
0 21.642 21.989* 21.78 
1 20.671* 22.174 21.271* 
2 20.812 23.472 21.874 
3 20.831 24.648 22.354 
4 21.027 26 23.011 
5 21.242 27.371 23.687 
Panel C: U.S. QE2 Period  
Order AIC SC HQ 
0 13.077 13.661* 13.314* 
1 12.606* 15.137 13.634 
2 12.802 17.28 14.621 
3 13.111 19.535 15.72 
4 13.404 21.775 16.804 
5 13.766 24.083 17.956 
  
 
  
Panel D: U.S. QE3 Period  
Order AIC SC HQ 
0 19.781 20.024* 19.876 
1 19.177 20.228 19.589* 
2 19.15* 21.01 19.878 
3 19.185 21.853 20.229 
4 19.308 22.785 20.669 
5 19.382 23.667 21.059 
* indicates the optimal lag length selected by each criterion    
In line with previous literature (Kang et al., 2016; Kilian 2001; Yang 2005), I decided the optimal lag 
length for each VAR model based on the AIC criteria, since AIC is of higher accuracy in confidence 
intervals than other selection criteria in impulse response analysis (Kilian, 2001). Therefore, the lag 
length is 4 for the SVAR model to estimate the entire sample period, 1 for the U.S. QE1 and QE2 
period and 2 for the U.S. QE3 period. 
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4.3.2 The Contemporaneous Interactions among Global Bond Markets  
After deciding the optimal lag length for each SVAR model, for the brevity purpose, I report the 
coefficients of the structural matrix calculated in each SVAR model shown in Tables 4.6 to 4.9, 
respectively. In all four tables (Table 4.14 to 4.17), column 1 reports the variance of 
contemporaneous shocks from each individual bond yield, which is also the coefficients in matrix B 
defined in Chapter 3. Column 2 reports the contemporaneous influence from the U.S. bond yield to 
other bond yields. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 represent the contemporaneous influence from the 
U.K. and Japanese yields to other bond yields, respectively. As defined in Chapter 3, I assumed that 
the U.S. bond yield could affect others (including the U.K. and Japan). Also I believed that the U.K. 
bond yield can influence other bond yields (only except for the U.S.). The Japan bond yield could 
affect bond yields other than the U.S. and the U.K. These assumptions were made not only based on 
the fact that all three markets (the U.S., the U.K. and Japan) are leading economies, but also because 
these three economies implemented QE policies during the sample period.  
In terms of the contemporaneous effects from the U.S. bond market, most of them (both emerging 
and developed markets) are significant (see Table 4.14) during the entire sample period and within 
the U.S. QE1 period (see Table 4.15). However, for the later U.S. QE periods (the U.S. QE2 and QE3 
periods), there are less significant contemporaneous effects from the U.S. bond market (see Table 
4.16 and 4.17). This suggests that the integration level between the U.S. and other bond markets 
gradually declined over the U.S. QE periods. Moreover, the negative significant coefficients of the 
contemporaneous effects from the U.S. indicates a reverse trend between the U.S. bond yields and 
the bond yield in other markets. When compared to the contemporaneous impact from the U.K. and 
Japanese bond markets, the U.S. contemporaneous effects are more significant during the U.S. QE1 
and QE3 periods (see Table 4.16). The reason may be that both the U.S. QE1 and QE3 policies carried 
more unexpected shocks to the markets than the U.S. QE2 policy. More specifically, the U.S. QE1 
policy was the first unconventional monetary policy implemented after the 2008 financial crisis, 
which was unanticipated. In terms of the U.S. QE3 policy, although it was less unexpected compared 
to the U.S. QE1 and QE2 policies, it did contain information about the halt of future U.S. QE policies, 
which was unanticipated. In general, the contemporaneous effects from the U.S. bond market were 
larger than the U.K’s and Japanese for the most part; this suggests that the market interrelationship 
between the U.S. and others are higher than those of the U.K. and Japan.  
4.3.3 Impulse Response Analysis 
Apart from the contemporaneous coefficients estimated in the SVAR models, I also examined 
market integration levels based upon the impulse response function generated from the SVAR 
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models11. Impulse response analysis examines how long it takes for bond yields to return to zero 
level following one standard deviation shock in other bond markets. The shorter the response time 
(to return to pre-shock levels), the faster the speed of adjustment, which indicates a higher level of 
market integration (Phylaktis, 1999). Figures 4.3 to 4.5 show global bond impulse responses towards 
the U.S., the U.K. and Japanese bond market shocks during the entire sample period (2007 to 2016). 
Figures 4.6 to 4.8 report global bond impulse responses towards the U.S., the U.K. and Japanese 
bond shocks during the U.S. QE1 period. Figures 4.9 to 4.11 and Figures 4.12 to 4.14 depict global 
bond responses towards the U.S., the U.K. and Japan shocks during the U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods, 
respectively.  
Figures 4.3 to 4.5 display the global bond yield impulse responses to the shocks of the U.S., the U.K. 
and Japanese bond markets during the last decade (2007 to 2016), respectively. Specifically, most 
bond yields (only except for China and Russia) have a significant and positive response towards the 
U.S. shocks. This response reduces and then vanishes (becomes insignificant) instantly within three 
trading dates. In terms of the Chinese bond yields, they seem to be immune from the U.S. shocks. 
However, for the Russian markets, the bond yields exhibit a negative but gradually increase response 
to the U.S. shocks. In case of the U.K. and Japanese shocks, they have less pronounced impact on 
especially the bond yields in emerging markets as well as the U.S. markets. Another interesting 
finding is that, for the U.S. bond yields, their impulse responses are only significant to their own 
shocks. During this period, the global bond yields adjust quicker following the U.S. bond yield shocks 
than following the U.K. and Japanese bond shocks. Following the U.S. bond shocks, the bond yield 
responses in developed markets generally lasted for one week and then returned to zero level. As 
for the emerging bond yields, it took less than ten days to go back to zero level. In the case of the 
U.K. and Japanese bond shocks, the responses from the global bond yields lasted approximately ten 
days. This indicates that over the last decade (2007 to 2016), the global bond markets adjusted 
quicker to the U.S. bond shocks than the U.K. and Japanese shocks.  
Meanwhile, most of the bond yields showed positive responses following the U.S., U.K. and Japanese 
bond shocks. Russia was the only market that exhibited negative instant responses to the bond yield 
shocks from the U.S., the U.K. and Japan. In terms of the magnitude of the responses, the U.S. bond 
shocks triggered larger responses than the U.K. and Japanese bond yield shocks. Specifically, all of 
the developed bond yields ranged more than 30% intervals due to the U.S. bond shocks (the widest 
fluctuating interval was the U.S. bond yield ranges from 80% to -5%), while for the emerging bond 
yields, they fluctuated within 10% intervals. As for the impulse responses towards the U.K. and 
                                                          
11 Only the impulse response results from the U.S., the U.K. and Japan shocks are reported in this study. 
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Japanese bond shocks, most of the bond yields changed within 10% intervals, some within 5% 
intervals. Based on the speed adjustment of the global bond markets, and the magnitude of the 
responses following the U.S., U.K. and Japanese bond shocks, it is evident that the global bond 
markets are more integrated with the U.S. bond markets than with the U.K. and Japanese markets. 
Figures 4.6 to 4.8 portray the impulse response results from the global bond markets following the 
U.S., U.K. and Japanese bond shocks during the U.S. QE1 period. As with the impulse responses for 
the entire sample period (2007 to 2016), most of the bond yields responded positively to the U.S., 
U.K. and Japanese bond shocks immediately after the shocks. However, compared to the adjustment 
speed of the impulse responses from 2007 to 2016, the adjusted speed of the responses during the 
U.S. QE1 were faster. During the U.S. QE1 period, the impulse responses following the U.S. bond 
shocks generally lasted for five days, which was considerably shorter than the responses (from 5 to 
12 days) from the previous decade (2007 to 2016).  
During the U.S. QE1 period, the adjusted speed of the global bond yields in response to the U.K. and 
Japanese bond shocks also increased. It took approximately 7 days for global bond yields to respond 
to the U.K. and Japanese bond shocks during the U.S. QE1 period. However, the impulse responses 
for the global bond yields due to the U.K. and Japan bond shocks generally lasted 10 days. This 
suggests that during the U.S. QE1 period, market integration levels between all three markets (the 
U.S., the U.K. and Japan) and global bond markets are increasing. In terms of the magnitude of the 
impulse responses, the emerging bond yields responded (following the U.S. bond shocks) were more 
volatile than during the entire sample period. For example, the Brazilian bond yield ranged from 20% 
to zero level due to the U.S. bond shocks (during the U.S. QE1 period), while the interval ranged 
from 10% to -1% from 2007 to 2016. Similar to the U.S. bond shocks, the U.K. and Japanese bond 
yield shocks also triggered more intense emerging bond yield responses during the U.S. QE1 period. 
For instance, Russian bond yields changed from 5% to -25% in response to the U.K. shock during the 
U.S. QE1 period. However, for the entire sample period, following the U.K. shocks, Russian bond 
yields fluctuated from 4% to -4%. In the case of the Japanese shocks, Russian bond yields dropped 
from 15% to zero level during the U.S. QE1 period. When considering the entire sample period, 
Russian bond yield fluctuated within intervals of 3% to -1%.    
In terms of impulse responses during the U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods, the results are similar to the 
responses during the U.S. QE1 period (see Figure 4.9 to 4.14). The global bond impulse responses 
towards all three markets (the U.S., the U.K. and the Japanese) last for a shorter period than the 
ones during the entire sample period (2007 to 2016). This faster speed of global bond yield 
adjustment indicates higher levels of integration between these three markets and the global bond 
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markets. The positive responses from most bond markets suggests a positive co-movements of 
global bond yields. In other words, most of the bond yields tended to move in the same direction 
during this time. The emerging bond yield fluctuated more following the U.S., U.K. and Japanese 
shocks during the U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods than during the entire sample period. This is consistent 
with emerging bond yield responses during the U.S. QE1 period, which suggests a larger response in 
emerging markets during the U.S. QE periods.  
4.3.4 Variance Decomposition Analysis 
The variance decomposition analysis tests what proportion the variance of each dependent variable 
changes in response to the shocks. I use variance decomposition to examine how much of the bond 
yield variance changes due to the U.S., U.K., Japanese and domestic bond market shocks12. Table 
4.18 reports the variance decomposition results of global bond yields variance decomposed by the 
U.S., U.K., Japan, along with the domestic factors. Each bond yield is decomposed and forecasted for 
1, 5, 10 and 15 days (Horizon column in Table 4.18). In Table 4.18, there are four columns within 
each decomposed factor (the U.S., U.K., Japan and domestic factors), which represents the different 
SVAR results estimated to examine global bond market integration levels during the entire sample 
period (entire column), and the U.S. QE1, QE2 and QE3 periods, respectively. Most of the bond yield 
variances are subject to domestic factors. During the entire sample period, the domestic shocks 
accounted for all of the bond yield variances from the sample markets; the highest, in the U.S. bond 
yield variance can be fully explained by the initial domestic shocks. Likewise, the lowest, in the 
German bond market, with around 60% of the bond yield variance, can be explained by the domestic 
shocks. The effects from the domestic shocks on the most developed bond yield variances gradually 
reduce over ten 10 days following the initial domestic shocks. Thereafter, the effects of domestic 
shocks on developed bond yield variances are stable. However, the effects of domestic shocks on 
emerging bond yield variances are more constant when compared with developed bond yield 
variances. Emerging bond yield variances (due to domestic shocks) tended to change only 5 days 
after the initial domestic shocks happened. This suggests that emerging bond yield variances are 
more subject to domestic shocks rather than external shocks or those from other markets. In the 
case of developed bond yield variances, these were not only affected by domestic shocks, but also 
by external shocks as well. This indicates that developed bond markets are more integrated with 
global bond markets than emerging markets.  
                                                          
12 Only global bond markets variances decomposed by the U.S., U.K., and Japan (and domestic factors) are 
reported in this study. 
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This study found several interesting observations related to the effects of the shocks in the U.S. QE 
periods. Firstly, compared to the entire sample period, most of the bond yield variances were less 
affected by their domestic shocks. Only a few bond yield variances were more subject to their 
domestic shocks during the U.S. QE periods than the entire sample period (the U.K. and Japan during 
the U.S. QE1 period and India and Australia during the U.S. QE3 period). Most developed bond yield 
variances were affected less by domestic shocks than the emerging bond yield variances. This 
indicates that global bond markets, especially the developed bond markets, are more integrated 
with each other during the U.S. QE periods.   
Moreover, compared to the bond yield variances induced by external shocks (from the U.S., the U.K. 
and Japanese markets) during entire sample period, within the three U.S. QE periods, most of the 
bond yield variance changes were the result of external shocks, not only from the U.S., but also from 
the U.K. and Japanese markets. The increasing proportion of the bond yield variance changes 
explained by external shocks, suggests growing market integration levels for global bond markets, 
among the U.S., the U.K. and Japanese markets. However, most bond yield variance changes were 
more affected by the U.S. shocks than by those from the U.K. or Japan; this indicates that global 
bond markets are much more integrated with U.S. bond markets than with the U.K. and Japanese 
markets. 
In terms of the U.S. shocks, there was an increasing proportion of bond yield variance changes in most 
developed markets, induced by the U.S. shocks during the U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods. This growing 
trend indicates that during the U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods, most developed bond yield variance changes 
were affected by the U.S. shocks than during the U.S. QE1 period. However, the bond yield variance 
changes in emerging markets were more affected by the U.S. shocks, particularly during the U.S. QE1 
period. This means that emerging markets are far more integrated with the U.S. bond market in the 
U.S. QE1 period, while developed markets are more integrated with the U.S. market in the U.S. QE3 
period. .     
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Table 4-14 Structural Matrix Coefficients for the Entire Sample Period 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
CUS 0.797*** CUSUK -0.512*** CUKJP -0.082** CJPCH -0.001 
CUK 0.709*** CUSJP -0.099*** CUKCH 0.004 CJPBR -0.027 
CJP 1.128*** CUSCH -0.018 CUKBR -0.004 CJPIN -0.002 
CCH 0.592*** CUSBR -0.111*** CUKIN 0.021* CJPRU 0.01 
CBR 0.934*** CUSIN -0.027** CUKRU 0.065* CJPAU -0.061*** 
CIN 0.371*** CUSRU 0.056 CUKAU -0.114*** CJPFR -0.078*** 
CRU 1.201*** CUSAU -0.055*** CUKFR -0.598*** CJPGE -0.089*** 
CAU 0.574*** CUSFR -0.081*** CUKGE -1.125***   
CFR 0.893*** CUSGE -0.191***     
CGE 1.323***       
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Table 4-15 Structural Matrix Coefficients for the U.S. QE1 Period 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
CUS 0.865*** CUSUK -0.266*** CUKJP -0.023 CJPCH 0.044 
CUK 0.764*** CUSJP -0.041 CUKCH -0.025 CJPBR -0.227** 
CJP 0.577*** CUSCH -0.081** CUKBR 0.08 CJPIN -0.056 
CCH 0.602*** CUSBR -0.217*** CUKIN 0.074 CJPRU -0.245 
CBR 1.009*** CUSIN -0.108** CUKRU 0.328* CJPAU -0.26*** 
CIN 0.644*** CUSRU -0.057 CUKAU -0.019 CJPFR 0.007 
CRU 2.559*** CUSAU -0.127*** CUKFR -0.406*** CJPGE -0.01 
CAU 0.537*** CUSFR -0.067*** CUKGE -0.505***   
CFR 0.381*** CUSGE -0.105***     
CGE 0.437***       
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively  
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Table 4-16 Structural Matrix Coefficients for the U.S. QE2 Period 
 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
CUS 0.709*** CUSUK -0.374*** CUKJP -0.309** CJPCH -0.097* 
CUK 0.441*** CUSJP -0.039 CUKCH 0.031 CJPBR -0.044 
CJP 0.765*** CUSCH 0.035 CUKBR 0.3** CJPIN -0.003 
CCH 0.536*** CUSBR -0.305*** CUKIN 0.023 CJPRU 0.114* 
CBR 0.784*** CUSIN 0.003 CUKRU -0.196* CJPAU -0.133*** 
CIN 0.2*** CUSRU 0.134* CUKAU -0.135*** CJPFR 0.011 
CRU 0.601*** CUSAU 0.027 CUKFR -0.619*** CJPGE 0.035 
CAU 0.286*** CUSFR 0.013 CUKGE -0.81***   
CFR 0.348*** CUSGE -0.041     
CGE 0.423***       
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively  
Table 4-17 Structural Matrix Coefficients for the U.S. QE3 Period 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
CUS 0.672*** CUSUK -0.636*** CUKJP -0.054 CJPCH 0.006 
CUK 0.613*** CUSJP -0.114 CUKCH -0.035 CJPBR -0.022 
CJP 1.107*** CUSCH -0.032 CUKBR -0.095 CJPIN 0.005 
CCH 0.578*** CUSBR -0.25*** CUKIN 0.01 CJPRU 0.003 
CBR 1.014*** CUSIN 0.016 CUKRU 0.037 CJPAU -0.048* 
CIN 0.356*** CUSRU 0.031 CUKAU -0.062 CJPFR -0.047** 
CRU 0.54*** CUSAU -0.027 CUKFR -0.527*** CJPGE -0.047** 
CAU 0.63*** CUSFR -0.077* CUKGE -0.883***   
CFR 0.579*** CUSGE -0.169***     
CGE 0.546***       
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively  
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Figure 4-3 Impulse Responses to U.S. Bond Shocks (2007 to 2016) 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-4 Impulse Responses to the U.K. Bond Shocks (2007 to 2016) 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-5 Impulse Responses to Japanese Bond Shocks (2007 to 2016) 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-6 Impulse Response to U.S. Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE1 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-7 Impulse Responses to the U.K. Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE1 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-8 Impulse Responses to Japanese Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE1 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 79 
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of US10 to US shock
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of UK10 to US shock
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of JP10 to US shock
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of CH10 to US shock
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of BR10 to US shock
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of IN10 to US shock
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of RU10 to US shock
-.1
.0
.1
.2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of AU10 to US shock
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of FR10 to US shock
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Response of GE10 to US shock
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
  
Figure 4-9 Impulse Response to U.S. Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE2 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-10 Impulse Response to U.K. Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE2 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-11 Impulse Response to Japanese Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE2 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-12 Impulse Responses to U.S. Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE3 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-13 Impulse Responses to U.K. Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE3 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Figure 4-14 Impulse Responses to Japanese Bond Shocks during the U.S. QE3 Period 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 4-18 Variance Decomposition with the U.S., U.K., Japanese and Domestic Yields (%) 
Markets Horizon US UK JP Domestic 
  Entire  USQE1 USQE2 USQE3 Entire  USQE1 USQE2 USQE3 Entire  USQE1 USQE2 USQE3 Entire  USQE1 USQE2 USQE3 
US 
1 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 
5 98.849 92.574 82.704 92.744  0.291 0.248 0.276 0.551 0.178 0.28 0.037 0.074 98.849 92.574 82.704 92.744  
10 96.387 92.574 82.702 92.728 0.296 0.248 0.276 0.551 0.189 0.28 0.038 0.077 96.387 92.574 82.702 92.728 
15 96.274 92.574 82.702 92.728 0.297 0.248 0.276 0.551 0.189 0.28 0.038 0.077 96.274 92.574 82.702 92.728 
UK 
1 24.862 8.283 26.609 32.754 75.138 91.717 73.391 67.246 0 0 0 0 75.138 91.717 73.391 67.246 
5 25.465 13.462 26.596 31.486 71.442 81.685 60.741 63.374 0.137 0.367 2.018 0.421 71.442 81.685 60.741 63.374 
10 25.422 13.462 26.593 31.479 71.34 81.684 60.735 63.359 0.15 0.367 2.021 0.423 71.34 81.684 60.735 63.359 
15 25.422 13.462 26.593 31.479 71.34 81.684 60.735 63.359 0.15 0.367 2.021 0.423 71.34 81.684 60.735 63.359 
JP 
1 0.978 0.5 1.949 0.808 0.263 0.094 3.017 0.09 98.759 99.406 95.033 99.102 98.759 99.406 95.033 99.102 
5 7.142 13.234 16.257 6.855 0.95 1.125 2.433 0.545 88.122 80.718 72.723 89.546 88.122 80.718 72.723 89.546 
10 7.176 13.234 16.257 6.854 0.962 1.125 2.433 0.551 87.819 80.717 72.72 89.521 87.819 80.717 72.72 89.521 
15 7.166 13.234 16.257 6.854 0.962 1.125 2.433 0.551 87.818 80.717 72.72 89.521 87.818 80.717 72.72 89.521 
CH 
1 0.045 1.495 0.177 0.383 0.002 0.088 0.001 0.132 0.001 0.176 1.871 0.012 99.952 98.242 97.951 99.473 
5 0.416 1.92 1.602 1.015 0.214 3.123 0.411 0.448 0.172 0.158 1.55 1.171 96.624 93.22 89.136 95.059 
10 0.423 1.92 1.605 1.014 0.251 3.123 0.415 0.448 0.178 0.158 1.55 1.171 96.332 93.217 89.12 95.05 
15 0.424 1.92 1.605 1.014 0.251 3.123 0.415 0.448 0.178 0.158 1.55 1.171 96.33 93.217 89.12 95.05 
BR 
1 0.993 2.971 3.054 4.116 0.002 0.308 2.454 0.322 0.108 1.603 0.175 0.054 98.896 95.118 94.317 95.508 
5 1.063 3.296 4.378 4.672 0.107 1.187 2.693 1.164 0.366 1.751 0.45 0.306 96.156 92.007 86.777 91.641 
10 1.077 3.296 4.386 4.671 0.112 1.187 2.697 1.164 0.381 1.751 0.45 0.307 96.035 92.007 86.753 91.617 
15 1.077 3.296 4.386 4.671 0.112 1.187 2.697 1.164 0.381 1.751 0.45 0.307 96.035 92.07 86.753 91.617 
IN 
1 0.124 1.44 0.146 0.18 0.156 0.736 0.242 0.03 0.003 0.246 0.011 0.024 99.717 97.578 99.601 99.767 
5 1.341 3.674 0.494 0.564 0.55 3 0.697 0.274 0.23 1.529 0.62 0.112 95.916 89.14 82.426 95.954 
10 1.391 3.674 0.494 0.565 0.616 3 0.697 0.274 0.253 1.529 0.62 0.112 95.694 89.14 82.425 95.945 
15 1.391 3.674 0.494 0.565 0.616 3 0.697 0.274 0.253 1.529 0.62 0.112 95.692 89.14 82.425 95.945 
RU 
1 0.357 0.004 0.809 0.463  0.149 0.916 1.329 0.179 0.009 0.3 2.02 0.003 99.485 98.78 95.843 99.354 
5 0.497 0.289 2.113 1.018 0.248 0.799 1.745 0.258 0.06 0.396 2.719 1.187 96.564 94.767 89.659 95.209 
10 0.525 0.289 2.112 1.022 0.333 0.799 1.746 0.264 0.071 0.397 2.72 1.19 96.322 94.765 89.656 95.185 
15 0.525 0.289 2.112 1.022 0.333 0.799 1.746 0.264 0.071 0.397 2.72 1.19 96.321 94.765 89.656 95.185 
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 AU 
1 2.718 4.812 0.959 0.603 2.043 0.116 6.068 0.383 1.355 6.873 10.45 0.693 93.884 88.199 82.523 98.321 
5 16.036 18.668 18.64 12.095 2.965 5.191 4.412 1.005 1.65 5.942 7.094 1.981 76.517 63.491 58.666 78.295 
10 15.959 18.667 18.64 12.093 3.025 5.191 4.412 1.005 1.644 5.942 7.094 1.982 76.153 63.488 58.66 78.288 
15 15.959 18.667 18.64 12.093 3.026 5.191 4.412 1.005 1.644 5.942 7.094 1.982 76.152 63.488 58.66 78.288 
FR 
1 9.244 8.574 10.808 15.214 16.864 36.39 33.737 20.171 0.713 0.006 0.03 0.52 73.178 55.03 55.425 64.095 
5 9.809 13.79 13.93 16.038 16.911 31.625 31.223 20.642 0.93 0.459 2.58 0.586 71.087 47.961 48.905 57.547 
10 9.808 13.79 13.93 16.035 16.899 31.624 31.221 20.637 0.95 0.459 2.582 0.589 70.998 47.96 48.901 57.536 
15 9.808 13.79 13.93. 16.035 16.898 31.624 31.221 20.637 0.95 0.459 2.582 0.589 70.998 47.96 48.901 57.536 
GE 
1 13.833 11.232 15.986 29.245 23.103 38.918 34.349 35.018 0.357 0.009 0.198 0.318 62.707 49.841 49.468 35.418 
5 13.433 18.364 19.16 28.101 21.69 33.101 30.312 33.246 0.5 0.684 0.919 0.393 60.864 43.189 41.782 35.878 
10 13.404 18.364 19.158 28.096 21.578 33.101 30.31 33.239 0.518 0.684 0.921 0.395 60.74 43.189 41.776 35.87 
15 13.404 18.364 19.158 28.096 21.576 33.101 30.31 33.239 0.518 0.684 0.921 0.395 60.74 43.189 41.776 35.87 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Table 4-19 Short-Term and Long-Term QE Shocks on Global Bond Yields 
Market Domestic US UK Japan QE1 QE2 QE3 QEL1 QEL2 QEL3 Lag 
1  2  
CH   -0.013  0.073*** -0.064***     0.016  1.366    1.325 0.877 -0.034*     0.018   -0.006 -0.218***  0.009*** 0.956*** 
BR -0.172***    -0.046 -0.125***     0.005  3.397** -14.316** -3.404 -0.094*** -0.268*** -0.179***   -0.026   0.007** 0.965*** 
IN -0.054***    -0.002     0.006 0.029*** -0.669  -0.869 -2.246   -0.007     0.001     0.003 0.076***     0.012 0.909*** 
RU -0.032*** -0.036* -0.074*** -0.074*** 15.372*** 18.365*** 27.65***  -0.029   0.042**   -0.003 -0.203***   0.006** 0.975*** 
AU     0.031*    0.055** 0.086*** 0.279***  -1.924   -1.206 4.119   -0.04**   -0.02   -0.11*** -0.171***  0.014***   0.92*** 
FR 0.116***  0.11*** 0.171***   -0.022  -0.832    3.857 -2.497 -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.214***     0.032  0.01*** 0.983*** 
GE 0.275***    0.115*** 0.189***   -0.013  -1.024     3  5.318 -0.108*** -0.115*** -0.354***     0.003 0.012*** 0.965*** 
US 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.108***   -0.006  -1.978**    -2.138 -10.657 -0.282*** -0.293*** -0.353*** -0.042*   0.008** 0.978*** 
UK 0.326***  0.15*** 0.326***     0.02  -1.06     5.308 2.447 -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.268*** -0.031   0.008** 0.978*** 
JP 0.444***   -0.011     0.037 0.444***   0.405 18.689** -27.021***     0.006     0.041    -0.06* -0.04*   0.008** 0.978*** 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Figure 4-15 Dynamic Conditional Correlation among Markets with Short-and Long-Term QE Shocks (DCC-GARCH) 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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Table 4-20 Short- and Long-Term QE Shocks on Global Bond Yield Volatility 
Market ARCH GARCH Leverage Domestic  US UK Japan QE1 QE2 QE3 QEL1 QEL2 QEL3 1  2  
CH 0.102*** 0.582*** 0.021 -0.007 -0.24*** -0.031 -0.022 -0.448 -8.464 -3.649 0.028** 0.034 -0.021 0.039*** 0.729*** 
BR 0.161*** 0.471*** 0.07* -0.035 0.081 -0.239*** 0.038 7.701*** -6.523 -18.591* 0.1*** 0.125*** -0.081*** 0.008** 0.985*** 
IN 0.121*** 0.577*** -0.016 -0.024*** -0.028* -0.012 -0.024*** 2.53*** -6.795*** 13.708*** 0.009 0.017 -0.027*** 0.039*** 0.62*** 
RU 0.152*** 0.568*** 0.034 0.202*** -1.554*** -0.034 -0.187*** 1.524 -75.336*** -117.74*** 0.264*** 0.202*** -0.298*** 0.027** 0.451 
AU 0.263*** 0.451*** -0.084** 0.001 -0.015 -0.036 -0.056*** 0.389 -7.558*** 0.844 -0.007 0.049*** -0.028*** 0.043*** 0.693*** 
FR 0.018*** 0.95*** 0.065*** -0.016 -0.024* -0.001 0.022*** 0.05 -0.526 3.664*** 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.014*** 0.981*** 
GE 0.185*** 0.699*** 0.295*** -0.072*** -0.142*** 0.198*** 0.026 -3.062*** -9.038*** 1.626 0.038*** -0.001 -0.02 0.006*** 0.993*** 
US 0.023*** 0.952*** 0.039*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 0.016 0.05*** -0.019 -2.073 3.838** -0.002 -8.79E-05 -0.005 0.061*** 0.636*** 
UK 0.306*** 0.649*** 0.058 0.16*** -0.251*** 0.16*** -0.019*** 2.563* -6.984* 0.939 -0.053** 0.021 0.005 0.061*** 0.636*** 
JP 0.116*** 0.567*** -0.077** -0.087 -0.154 -0.109 -0.087 -5.807 -74.804*** 115.586*** 0.108 0.072 -0.283*** 0.061*** 0.636*** 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
***, ** and * represent significant values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Figure 4-16 Dynamic Conditional Correlation among Markets with Short- and Long-Term QE Shocks (DCC-TGARCH) 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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4.4 Empirical Results and QE Spillover Effects on Global Bond Yields  
This section describes the regression results calculated using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC)-MGARCH model. The model enable researchers to investigate how the U.S. QE spillover effects 
influence both the bond yields and volatilities on long-term bond markets globally. In order to 
measure the spillover effects of different U.S. QE policies on global bond yields (see research 
objective 2), I incorporated the DCC-MGARCH (1, 1) models with both short-term and long-term U.S. 
QE policy shocks. Table 4.19 reports both the short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks that 
measure the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields. Figure 4.15 depicts the dynamic 
conditional correlation plots between the U.S. bond market and global bond markets, with both the 
short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks.  
4.4.1 Effects of Domestic and International Economic Factors on Bond Yields 
Before estimating the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond markets, I first provide a control for 
changes in both the domestic and international economic environment and their impact on global 
bond yields. Column 1 in Table 4.19 shows the impact of the changes in domestic economic 
environments on global bond yields, calculated using daily domestic stock returns from each market. 
A significant and positive coefficient for this column means that the bond yield will increase when 
domestic economic environments improve; in short, domestic economic prosperity increases bond 
yields. While, a significant and negative coefficient in column 1 means changes in domestic economic 
environments will have a negative impact on bond yields. More specifically, bond yields will increase 
when the domestic economy is in recession. As Table 4.19 shows, changes in domestic economic 
environments have a significant and positive impact on bond yields in developed markets; 
conversely, in most emerging markets (with the exception of China), changes in domestic economic 
environments have a significant, but negative, impact on bond yields. One possible explanation for 
positive coefficients in developed market is that bad economic environments push investors towards 
safer investments. Therefore, when the economy is depressed, as it was during the 2007 subprime 
loan crisis, market participants tend to invest in less risky securities such as government bonds. 
Moreover, central banks such as the Federal reserves launched large-asset purchasing programs 
during that period, causing the demand for government bond such as Treasury to rapidly increase. 
This rapid increase in the ten-year bond demand led to a dramatic increase in the bond price and a 
decrease in bond yields. However, sluggish economic environments can also reduce investors’ future 
expectations about inflation, which leads to a drop in bond yields. During the sample period (around 
the 2007 subprime loan crisis), most emerging markets had better economic growth than their 
developed counterparts; in short, emerging bond markets attracted investment interest from 
developed markets and bond prices increased while bond yields subsequently decreased.   
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Column 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4.19 report coefficients for changing conditions of leading economies (the 
U.S., the U.K. and Japan) on bond yields, respectively. As with changes in domestic economic 
environments, stock return data is used to represent the changes in the economic environments of 
the three leading economies (the U.S., the U.K. and Japan). I selected data from these countries 
because they are the leading economies in the word. Additionally, these three economies launched 
quantitative easing policies after the 2008 global financial crisis. This enlarges the potential spillover 
effects from these economies into global markets. According to Table 4.19 (Column 2), the changes 
in U.S. economic environments were positive significant impact upon most ten-year bond yields, 
especially in advanced markets. This indicates that economic prosperity in the U.S. can lead to an 
increase in most developed bond yields. Meanwhile, unlike the impact on developed bond markets, 
changes in the U.S. economic environment had negative effects on most emerging bond markets, 
with the exception of China. The impact was much smaller than the impact on advanced markets and 
most of the results were statistically insignificant. This fact suggests that for most emerging markets, 
bond yields tend to be less affected by changes in the U.S. economic environment.  
The impact from U.K. stock returns on global bond yields is similar with the U.S. Column 3 in Table 
4.19 shows a significant and positive impact on all advanced bond yields due to changes in the U.K. 
economic environments. Unlike the U.S., the changes in the U.K. economic environment significantly 
lowered long-term bond yields in most emerging markets (except for India). This suggests that when 
the U.K. economy is in recession, investors tend to invest in emerging bond markets. Similarly, 
changes in the Japanese economic environment has a significant and positive impact on global bond 
yields. However, compared to the impact from the U.S. and U.K. economies, changes in the Japanese 
economic environment had less notable impact on developed bond yields. This finding is consistent 
with the empirical results, discussed in section 4.2, which demonstrate that there is a lack of market 
integration between Japanese and other bond markets as compared with the U.S. and U.K.   
Meanwhile, the impact of domestic and international economic changes on bond yields are different. 
Most long-term bond yields were affected more by the changes in the domestic economic 
environments (including the U.S., the U.K. and Japan) than the spillover effects from the changes in 
economic environments in other markets. The changes in international economic environments 
played a less significant role on bond yield changes, than domestic economic changes. When 
comparing the impact triggered by the changes in the economic environments of the U.S., U.K. and 
Japan, it seems changes in the U.S. economy have less impact on global bond yields than the U.K. 
This is because the changes triggered by the U.S. QE policies shocks are examined individually in this 
study, rather than overall changes in the economy, which reduces the spillover effects caused by 
changes to the U.S. economy. In other words, the changes in the U.K. and Japanese economies also 
include part of the QE shocks from these two countries.     
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Apart from the impact of changes in economic environments domestically and externally, there is 
also the dynamic impact of bond yield changes. The dynamic coefficients in Table 4.19 (column 11) 
show that in most markets, the bond yield from last period has a significant impact on the current 
period. This suggests that for most long-term bond markets, the current bond yield changes are 
significantly affected by previous yield changes and there is a significant dynamic relationship in bond 
markets.   
4.4.2 The U.S. QE Spillover Effects on Global Bond Yields 
Besides changes to domestic and international economic environments and the dynamic effects of 
bond yields discussed in Section 4.4.1, the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields are also 
included. In order to assess the potential U.S. QE policy shocks, from both short- and long-term 
perspectives, in this study, I examined both the short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks defined in 
section 3.3. Specifically, Table 4.19 shows the spillover effects of both the short-term U.S. QE 
(column 5, 6 and 7) and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks (column 8, 9 and 10) on global bond yields.   
In terms of the short-term U.S. QE policy shock, as suggested by some previous studies, these had 
limited significant spillover effects on most bond markets (with the exception of Russia). As has been 
argued in to previous literature, during the U.S. QE periods, the short-term interest rate is limited to 
zero lower bound and cannot drop any further; therefore, the monetary policy of keeping lower 
future short-term interest rates ceases to be effective. Table 4.19 also shows that the short-term U.S. 
QE policy shocks significantly lowered the U.S. domestic government bond yields in the early phase 
of the U.S. QE period (the U.S. QE1 period). In contrast, for Russia bond yields, the short-term U.S. QE 
policy shocks significantly raised bond yields throughout all three U.S. QE periods. Moreover, though 
the short-term U.S. QE spillover effects on most developed bond markets were insignificant, they 
lowered bond yields in most developed markets during U.S. QE1 and QE3 periods. In terms of bond 
yields in emerging markets, there is no common response to the U.S. QE spillover effects.  
Unlike the short-term U.S. QE spillover effects, which only affected limited bond yields, the long-term 
U.S. QE policy shocks have pronounced spillover effects on most bond yields, especially in developed 
markets. According to Table 4.19 (column 8, 9 and 10), the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks 
significantly lowered bond yields in most developed markets throughout all three U.S. QE periods 
(with the exception of Japan ). In emerging markets, bond yields significantly dropped in respond to 
the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks, although this was limited to certain emerging markets like Brazil. 
This indicates that the U.S. QE policy shocks (through continuous long-term assets purchase 
programs), had persistent spillover effects such as lowering most long-term bond yields.  
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The persistent negative spillover effects on most developed bond yields during all three U.S. QE 
periods can also explain capital flows in global bond markets during the U.S. QE periods. Based on 
previous studies, the U.S. QE policies affected financial assets through the portfolio rebalancing 
channel. Through this channel, the purchase of long-term U.S. domestic assets, especially the long-
term U.S. government bonds, resulted in changes to the supply and demand of certain financial 
assets (which related to long-term U.S. securities) in global financial markets. In particular, since the 
Federal Reserves absorbed large scale, long-term U.S. Treasuries after the 2008 financial crisis, the 
supply of long-term U.S. Treasuries reduced. In order to rebalance their investment portfolios, 
market participants had to purchase assets which were close substitutes for long-term U.S. 
Treasuries. Therefore, the wide-spread spillover effects of the U.S. QE policy shocks on developed 
markets also meant that, market participants’ chose securities with similar maturities to the long-
term U.S. assets, in developed markets, as a substitute to rebalance their investment portfolios in 
global financial markets. The negative long-term U.S. QE spillover effects on developed markets can 
be explained in the following manner: the long-term U.S. Treasury purchase policies (the U.S. QE 
policies) which continuously reduced the amount of long-term U.S. securities on the market. This 
practice led to an increased demand for long-term securities in other developed markets, which in 
turn decreased most developed bond yields. Hence, a pronounced amount of capital flowed from the 
U.S. bond market flows into developed bond markets throughout all three U.S. QE periods. At the 
same time, only limited capital flowed into emerging bond markets, since there were less significant 
spillover effects from the U.S. QE policies on emerging bond yields.   
In terms of the magnitude of the long-term U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yields, the largest 
effects created by the U.S. QE policy shocks were on the U.S. Treasury yields in general. The 
magnitude of the long-term U.S. QE spillover effects on developed bond markets were generally 
larger than the ones on emerging bond markets (with the exception of Brazil). Moreover, when 
comparing different U.S. QE policies on developed bond yields, the spillover effects from the U.S. 
QE3 policies are generally more significant than the ones from previous U.S. QE policies. 
4.4.3 Dynamic Correlations (Modelling Spillover Effects on Bond Yields) 
The time-varying conditional correlation coefficients reported in Table 4.19 (column 12, 13) were 
significant for most of markets, with the exception of India. Meanwhile, the sum of these two 
dynamic conditional correlation coefficients for each market have a total value of less than one, 
which suggests all of the dynamic correlation series are stationary. Since in this study, the interaction 
from three leading bond markets (the U.S., the U.K. and Japan) are also included in the model, the 
dynamic correlation coefficients in Table 4.19 and 4.20 are the correlation coefficients not just 
between the U.S. and other bond markets, but also the correlations between each bond market and 
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the three leading bond markets. Hence, the coefficients for each bond market suggest that after the 
2008 global financial crisis, there was a significant dynamic and time-varying correlation between 
global bond markets and leading bond markets13. In other words, the policy shocks generated from 
these three leading markets spread to all of the sample markets. Moreover, the plots of the dynamic 
conditional correlation among global bond markets with both short- and long-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks are also displayed in Figure 4.1514. The dynamic correlation plots reveal the relationship 
between each bond market and the U.S. bond market.  
In Figure 4.15, the three vertical bars in each figure represent the initial announcement date of each 
U.S. QE policy. Generally, the correlations between the U.S. bond market and emerging markets are 
weaker (no more than 0.5) compared to developed markets; sometimes the emerging bond markets 
are negatively correlated with the U.S. bond markets (less than 0). This indicates that the emerging 
bond yields are weakly correlated with the U.S. bond market; therefore the U.S. QE policy shocks 
tended to have a lesser impact on emerging markets than developed markets. Moreover, most of the 
developed bond markets have a positive correlation with the U.S. bond market (except for Australia 
and Japan). This suggests that developed bond yields change in the same direction as the U.S. bond 
yields. The positive correlation between the U.S. bond market and other developed bond markets 
implies that as the U.S. bond yield drops, other developed bond yields drop as well. This 
phenomenon indicates that developed bond markets are affected more by the U.S. QE policy shocks 
compared to emerging bond markets. In terms of the magnitude of the correlation, the dynamic 
correlations between emerging bond markets and the U.S. bond market fluctuated within a narrow 
range during the U.S. QE periods. In terms of developed bond markets, the dynamic correlations with 
the U.S. tended had a wider range of change than emerging markets. Increasing volatile correlations 
with the U.S. market suggests that developed bond markets were more affected the U.S. QE policy 
shocks. When considering each individual U.S. QE policy in relation to various bond markets, 
correlations with the U.S. bond market tended to decline right after each initial U.S. QE 
announcement, and then the dynamic correlations gradually increased to around the same with the 
pre-announcement level for most bond markets. This can be attributed to the spillover effects of the 
initial U.S. QE policy shocks on global bond markets. The return to pre-announcement levels of time-
varying correlation movements with the U.S. bond market can be considered a result of a reduction 
of spillover effects of the initial U.S. QE policy shock.  
                                                          
13 In this case, the coefficients calculated for the U.S., the U.K. and Japan are the same, since the coefficients all 
report the dynamic correlations among these three bond markets. 
14 In the interest of brevity, only the dynamic conditional correlation between the U.S. market and other 
markets are reported in this study. 
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4.5 Empirical Results and QE Spillover Effects on Global Bond Volatilities  
This section presents the U.S. QE volatility spillover effect on global bond markets (see research 
objective 3). In order to measure the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond yield volatilities, I use 
the DCC-TGARCH model to examine the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects. The model also includes 
control variables such as changes to domestic economic environments and changes to the U.S., U.K. 
and Japan’s economic environments. Furthermore, the TGARCH model tests for asymmetric terms in 
the variance equation, which examines the potential leverage effects on global bond yield volatilities. 
As with the U.S. QE policy spillover effects on global bond yields, both the short- and long-term U.S. 
QE policy shocks are jointly included. Table 4.20 shows the results of both the short-and long-term 
U.S. QE policy spillover effects on the bond yield volatilities. More specifically, column 1 in Table 4.20 
reports the ARCH term, which measures the impact of short-term shock on bond volatility. Similarly, 
column 2 in Table 4.20 shows the coefficient of the GARCH term that measures the impact of 
persistent long-term shocks. Column 3 reports the asymmetric terms, calculated using the TGARCH 
model, to examine the potential leverage effects of bond volatilities. Column 4 represents the impact 
of changes in domestic economic environments on bond yield volatilities. Columns 5, 6, and 7 report 
the impact of changes in the U.S., U.K and Japanese economic environments on global bond yield 
volatilities. Columns 8, 9, and 10 in Table 4.20 report the volatility spillover effects from short-term 
U.S. QE policy shocks while columns 11, 12 and 13 report volatility spillover effects from long-term 
U.S. QE policy shocks. The last two columns in Table 4.20 report the time-varying conditional 
correlation coefficients between global bond market and the three leading bond markets. The 
dynamic conditional correlation plots between the U.S. and global bond markets incorporated with 
both short-and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks are depicted in Figure 4.16.    
4.5.1 ARCH, GARCH and Asymmetric Terms on Global Bond Yield Volatilities   
The ARCH and GARCH coefficients in Table 4.20 are significant at 1% levels, which indicate that all of 
the long-term bond volatilities are influenced by previous short-term shocks as well as long-term 
shocks. Moreover, the GARCH term coefficients are far higher than the ARCH term coefficients. This 
indicates that in long-term bond markets, the long-term volatility impact is more persistent than the 
short-term. These significant coefficients for both ARCH and GARCH terms provide evidence for the 
volatility clustering phenomena of the bond yield data.  
The coefficients of asymmetric terms vary between emerging and developed market (see Table 4.20). 
In most emerging bond markets, asymmetric terms are insignificant. This indicates that for emerging 
bond yield volatilities, there is no significant leverage effects. More specifically, the emerging bond 
yield volatilities show no difference in relation to either good or bad news. In short, bad news did not 
trigger more bond volatility than good news in most emerging bond markets. However, the 
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developed bond yield volatilities show significant leverage effects towards different policy news. 
Moreover, the pronounced leverage effects on developed bond yield volatilities are mostly positive. 
This positive leverage effect on developed bond yield volatilities means that negative residuals 
tended to increase the conditional volatility more than positive shocks. In other words, developed 
bond yields were more volatile when faced with bad news than good news.   
4.5.2 Effects of Domestic and International Economic Factors on Bond Yield 
Volatilities 
Changes to domestic economic environments greatly affect most emerging bond yield volatilities; 
however, the same is not true for developed bond yield volatilities (see Table 4.20). This indicates 
that for most emerging bond markets, bond yield volatilities are subject to changes in the domestic 
economic environment. However, for most developed bond markets, changes in domestic economic 
environments have no significant effects on bond yield volatility, with the exception of the U.S. The 
negative and significant impact of the U.S. domestic economic changes indicate that when the U.S. 
economy is in recession, the U.S. bond yield volatility tends to increase. This is particularly true in the 
case of the subprime loan crisis which erupted in 2007. The U.S. economy fell into a recession and 
the Federal Reserve launched the QE policies, which significantly pushed down long-term bond yields 
and increased market volatility.    
Most bond yield volatilities were significantly influenced by changes in the U.S. and Japanese 
economies, while in the U.K., a limited number of bond yield volatilities were significantly affected. In 
particular, changes in the U.S. economic environment had a negative impact upon global bond yield 
volatilities. This indicates that when the U.S. economy is in recession, bond yield volatilities will 
increase. This can be attributed to the U.S. QE policies, since the Federal Reserves launched large 
scale assets purchase policies, which reduced the supply of the U.S. long-term assets and thereafter, 
pushed private investors to purchase other securities or assets in other markets. This, in turn, which 
increased global market liquidity levels as well as volatility levels.      
4.5.3 Volatility Spillover Effects of the U.S. QE Policies on Global Bond Yields 
Bond yield volatilities across markets have different responses towards the U.S. QE policy shocks 
during different U.S. QE phases. Generally, most emerging bond volatilities were significantly 
affected by both the short- and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks. However, for developed bond yield 
volatilities, the volatility spillover effects from the U.S. QE policies, especially long-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks were less significant.  
In terms of the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks, they increased bond yield volatilities in most 
emerging markets in the early U.S. QE period (the U.S. QE1 period), though some changes were 
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insignificant (see Russia). During later U.S. QE phases, the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks 
continuously reduced bond yield volatilities in most emerging markets. The only exception was 
China; although the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks lowered the Chinese bond yield volatilities 
during all three U.S. QE periods, the spillover effects are insignificant. In terms of for bond yield 
volatilities, there were only a few developed markets influenced by the short-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks (see Table 4.20). The increase in emerging bond volatilities can be explained by the U.S. QE 
spillover effects through the liquidity channel. During this period, major economies suffered from 
severe economic recession. Most central banks injected massive liquidity to stimulate their 
economies; the rapid increase in liquidity generated market uncertainty. Investors tended to 
purchase assets with lower risk, such as government bonds. Increasing levels of market liquidity level 
and the need for safer assets jointly contributed to growing demand for government bonds. The 
increase in demand for government bonds bought more uncertainty and increased volatility levels in 
government bond markets. In other words, the U.S. QE policies increased the global systematic risks 
(Yang & Zhou, 2016).  
Since emerging markets are less developed than advanced markets, they are more vulnerable to 
systematic risk. Emerging bond yield volatilities were thus more volatile during the U.S. QE periods. 
During the later U.S. QE phases (the U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods), especially the U.S. QE3 period, bond 
yield volatilities in most emerging markets tended to decline. The decrease in emerging bond 
volatilities during the U.S. QE3 period may due to the announcement of exiting QE policies by the 
Federal Reserves (Ghosh and Saggar, 2016). This was an unpredicted shock for market participants, 
which suggested that the U.S. QE policies were no longer effective and there would be no more QE 
policies after the U.S. QE3 period. This signalled the reduction of market liquidity at a global level. 
Reduced liquidity levels in the market led to a decline bond yield volatilities. Less pronounced short-
term U.S. QE spillover effects on developed bond yield volatilities can be attributed to the 
adaptability of developed markets. Developed markets were less affected by to external shocks than 
emerging markets.  
The long-term U.S. QE policy shocks also had pronounced spillover effects on bond yield volatilities in 
most emerging markets (across all three U.S. QE periods). This was not the case for most developed 
markets. Like the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks, the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks also 
increased emerging bond yield volatilities in the U.S. QE1 phase and decreased them in the U.S. QE3 
period. The explanation for these volatility spillover effects induced by the long-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks are the same as the short-term ones.  
Overall, the results for both short- and long-term U.S. QE policy spillover effects on global bond yield 
volatilities suggest that bond yield volatilities in developed markets were less likely to be affected by 
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the U.S. QE policy shocks (either short- or long-term). In terms of bond yield volatilities in most 
emerging markets, the introduction of the U.S. QE policies significantly increased volatility levels in 
emerging bond markets. This increase in emerging bond volatility level can be explained by the 
nature of emerging markets, which are less developed, and increased liquidity levels resulting from 
the implementation of the U.S. QE1 policy. The significant reduction in emerging bond volatility 
during the U.S. QE3 policy phase can be attributed to the exit announcement, which represented the 
gradual reduction of asset purchases and signalled a decrease in global liquidity levels15. All these 
signals lead to a decrease in emerging bond volatility. However, when compared to developed bond 
volatilities, emerging bond volatilities were more vulnerable to the U.S. QE policy shocks since most 
emerging bond yield volatilities are significantly influenced by both short- and long-term U.S. QE 
policy shocks. This indicates that emerging markets are less able to protect themselves from external 
shocks.       
4.5.4 Dynamic Correlations (Modelling Spillover Effects on Bond Yield Volatilities) 
Similar to the dynamic conditional correlation coefficients estimated in section (4.3), most of the 
coefficients are positive and significant (see the last two columns in Table 4.20). Furthermore, the 
sum of the two coefficients for all markets are less than one, which indicates that there is a 
stationary and significant dynamic correlation between each bond market and the three leading 
bond markets. Moreover, since the sum of the two coefficients are less than one, this time-varying 
conditional correlations are mean reverting. Figure 4.16 shows the DCC coefficient plots of the U.S. 
market and global bond markets, with both the short-and long-term U.S. QE policy shocks included in 
the variance equations. The three vertical bars represent the announcements date of each of the U.S. 
QE policies. Unlike the DCC plots in Figure 4.15, which were generated using different U.S. QE policy 
shocks in the DCC-GARCH model, the DCC plots in Figure 4.16 were estimated with the U.S. QE policy 
shocks included in the variance equation of the DCC-TGARCH models. Most of the dynamic 
conditions correlations are persistent during this period (2007 to 2016), with no clear upward or 
downward trends. Only the dynamic conditional correlations between the U.S. market and the 
French and German bond market decline after the U.S. QE policy announcements. The dynamic 
correlation between the U.S. market and Brazilian bond market is another exception in which the 
correlation increases when faced with the U.S. QE policy announcements. Although there is no clear 
trend for the dynamic conditional correlations between the U.S. bond market and other bond 
markets , when the different U.S. QE policy are announced, most of the dynamic correlations were 
more volatile than before the U.S. QE announcements. Developed bond markets tended to have 
higher dynamic correlations with the U.S. bond markets than emerging markets. This is consistent 
                                                          
15 In this study, the announcement of tapering talk of the U.S. QE policy are included in the U.S. QE3 policy. 
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with the results of unconditional correlation reported in section (4.1.1) (see Tables 4.6 to 4.9). Similar 
to the dynamic conditional correlation discussed in section (4.3.3), the high correlation between the 
U.S. market and other developed bond markets suggests that these markets are affected more by 
policy shocks from the U.S. market. This means that developed bond markets are more integrated 
the U.S. bond market (this is demonstrated in the SVAR results in section 4.3). 
In terms of the emerging bond markets, most of the dynamic correlation with the U.S. bond market 
is lower than developed bond markets. On the one hand, this lower correlations with the U.S. market 
hand indicates that emerging bond markets are less affected by the U.S. QE policy shocks, which 
means the markets are more segmented. On the other hand, the low or even negative dynamic 
correlations with the U.S. bond market indicates that emerging bond yields are less likely to move 
along with U.S. bond yields, which provides potential diversification benefits for investors when 
compared with developed bond yields. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter reports the empirical results of the U.S. QE impact on the global bond markets. Based on 
the SVAR results, the global bond markets are increasingly integrated with the U.S. bond market 
during each U.S. QE phase. This increasing integration level among global bond markets indicates the 
strong spillover effects from the U.S. QE policy shocks. In terms of the U.S. QE spillover effects on the 
global bond yields, the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks significantly lower the bond yields in most 
developed markets across different U.S. QE periods. While for short-term U.S. QE policy shocks and 
the U.S. QE spillover effects on bond yields in emerging markets, there is little evidence of 
pronounced impact. When considering the U.S. QE spillover effects on bond yield volatilities, most 
emerging markets show pronounced effects while not for the developed markets. In specific, the 
long-term U.S. QE policy shocks tend to increase the volatility level in emerging markets at the early 
phase of U.S. QE policy. Later when the Fed exited their QE policies, bond yield volatilities in most 
emerging markets tend to decline in response. Next chapter will conclude the entire thesis. There are 
also some practical suggestions for both policy makers and market participants. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the research results in the previous chapter, this chapter concludes the thesis. This 
chapter first summarizes the main empirical findings against each of the research objectives and then 
presents the practical implications for policy makers as well as market participants. This chapter also 
includes the contributions and the limitations of this study. This chapter then ends with 
recommendations for future studies. 
5.2 Summary of the Empirical Findings 
5.2.1 Research Objective One 
The first objective of this research was to test integration levels among the global bond markets over 
the three U.S. QE periods. When faced with a shock (either external or internal), the market is forced 
to respond. In terms of this study, bond yields are affected by both internal and external (also known 
as domestic and international) shocks. Changes to bond yields can last for a short period or 
significantly longer. The quicker the speed of adjustment of bond yields or returns to pre-shock 
levels, the higher the market integration level. Higher integration levels between specific markets, 
means that those markets have higher levels of convergence and unexpected changes in one market 
can spillover in the others. This is less likely in those which have lower levels of integration.   
This study has shown that there were significant contemporaneous effects from U.S. bond markets 
on global bond yields during the U.S. QE1 period. In terms of the later U.S. QE periods (the U.S. QE2 
and QE3 period), the contemporaneous effect was less significant; however, when compared with 
effects caused by the British and Japanese markets on global bond yields, the U. S. effects were 
larger. The U.S. central position in global markets, means that any announcements (including the U.S. 
QE policy shocks) almost immediate affect bond yields.  
In this study, market integration levels were assessed using both the impulse response function and 
forecasted variance decomposition analysis generated within the SVAR framework. The impulse 
response results showed that overall, global bond yields had shorter adjustment periods following 
the U.S. bond shocks during all three U.S. QE periods than the responses during the entire sample 
period (2007 to 2016). This result means that global bond markets were more integrated with U.S. 
bond markets during the U.S. QE periods than other period (the entire sample period). Additionally, 
the speed of adjustment for bond yields in developed economies were much shorter than those from 
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emerging economies. Moreover, when considering the response to external shocks (the U.S., U.K. 
and Japan bond shocks), most bond yields spent less time digesting U.S. bond shocks than the British 
and Japanese shocks. These results indicate that, the majority of bond markets are more integrated 
with U.S. bond markets than with the British and Japanese markets    
In particular, this study found that developed bond markets are more integrated with the U.S. bond 
market compared with emerging bond markets. On the one hand, higher integration levels between 
global bond markets suggests that bond yields follow U.S. trends and are affected by policy changes. 
On the other hand, higher integration levels indicate that bond yields are correlated with U.S. bond 
yields. In other words, the U.S. spillover effects on bond yields (developed bond markets) are more 
significant than on those with lower levels of integration with the US bond market (emerging bond 
markets). All bond markets were found to be more integrated with the U.S. bond market during the 
U.S. QE periods than over the entire sample period (2007 to 2016). This indicates that the U.S. QE 
policies can increase market integration levels for global bond markets. More importantly, this 
increase in the global bond market integration level in turn enhanced the spillover effects of the U.S. 
QE policies on the global bond markets. 
This study also employed forecast error variance decomposition to assess market integration levels. 
Variance decomposition analysis was used to quantify the forecast error of each variable which can 
be explained by other variables. The higher the proportion, the higher the market integration levels 
are. Although most of the forecast errors are due mainly to domestic shocks, during the U.S. QE 
periods, external shocks (such as the U.S., U.K. and Japanese bond shocks), can explain more 
proportion of the forecast errors. This is particularly true when the results are compared with the 
entire sample period (2007 to 2016). Moreover, the proportion of forecast errors for developed bond 
yields that can be explained by the U.S. bond shocks, increases during the latter U.S. QE periods (the 
U.S. QE2 and QE3 periods). When compared with the effects triggered by the U.S., U.K. and Japanese 
bond shocks, the U.S. bond shocks affected more of the bond yield forecast errors. Like the impulse 
response results, the variance decomposition results suggest increasing levels of market integration 
between developed economies during the during the U.S. QE periods. The results also show that the 
U.S. bond markets are more integrated with global bond markets than the British and Japanese 
markets. As with the previous results, these findings indicate high levels of convergence between 
global bond markets and the U.S. one. Therefore it is no surprise that the U.S. QE policy shocks had a 
significant impact on global bond markets during the U.S. QE periods.  
5.2.2 Research Objective Two    
Research objective two examined the spillover effects of both short- and long-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks on global bond yields. The empirical results suggest that the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks 
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persistently lowered long-term bond yields, especially in developed bond markets across all three 
U.S. QE periods (QE1, QE2 and QE3 periods). In terms of emerging bond yields, long-term U.S. QE 
policy shocks had less noticeable effects. The persistent significant results of long-term U.S. QE policy 
shocks revealed that as long as the Feds kept purchasing long-term float securities, investors’ global 
portfolio rebalancing activities will continue. This continuous global portfolio rebalancing activities 
increased demand and lowered yields (or returns) of securities with similar maturities in other 
markets. Reductions to developed bond yields also indicates the main direction of global portfolio 
rebalancing movements; investors looking for substitutes to U.S. long-term securities tended to 
purchase assets with similar maturities available in other developed markets.  
Short-term U.S. QE spillover effects differ from the long-term ones. This study found that short-term 
U.S. QE policy shocks had limited significant spillover effects on most bond yields. This suggests that 
U.S. QE policies which signal future short-term interest rates did not significantly affect global bond 
yields during the U.S. QE periods. This is consistent with previous research (Wright, 2012; Glick & 
Leduc, 2015) which indicated that short-term U.S. monetary policy shocks would have little impact 
on financial variables since during periods of liquidity trap, the short-term interest rate cannot be 
lowered any further and would therefore have little or no impact upon market participants’ 
expectations.  
When compared with the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks (announcements about lower future 
policy rates), the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks, generated by persistent long-term asset 
purchasing activities, lowered global bond yields (especially developed bond yields) throughout all 
three U.S. QE phases. The continual lowering of developed long-term bond yields was a result of U.S. 
QE policy. As long as the Feds keep absorbing domestic long-term securities, market participants will 
keep their rebalancing their assets and global long-term bond yields, especially long-term bond yields 
in developed markets will drop in response to U.S. QE policy shocks.  
In terms of the short-term U.S. QE policy shocks, the spillover effects on global bond yields were less 
pronounced. This is due to the reality that short-term policy rates were already very low at the onset 
of the U.S. QE period. Based on the fact that the developed bond markets were more impacted than 
emerging ones, it is fair to conclude that global portfolio rebalancing activities mainly occurred within 
developed markets. More specifically, since the long-term U.S. QE policy shocks significantly reduced 
bond yields primarily in developed markets, investors tended to substitute securities in developed 
markets as a way to rebalance their asset portfolios. In terms of emerging bond yields, this study 
found limited evidence to support significant U.S. QE spillover effects. As noted earlier, emerging 
bond yields are more vulnerable to internal shocks or are more likely to be affected by domestic 
financial factors than external ones. 
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5.2.3 Research Objective Three 
In addition to examining the U.S. QE spillover effects on long-term bond yields globally, our study 
also reports the empirical results of the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on global bond markets 
(research objective three). In order to examine the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on global bond 
markets, this study applied the DCC-TGARCH model to capture both U.S. QE volatility spillover effects 
and leverage effects of the policy shocks. The empirical results demonstrate that both short- and 
long-term U.S. QE policy shocks significantly affected bond yield volatilities, especially in the 
emerging markets. In contrast, most developed bond yield volatilities (including U.S. bond yield 
volatilities), the U.S. QE policy shocks had a much more limited impact.   
The U.S. QE policy shocks vary within each period. Volatility spillover effects from the short-term U.S. 
QE policy shocks, significantly increased volatility levels in emerging bond markets during the U.S. 
QE1 phases, but lowered them in later U.S. QE periods (the U.S. QE 2 and QE3 periods). This finding 
was hardly surprising given that the U.S. QE policies introduced large-scale assets purchase programs 
which, in turn, increased liquidity levels in the markets. Increasing liquidity levels increased market 
uncertainty or market volatility levels. Unlike developed markets, emerging markets are less 
developed (both in terms of fundamentals and market liquidity levels) and therefore are more 
vulnerable to external shocks (Chen et al., 2014). Bond volatility levels in most emerging markets 
significantly increased in response to the U.S. QE1 policy shocks. Later U.S. QE policies, especially the 
U.S. QE3 policy, which included the “taper talking” period, signalled the Feds intention to exit QE 
policies and lower market liquidity levels. Bond volatility levels in emerging markets reduced during 
the U.S. QE3 period. In contrast to some previous studies (Steeley & Matyushkin, 2015; Tan & Kohli 
2011), which found significant reductions in equity volatilities as a result of QE policies (both the U.S. 
and U.K. QE policies), our study found negative but insignificant bond yield volatility changes in most 
developed markets.  
Long-term U.S. QE volatility spillover effects are similar to short-term U.S. QE policy shocks. The long-
term U.S. QE policy shocks significantly increased emerging bond yield volatilities during the U.S. QE1 
period and lowered emerging bond yield volatilities during the U.S. QE3 period. The explanation are 
the same as the volatility spillover effects from the short-term U.S. QE policies. The introduction of 
U.S. QE policies led to uncertainty and hence increasing bond yield volatilities in emerging markets, 
especially during the U.S. QE1 period. 
The end of this unconventional monetary policy (during the U.S. QE3 period) signalled a reduction in 
global liquidity levels and accounted for the decreasing uncertainty levels in emerging markets. 
Lower emerging bond volatilities can also be explained by the fact that the U.S QE3 policy shocks 
were “positive shock”. Policy shocks which increase volatility are seen as “negative shocks,” while 
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those which decrease volatility are “positive shock” (Asai & McAleer, 2011). In short, the U.S. QE3 
shocks which led to declining bond yield volatility in emerging bond were largely positive.  
In terms of developed bond yield volatilities, most were less affected by U.S. QE policy shocks. As 
with some previous studies (Chen et al., 2014; Neely, 2015; Park & Um, 2016) we believe that 
different volatility responses between developed and emerging markets to the U.S. QE policy shocks 
can be explained by the characteristics of the recipient markets, or financial and economic 
fundamentals (such as the soundness of banking systems, real GDP growth and exchange rate 
regimes). Since most emerging markets have weaker banking systems and less developed economic 
fundamentals compared to the developed markets, they are typically more sensitive to external 
shocks. Hence, the U.S. QE policy shocks had pronounced volatility spillover effects (both positive 
and negative) on emerging markets. 
Another explanation for the more significant volatility spillover effects in most emerging markets is 
related to increasing global liquidity levels. As suggested by some studies (Eichengreen & Gupta., 
2014; Chen et al., 2014), the liquidity created by the U.S. QE policies increased global liquidity levels 
and the resulting market uncertainty; thereafter, emerging markets appeared to be more volatile 
than developed markets. Our results on the dynamic correlations between the U.S. and global bond 
markets also support this idea. During the U.S. QE periods, there is no evidence of significant growth 
in the dynamic correlations between the U.S. bond market and the emerging markets; the 
correlations are still much lower than the ones between the U.S. market and other developed 
markets. Therefore, the U.S. QE volatility spillover effects on emerging markets cannot pass through 
increasing market interactions between the U.S. and emerging markets. Hence, the pronounced 
volatility spillover effects of the U.S. QE policy shocks may be attribute to growing uncertainty levels 
in global markets.  
5.3 Practical Implications for Policy Makers and Market Participants 
Based on the empirical results of the three research objectives (discussed in section 5.1), there are 
several implications for both the policy makers and the market participants. The implications for 
policy makers are discussed in section 5.2.1 and the implications for market participants are 
presented in section 5.2.2. 
5.3.1 Implications for Policy Makers 
Since global bond markets (both developed and emerging markets) are more integrated with the U.S. 
bond market, U.S. spillover effects to other markets were more pronounced than during non-QE 
periods. Therefore, policy makers in host markets (markets which were subject to the U.S. QE 
spillover effects) should strengthen prudential regulations to mitigate future risks. Moreover, also 
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due to the pronounced effects on other markets (either from bond yield or bond volatility 
perspectives), it is essential to consider external macroeconomic and policy shocks when designing 
domestic economic policies. More specifically, it is necessary to construct financial stabilization 
mechanisms to protect from potential negative spillover effects from other markets. Equally, the 
enhancement of the cross-border policy coordination would also help lower the global systematic 
risks induced by asymmetric information. 
The pronounced U.S. QE spillover effects on emerging bond volatilities (but not bond yields), 
indicates that bond yield volatilities in emerging markets are more vulnerable to external shocks than 
those in developed markets. The dynamic correlations between the U.S. bond market and most 
emerging markets are much lower than the correlations between the U.S. market and other 
developed markets. These results indicate that the significant volatility spillover effects of the U.S. QE 
policies on emerging markets may not be transferred through market interactions (since the 
correlations are very low) but from growing global market liquidity levels. The results also imply that 
for markets with better economic and financial fundamentals (such as the developed markets), the 
U.S. QE volatility spillover effects tend to be minimized. In terms of emerging markets, it is necessary 
to improve both their economic and financial fundamentals and develop their liquidity markets to 
dampen market volatility triggered by external policy shocks. These would be more effective than 
distortion-creating implements such as capital controls and foreign exchange interventions. 
5.3.2 Suggestions for Market Participants 
In addition to policy implications, there are some suggestions for market participants as well. The 
U.S. QE spillover effects on both bond yield changes and bond yield volatilities can significantly affect 
investors’ portfolio decisions and increase uncertainty in global government bond markets, even for 
markets which are less affected by the 2008 financial crisis. Australia is one such example, it had a 
relatively strong economy and good market performance even after the 2008 crisis (Allen et al., 
2017). Nevertheless, based on our empirical results, Australian long-term government bond markets 
were still significantly reduced by the U.S. QE policy shocks. The pronounced U.S. QE spillover effects 
on global bond markets acts as a reminder for investors to pay special attention, even if they are 
investing outside the U.S. Brazil is another example. According to the results in this study, the 
dynamic correlations between the U.S. bond market and the Brazil bond markets are much lower 
than with other developed markets. This means that the interaction between the Brazilian bond 
market and U.S. bond market are fairly limited, when compared with developed markets. However, 
the U.S. QE policy shocks have had pronounced spillover effects on Brazilian bond yield volatilities. 
This suggests that it is necessary for investors in emerging markets to track policy implementations in 
leading economies, especially the U.S. 
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Although government bonds have traditionally been considered as safe investments16, the U.S. QE 
spillover effects have increased the stakes for investors. Based on our empirical results, the U.S. QE 
volatility spillover effects on emerging bond markets increased bond yield volatilities, which 
increased the risks for bond investors. Hence, it is better for investors to diversify their investment 
portfolios and buy other assets, such as gold or real estate. Moreover, there is an upward trend in 
global bond market integration levels (with the U.S. bond market) during the U.S. QE periods. This 
trend indicates increasing co-movements in global bond markets, which results in decreasing 
diversification benefits for bond investors. This also supports the decision to invest outside bond 
markets.  
5.4 Contributions of this Study 
This study contributes to the extant literature in several aspects. First, most of the previous studies 
have focused on the U.S. QE impacts on cross financial variables (such as international stock returns 
and exchange rates) within the same markets. There is limited research on cross-bond markets, 
especially long-term government bond markets. This study has examined the U.S. QE spillover effects 
on both bond yields and bond volatilities, both from developed and emerging markets. Since long-
term government bonds are not only the main source of government spending, but also one of the 
most actively traded markets across the world, the results of this study provides essential advice for 
policy makers and investors who are interested in bond markets. 
The majority of studies on the U.S. QE policies have focused primarily on the U.S. QE1 and QE2 
periods, with only a few on the entire U.S. QE period. This study has covered a ten year period (2007 
to 2016), and not only covers the time period before the 2008 financial crisis, but also includes all 
three different U.S. QE periods. The empirical results suggest that within each individual U.S. QE 
period (including the U.S. QE3 period), the U.S. QE spillover effects on global bond markets are 
different. 
Unlike most existing literature which either applies the event study method with intraday data right 
after the U.S. QE announcements or defines it using VAR models, this study has calculated both 
short-and-long-term U.S. policy shocks independently to ensure that the impact of the U.S QE 
policies is measured correctly.  
This method is free of data length (compared to the event study method) and can explicitly measure 
unexpected changes of U.S. QE policies (compared to the shocks calculated in VAR models). The 
                                                          
16 Short-term government bonds are considered ‘safe investments.’ Long-term government bonds carry an 
inflation risk but are still seen as safe investments when compared to company bonds issued in developed 
markets. Hence, the U.S. QE policy shocks bring additional external risks for government bonds in most 
emerging markets. 
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application of the DCC-MGARCH model and control variables in this study also allows for potential 
interactions across markets, especially potential interactions from the leading markets (the U.S., U.K. 
and Japan) to be considered. This provides less biased results of the U.S. QE spillover effects than the 
univariate models.  
Another advantage of this study is the application of daily data. It addresses the transient responses 
to the U.S. QE policy shocks. This transient responses may be obscured when using weekly or 
monthly data. In terms of different bond markets, the trading hours vary from each other. While 
compared with intraday data, daily data can better capture simultaneous responses from 
international bond markets. Hence, I chose daily data which captures the transient U.S. QE policy 
shocks and also reduces difference in trading hours across markets. 
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study has several limitations. Firstly, I did not separate the “tapering talk” period from the U.S. 
QE3 period. In this study, the U.S. QE3 period includes the “tapering talk” period, as the 
announcement of exiting future U.S. QE policies was made within the U.S. QE3 period. Although the 
“tapering talk” provides important signals to the markets as suggested in some previous studies 
(Eichengreen & Gupta 2015; Ghosh & Saggar 2016), the Feds was still purchasing long-term U.S. 
Treasuries, albeit at a slower rate. Hence, I chose not to split the data into two periods.  
Another limitation was due to data availability. Although both developed and emerging bond 
markets were included in our study, there was no sample for frontier markets. The emerging markets 
examined in this study were BRIC markets. In short, our results may not be generalized to other 
developing markets.  
The study also only used ten-year government bond yield data. I have not included any discussion on 
government bond yield data with other maturities and I did not include private bonds. Hence, the 
results are limited to ten-year government bond markets and may not be applied to government 
bonds with different maturities or to private bonds. 
5.6 Suggestions for Future Studies 
This study provides some insights for future studies. First, as discussed in section 5.4, future study 
could divide the U.S. QE3 period into two; the “tapering talk” period and the remainder of the U.S. 
QE3 period. It may provide more explicit results relating to the U.S. unconventional monetary policy 
spillover effects on global markets. Also, the method of defining U.S. QE policy shocks could be 
applied to measure the unconventional monetary policy shocks in other leading economies such as 
the U.K. and Japan. It may help to better capture the spillover effects of the British and Japanese 
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unconventional monetary policy shocks on other markets. Further study could also extend the scope 
of this study to address the U.S. QE spillover effects on other markets. For example, the method 
could be applied to other developing markets which are also less likely to be correlated with the U.S. 
bond market (such as the frontier markets), since the results of this study suggest that the U.S. QE 
policy shocks can affect markets which have limited levels of correlation and integration with the U.S. 
market. 
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